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für
max , lola und oscar
“Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good and alike in virtue,
for these wish alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves.
Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends;
for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally.
Therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good,
and virtue is an enduring thing.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 1159 b, 2-12
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A B S T R A C T
Between 2000 and 2012, 2.3m sq. kilometers of tree cover, equivalent to 6.4
times the size of Germany, were lost globally due to land cover change. Forest
loss often comes with significant social and environmental costs. Deforestation
contributes 12% - 30% of global greenhouse gas emissions, reduces biodiversity
and threatens traditional livelihoods.
Forest conservation policies have shown mixed results worldwide. The suc-
cess of instruments depends on both their policy design and the context to
which they are applied. Even well designed policies can fail to avoid defor-
estation, when the bio-physical, socio-economic, and the political context are
overlooked. This thesis investigates the role of the political context as a poten-
tial inhibitor or facilitator of forest conservation in Brazil.
Brazil is an ideal case to study the political economy of forest conservation.
During the 2000s the country introduced a substantial forest conservation re-
form and deforestation rates subsequently fell by 80%. The realized policy-mix
included different disincentive and incentive components. Effective measures
include the expansion of protected areas, the increase in field-based environ-
mental law enforcement, fines and credit restrictions to environmental offend-
ers.
To understand the role of the political sector, this thesis analyzes three Brazil-
ian forest conservation policies that address the political context and the en-
vironmental governance at the local level: An anti-corruption policy targeting
districts’ administrational responsibilities, though leaving environmental per-
formance uncontrolled; a naming and shaming policy targeting districts with
high deforestation rates; and an incentive-based payments for environmental
services program combined with forest friendly investments to residents in
protected areas.
Impacts and the mechanism through which these policies effect environ-
mental outcomes are analyzed with a combination of spatial data processing
techniques and quasi-experimental methods. High resolution satellite data is
used to construct yearly outcomes on forest losses, degradation, and fires. Spa-
tial matching and panel data estimations allow to control for selection biases
and potential leakage effects.
The analysis of the anti-corruption policy reveals a robust relation between
corruption and deforestation, though no effect from publishing the corruption
findings. A very high reduction in deforestation rates is caused by the nam-
ing and shaming policy. This effect can be explained by an reputational risk
effect that caused stakeholders to form conservation alliances. The payment
for environmental services program had no sizable effects on forest cover.
The missing effects can best be explained with the imperfect policy designs
at hand. Whereas the high conservation impact of the naming and shaming
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policy stands as an example of how to shape political contexts towards better
environmental governance.
Given a reasonably well functioning institutions and enforcement system
as in Brazil during the study period, complementary contextualized policies
can remove potential inhibitors to conservation and motivate actors to create
new conservation incentives. In addition, immediate effects are best achieved
when targeting regions with high deforestation pressures, if evasive behavior
of targeted actors is monitored at the same time.
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Im Zeitraum von 2000 bis 2012 wurde der weltweite Waldbestand um 2,3m
Quadratkilometer aufgrund von Landnutzungsänderungen dezimiert, dies ent-
spricht 6,4 Mal der Größe Deutschlands. Waldverlust geht oft mit signifikanten
und Umweltkosten und sozialen Kosten einher. Abholzung trägt zu den glob-
alen Treibhausgasemissionen mit 12% - 30% bei, reduziert Biodiversität und
bedroht traditionelle Existenzgrundlagen.
Waldschutzpolitiken haben weltweit sehr unterschiedliche Wirkungen ge-
zeigt. Ihr Erfolg hängt sowohl von ihrer Politikgestaltung, als auch von dem
Kontext, in welchem sie eingesetzt werden, ab. Selbst gut gestaltete Politiken
können das Ziel Abholzung zu verhindern verfehlen, wenn der bio-physische,
sozio-ökonomische und politische Kontext nicht beachtet wird. Diese Disser-
tation untersucht die Rolle des politischen Kontextes als potenzieller Hemmer
oder Verstärker von Waldschutz in Brasilien.
Brasilien ist eine ideale Fallstudie, um die politische Ökonomie des Wald-
schutzes zu untersuchen. In den 2000er Jahren führte Brasilien eine maßge-
bliche Waldschutzreform durch, woraufhin die Abholzungsraten um 80% san-
ken. Das neue Politikportfolio beinhaltet verschiedene Komponenten aus neg-
ativen und positiven Anreizen. Effektive Maßnahmen umfassen eine die Ex-
pansion der Naturschutzgebiete, Verstärkung der umweltrechtlichen Strafver-
folgung, Geldstrafen und Kreditrestriktionen für Umweltsünder.
Um die Rolle des politischen Sektors zu verstehen, untersucht diese Disserta-
tion drei brasilianische Waldschutzpolitiken, die den politischen Kontext und
die Umwelt auf lokaler Ebene adressieren: Eine Anti-Korruptionspolitik, die
die administrative Verantwortung der Distrikte anvisiert, jedoch Umweltper-
formance unkontrolliert lässt; eine Politik des Anprangerns, die auf Distrikte
mit hohen Abholzungsraten abzielt; und ein Anreizprogramm mit Zahlungen
für Umweltdienstleistungen in Kombination mit umweltfreundlichen Investi-
tionen für Bewohner von Waldschutzgebieten.
Die Auswirkungen und Mechanismen, durch die diese Politiken Umwel-
tergebnisse beeinflussen, werden anhand einer Kombination von räumlichen
Datenverarbeitungstechniken und quasi-experimentellen Methoden analysiert.
Hochauflösende Satellitendaten werden genutzt, um jährliche Daten für Wald-
verlust, -degradation, und -feuer zu konstruieren. Mit Hilfe von räumlichen,
statistischen Zuordnungsverfahren (matching) und Paneldaten- Schätzungen
werden Stichprobenverzerrung (selection biases) und potenzielle Ausweichef-
fekte (leakage effects) kontrolliert.
Die Analyse der Anti-Korruptionspolitik zeigt eine robuste Beziehung zwis-
chen Korruption und Abholzung, jedoch keinen Effekt durch die Veröffent-
lichung der Korruptionsergebnisse. Eine sehr hohe Reduzierung der Abholz-
ungsrate wird durch die Politik des Anprangerns erzielt. Diese kann, unter an-
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derem, anhand eines Reputationsverlustes erklärt werden, der dazu führt, dass
Interessengruppen Waldschutzallianzen gründen. Das Programm von Zahlun-
gen für Umweltdienstleistungen hat kaum Auswirkungen auf den Waldschutz.
Die fehlenden Effekte können am besten auf das zugrundeliegende, unvol-
lkommene Politikdesign zurückgeführt werden. Wohingegen der hohe Schutz-
effekt der Politik des Anprangerns als Beispiel dient für die Entwicklung einer
besseren Umweltsteuerung durch den zugrundeliegenden politischen Kon-
text.
Bei hinreichend funktionierenden Institutionen und Strafverfolgung, wie es
in Brasilien im untersuchtem Zeitraum der Fall war, können ergänzende, kon-
textualisierte Politiken potenzielle Hemmnisse im Waldschutz beseitigen und
Akteure motivieren neue Schutzanreize zu kreieren. Des Weiteren werden un-
mittelbare Effekte größtmöglich erzielt, wenn auf Regionen mit hohem Ab-
holzungsdruck fokussiert wird und gleichzeitig ausweichendes Verhalten kon-
trolliert wird.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N A N D M O T I VAT I O N
Between 2000 and 2012, 2.3m sq. kilometers of tree cover, equivalent to 6.4
times the size of Germany, were lost globally due to land cover change (Hansen
et al., 2013). Forest loss often comes with significant social and environmental
costs. Worldwide forests provide livelihood to a least 250m people and the
remaining 25m sq. km of tropical forests host more than half of worldwide
species (Byron and Arnold, 1999; Hecht and Cockburn, 2010; Saatchi et al.,
2011). Moreover, deforestation contributes 12% - 30% to global greenhouse gas
emissions (IPCC, 2007, 2013; van der Werf et al., 2009). These and other neg-
ative externalities of the economic activities associated with deforestation are
seldom fully taken into account by land users and political decision-makers.
The largest continuous tropical forest (2.89m sq. km or two-thirds the size of
the European Union) is located in Brazil.1 The country has undergone a major
paradigm shift in the early 2000s, launching an effective coordination of for-
est conservation policy instruments (Maia, Hargrave, Gómez, and Röper, 2011;
MMA, 2013; Miccolis et al., 2014). Consequently, deforestation dropped by 80%
from 27,000 sq. km to 5,000 sq. km per year. The country’s conservation pol-
icy mix is highly diverse and its effectiveness varies depending on both policy
design and local economic and political contexts. Empirically disentangling
the effects of multiple policy measures implemented in locally heterogeneous
settings, requires a sub-national perspective and the integration of spatial anal-
ysis tools with econometrics (Anselin, 2001).
This thesis investigates the effectiveness of conservation policies in the Brazil-
ian Legal Amazon and the mechanisms through which these policies may
affect environmental governance outcomes. The introductory chapter briefly
discusses the costs and benefits of deforestation and international mitigation
policies and efforts. Subsequently, the underlying conceptual framework as
well as the main research questions of this thesis are discussed. It follows a
comprehensive description of the study area, the Brazilian Legal Amazon, and
an assessment of Brazil’s economic history, institutional setting and policies
geared towards reducing deforestation.
1 Based on own calculation using the remaining forest cover in 2012 and the area of the 28
European Union member states (including Great Britain)
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1.1 background
The 5th assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) confirmed the anthropogenic influence on global warming, with a
0.85 °C increase in average temperature since the pre-industrial levels and
a projected increment of 1.8 °C to 4.0 °C until the end of our century (IPCC,
2007). Whereas fossil fuel combustion is the major source of greenhouse gas
emissions, deforestation holds the second largest share with 20% to 30% (IPCC,
2013; van der Werf et al., 2009). A decline in fresh water availability, accelerated
species extinction, extreme weather events, and reduced crop yields already
started to negatively affect the poor and most vulnerable (IPCC, 2014). Deal-
ing with the impacts of climate change on food security, health, and political
stability is considered a major societal challenge in the coming decades (UN,
2015).
From an economic perspective, the benefits from mitigating climate change
outweigh the cost of action by a multitude: Stern (2006) calculates a global re-
duction in annual economic growth by 5%, whereas the cutting of greenhouse
gas emissions to reduce climate impacts would only cost 1% of global GDP.
The TEEB (2010) report estimates a total avoided damage of 3.7 Trillion US
dollars of lost ecosystem services when deforestation rates are reduced by half
until 2030.2
Furthermore, deforestation involves an array of uncertain or unknown costs.
For example, because of changed evaporation patterns in deforested land-
scapes, regional climate could experience significant shifts in drought and
rainfall intensity and timing (Malhi et al., 2008). In addition, forest conver-
sion endangers millions of (unknown) species. Of all known plant and animal
species, 50% are found in tropical forests, but an estimated 90% of species still
remain unknown (Myers, 1988; Wilson, 2003). Forests thus represent an im-
portant future source for the development of new agricultural products, phar-
maceuticals, biomedical treatments and bio-technology applications based on
the discovery of new species and biological compounds (Balandrin, Klocke,
Wurtele, and Bollinger, 1985; Cragg, Newman, and Snader, 1997; Mares, 1986;
Wilson, 2003). The continuous expansion of forest frontiers also threatens the
livelihoods of native populations. Displacement and cultural confrontation en-
tails the destruction of societies from which humanity can learn different value
systems, psychologies, ways of communication and forms of conflict resolu-
tions (Everett, 2009, pp.275-279).
International commitments to environmental protection are increasingly trans-
formed into policy incentives at international and national levels. In December
2015, at the Paris conference of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCC), 195 countries ratified to a binding agreement
to take efforts to limit global warming to below 1.5 °C (Bodansky, 2016).3
2 Damage value calculated as net present value.
3 A complete fulfillment of the “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDC) at the
Conference of the Parties in Paris (COP21) is estimated to avoid temperature increases above
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Moreover, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 recog-
nize the link between economic growth, poverty alleviation and environmental
conservation. Monitoring forest cover and the share of sustainably managed
forests via satellite data are two concrete, easily measurable, and compara-
ble indicators agreed upon in the SDG framework (Leadership Council of the
Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2015). Forests also stand to ben-
efit from new global science-policy platforms, such as the Intergovernmen-
tal Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES).
IPBES will assess the worldwide state of biodiversity and its influences on hu-
man well-being by integrating multi-disciplinary knowledge systems across all
tiers (including indigenous knowledge). Its conceptual framework emphasizes
the role of spatially distributed knowledge on biodiversity and the importance
of understanding the causality of interventions to promote science-based pol-
icy advice (Díaz et al., 2015). The role of conserving forests for climate change
mitigation was institutionalized at the international level in 2008 with the UN
Collaborative Program on Reduced Emissions for Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (UN-REDD). International funding today amounts to 272m US
dollars, supporting national programs and projects in 64 countries (UN-REDD,
2016a,b).
Policymakers and advisers are increasingly reacting to the scientific pledge
to evidence based policy making (Sanderson, 2002; Savedoff, Levine, and Bird-
sall, 2006).4 Evidence based policy making has a long tradition in medical
research where experimental trials are intensively used since the 1970ies (cf.
Cochrane, 1972). Experimental evidence and science based policy making is
prominently promoted by organizations such as the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty
Action Lab (J-PAL), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) the Interna-
tional Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) or the Center for Global Devel-
opment (CGD). In consequence, governments are founding own evaluation
units committed to causal analysis.5 and to make public data accessible.6 The
2.6 - 3.1 °C only (Rogelj, den Elzen, Höhne, Fransen, Fekete, Winkler, Schaeffer, Sha, Riahi, and
Meinshausen, 2016). Nonetheless, according to The Washington Post (2016), because of Donald
Trump’s recent (November 2016) election as President of the United States, these reductions
could fall through. Under the Obama administration the US committed to a 26-28% cut of
CO2 emissions by 2025, which accords to 20% of globally intended reductions.
4 The European commission committed since 2003 to an impact assessment of all its policies
(Lee and Kirkpatrick, 2006). In the United States a Commission on evidence based policy mak-
ing initiated in 2016 with the goal to advise the the government and increase data accessibil-
ity to the public for evaluations (https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/management/commission_
evidence). Germany
5 To only mention a few: The German Ministry of Cooperation an Development created the
German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) in 2012. In the Netherlands, the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs runs the Operations Evaluation Department (IOB). The KfW Group
(Reconstruction Credit Institute) founded an independent evaluation department in 2000. The
World Bank leadership is advised by its Independent Evaluation Group (IEG).
6 Brazil has a long tradition in open data policy and since its launch of the National In-
frastructure of Open Data (INDA) in 2011, it publishes most data online (see http://www.
portaldatransparencia.gov.br/) (Neves, 2013). In comparison, Germany does not have an
open data policy and public data are largely unavailable to the public (Boockmann, Buch,
and Schnitzer, 2014). Data from governmental offices often remain closed, though remotely
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scope of randomized control trials to determine causal relations in environ-
mental research is limited (Baylis et al., 2016). Only after recent advances in
empirical evaluation methods (e.g., spatial matching) environmental scientists
started to command more rigorous evaluations (cf. Baylis et al., 2016; Ferraro,
2009; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014a; Miteva et al., 2012; Pullin and Knight, 2001).
The thesis uses and advances up to date empirical evaluation techniques com-
bining spatial panel data with quasi-experimental methods. Advantages and
limitations are thereby discussed for each evaluation.7
1.2 framework
To prevent the loss of environmental services, endangered environments have
to be governed by society. Approaches to environmental governance have
evolved over time including a paradigm change that led to the recognition
of the role of local actors in shaping governance outcomes. More recently also
intermediate value chain actors, such as retailers, and consumers are increas-
ingly held responsible for negative external effects of agricultural production.
Lemos and Agrawal (2006) describe environmental governance as “the set of
regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors in-
fluence environmental actions and outcomes.” I.e., environmental governance com-
prises all public policies that aim to improve the environmental behavior of
any actor, be it farmers, businesses, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
or political administrations. Public policies therefore comprise traditional pol-
icy instruments like taxes, subsidies, and regulations, but also the promotion
of public-private partnerships between state agencies and market actors (e.g.,
logging concessions with state monitoring) and private-social partnerships be-
tween market actors and communities (e.g., ecotourism) (Lemos and Agrawal,
2006).
The new forms of intervention focus on actors within a given context. Thereby
they follow scientific evidence showing that the effectiveness of environmen-
tal policies depends on the bio-physical, socio-economic and political context
(Lambin et al., 2014).8 The mix of different policy instruments can increase
sensed data from satellite images created under governmental research institutes is rapidly
increasing and available to the public, boosting research (Wulder et al., 2012). New machine
learning techniques combined with satellite and spatial data are now commencing to fill the
gap of missing official information (cf. Blumenstock, Cadamuro, and On, 2015; Jean et al., 2016;
Miteva, Pattanayak, and Ferraro, 2012).
7 Chapter 2 uses a natural experiment over time with yearly data at the district level, generated
by official statistics and remotely sensed data. Chapter 3 advances the mechanism analysis pre-
sented by Ferraro and Hanauer (2014b); Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009); Imai, Keele, Tingley,
and Yamamoto (2011) for cross-section data, and applies the empirical model to a matched sub-
set of spatial panel data. Chapter 3 applies matching with spatial data. A map with several
layers of spatial information are combined and sliced by a 5 to 5 km grid. Irregular vector
units are thereby left within the dataset to avoid data losses at the margin of administrational
boundaries.
8 Ferraro, Hanauer, and Sims (2011) detect differential impacts of protected areas on deforesta-
tion and poverty outcomes dependent on baseline poverty levels, slope and distance to major
cities.
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intervention effectiveness when the created incentives are complementary and
state monitoring and enforcement institutions are in place (Lambin et al., 2014;
Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson, 2006). Although the scientific literature has recog-
nized the influence of context on policy effectiveness, little attention is devoted
to policies designed to incorporate context conditions and shift the context it-
self.9
Given context heterogeneity with a variety in characteristics and actors, pol-
icy interventions can have widely different outcomes. Focusing on tropical
forest conservation in Brazil, the success of policies depends on character-
istics of soil quality for agriculture, demography and labor scarcity, educa-
tion, agricultural technologies, infrastructure development, etc. and on actors
forming social, economic and political elites. Many of these potential determi-
nants of policy outcomes are also underlying or proximate drivers of deforesta-
tion. Knowledge about their relative role in shaping policy impacts can help
decision-makers to design better policy mixes, adaptive to context. Contextual-
ization is therefore an additional policy design element alongside siting (spa-
tial targeting), targeting, monitoring and enforcement (cf. Howlett, 2005, pp.
40). Following that line of though we can categorize public policies in terms of
their “degree of contextualization”, i.e., the role context plays in policy design:
P1 Policies without apprehension of context characteristics or actors.
P2 Policies focused on context characteristics.
P3 Policies aimed at actors within given contexts to reduce antagonistic be-
havior.
P4 Policies stimulating actors within given contexts to create own interven-
tions.
Figure 1.1 relates forest conservation outcomes to their bio-physical, socio-eco-
nomic, and political context. The framework shows the option to directly target
deforestation actors (P1, P2), and their opportunity costs of forest conservation.
Further, it highlights the complementary approach to target political stakehold-
ers and change the political context (P3, P4). All elements are embedded within
a spatial scale, starting with the country as the highest level and decreasing
through state, district, household, farm level to the smallest data level - a pixel
from a satellite picture. 10
At farm level, forest conservation is determined by the profitability of alter-
native land uses. Forest are converted to agricultural land, pasture for cattle,
or mining sites to generate income. Investments in forest friendly land uses
(e.g., non-timber forest products, agro-forestry, etc.) are often judged less at-
tractive by farmers in forest environments. Reasons for the profitability gap of
9 Engel (2015) highlights the role of design options for Payments for Environmental Service
(PES) programs to specific context conditions.
10 Analyzing federal and state policies in this thesis, we focus on the political context at the
district and sub-district level, though the framework allows analyses at various other scales.
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Figure 1.1: Public policies for forest conservation
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forest friendly activities range from the low cost of forest conversion and cat-
tle farming, to economics of scale, insecure property rights, risk aversion, labor
availability, etc. and vary by country and region. The opportunity costs of con-
servation, depends on the bio-physical, socio-economic, and political context
including the implemented public policy mix.
Soil quality, climate, forest resources, land inclination, etc. are primary fac-
tors determining the costs and profitability of land uses. Market structures,
production technologies, population size, infrastructure, and credit access de-
termine actors’ decisions to convert forest. Household characteristics, from ed-
ucation and ethnicity to marital status, influence land use decisions at plot
level. 11
The political context plays a crucial role for the delivery of public services
and therefore the local socio-economic context. Investments in public infras-
tructure like roads, public transport, education, health systems, etc. are often
carried out by local administrations with varying degrees of success. Bad go-
vernance can waste resources and corrupt officials may capture federal funds,
both leading to an under provision of public services (Bardhan, 2006, 1997).
The lack of public services and basic infrastructure tends to hinder the de-
11 It is often difficult to predict each factors’ influence on deforestation decisions. E.g., roads
facilitate new clearings but at the same time decrease the probability of land abandonment
and conversion to pasture for cattle ranching (Ludewigs, de Oliveira D’antona, Brondízio, and
Hetrick, 2009). See also Angelsen (1999) for a detailed description of impacts of technological
improvements in different contexts.
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velopment and maintenance of forest friendly production systems (Ludewigs
et al., 2009).
Following our framework above, governments engaging in forest protection
have four design options at hand with respect to the context. The first category
of policies (P1) includes all policies that are designed or carried out without
differentiation to a context. Command and control instruments, laws, regula-
tions or taxes and subsides are often unspecific to context characteristics or
actor composition. E.g., actors’ opportunity costs of forest conservation are
directly affected through monitoring and enforcing environmental laws. Sanc-
tions and fines decrease the profits of forest harming activities and increase the
opportunity of forest friendly investments. Besides such disincentive policies,
public policies do engage in incentive policies (Börner and Vosti, 2013). E.g.,
conditional credit support and technical assistance to forest friendly produc-
tion reduce the opportunity cost of conservation.
The second category (P2) comprises policies and instruments that are tar-
geted at a specific context or take the local context into account. Enforcement
actions focused on deforestation hotspots are context specific. The transition
between the first and the second category is continuous. Laws, differentiating
between women and men, small and large land holders, cattle ranger and soy
producer, tropical forest and savanna forest, etc. are context specific. A pol-
icy will also be region specific if areas have a predominant characteristic, e.g.,
areas with predominantly large cattle rangers.
The third category (P3) shifts its focus from characteristics to actors them-
selves. These policies perceive the context as a kind of “resistor” between in-
struments and the deforesting actor. Political, social and economic actors can
inhibit or facilitate the working of public policies. E.g., district administrations
can choose to support with less or greater effort federal programs for health
care, education, environmental regulation, etc. Public policies can in conse-
quence be designed to enable or incentivize administrations to stop inhibiting
the service delivery and support (environmental) law enforcement. A tangible
example is the policing of corrupt politicians that capture funds for school
meals.12
Within the forth category (P4), policies recognize that stakeholders within
given contexts, i.e., politicians, firms, land-holders, NGOs, etc. themselves can
engage in environmental governance. Public policies can incentivize or enable
stakeholders to be part of a forest conservation agenda, engage in policy de-
sign and secure public outcomes (health, education, environment, etc.) Type
P4 policies are designed to incentivize the political actors to participate in the
conservation process. In consequence local actors can create new partnerships
and interventions adapted to the given context. E.g., to reward local admin-
istrations for protected area management, support private-social partnerships
between environmental service providers and buyers and public-private part-
nerships (e.g., logging concessions, technical assistance, environmental label-
ing) (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Wunder, 2005).
12 Cf. Reinikka and Svensson (2004).
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1.3 research questions
Policymakers are increasingly under pressure to deliver effective policies and
have numerous instruments with multitude of design options at hand. A sus-
tainable portfolio of forest conservation policies will likely have to include
both actor specific interventions and policies directed at local contexts (see
previous section). Relatively little empirical research has so far addressed the
latter. Hence, this thesis asks the following question:
RQ How do public policies shape the outcomes of local forest governance?
Actor specific policies implemented by federal or state governments are usu-
ally intended to influence local environmental governance outcomes through
incentives, disincentives or enabling measures (Börner and Vosti, 2013). This
thesis analyzes two innovative disincentive-based strategies in chapters 2, 3
and a combination of enabling and incentive-based policy instruments in chap-
ter 4. All three public policies are reflected within the theoretical framework
on forest conservation instruments of the previous section and are depicted in
Figure 1.1.
Corruption auditing falls under the public policy category P3. Federal gov-
ernments inspect the governance quality of local administrations and publicly
scrutinize the waste of public funds, the failure of public service delivery, and
corrupt activities. Inspecting local administrations can improve the overall lo-
cal governance. An improved public service delivery can increase the viabil-
ity of forest benign economic activity especially when poor forest-dependent
people gain access to such services. The disclosure of governance quality en-
ables the electorate to punish a corrupt administration and thereby weaken
ties between local political elites and illegally operating timber companies and
farmers. And yet, the opposite effect can materialize, too. Increased public
awareness of governance failures in the health sector, for example, may pro-
duce spillover effects to other sectors. For instance, corrupt politicians could
respond to the increased scrutiny by shifting rent seeking behavior to the agri-
cultural and forest sector. Targeting the overall governance quality rather than
directly focusing on environmental governance can result in detrimental or
favorable forest conservation outcomes. The corresponding research question
addressed in chapter 2 is:
RQ1 Do anti-corruption measures affect forest conservation outcomes?
Public disclosure of poor local environmental governance is an alternative strat-
egy akin to type P3 and P4 policy approaches. If only a few major actors are
causing environmental damage, naming and shaming the “worst” performers
can make a difference. Disclosure policies have been successfully used in dif-
ferent contexts to improve public service delivery, fight corruption, and control
pollution (Blackman, 2010; Jacobs and Anechiarico, 1992; McGee and Gavent,
2010; Reinikka and Svensson, 2011; Tan, 2014; Tietenberg, 1998). In many of
these cases, disclosure has induced government, civil society, and individuals
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to collaborate in selectively downscaling support or targeting punitive action
to the identified key actors. Few examples and little research has evaluated
public disclosure as a quality control mechanism for decentralized environ-
mental governance. A corresponding research question of chapter 3 is:
RQ2 Does naming and shaming reduce deforestation? And, if yes, which
mechanisms are at work?
Finally, many potential options exist to enable local environmental governance.
There is broad agreement that successful environmental governance requires
the involvement of local actors and an appropriate combination of rules and
incentives (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). Protected
areas that allow particular local resource use strategies are one of the most com-
mon approaches to forest conservation in the tropics. Often, however, both re-
serve managers and the local population need additional support to effectively
govern the protected territory (Brandon and Wells, 1992; Bruner, Gullison, Rice,
and da Fonseca, 2001). Such support measures fall under our policy category
P4. Incentive programs for residents of protected areas, for example, have been
proposed as means to increase the quality of environmental governance and
sustainably secure forest resources (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002).13 This thesis eval-
uates the additionality of such incentive-based reserve management support,
through the following research question:
RQ3 Do conservation incentives in protected areas reduce deforestation?
1.4 study area
Brazil is an ideal laboratory to study the performance of forest conservation
policies. After decades of support for infrastructure expansion in the region,
leaving 20% of the Amazon deforested,14 public policy underwent a major
paradigm shift towards improved forest governance during the early 2000s
(Maia et al., 2011; Miccolis et al., 2014). Allegedly as a result of this paradigm
shift, deforestation rates dropped by 80% since 2004, making Brazil the coun-
try with the largest reduction in forest loss worldwide (Hansen et al., 2013;
INPE, 2012).15 In this respect the ’Brazilian approach to forest conservation’
is a historical phenomenon and a highly relevant research topic. It follows a
brief description of the historical context of environmental policy development
in Brazil. Subsequently, the three analyzed policies are described. The section
ends with an outlook on future forest conservation challenges in Brazil.
13 Wunder (2005; 2007) highlights the limit of payments for environmental services for residents
of protected areas.
14 The Brazilian territory is segmented into five biomes: Amazonia, Caatinga, Cerrado, Pampas,
Pantanal, Mata Atlantica. The Cerrado is commonly classified as a tropical savanna ecoregion.
15 Neighboring Latin American countries increased deforestation rates by 459 sq. km per year.
Indonesia increased deforestation by 1,021 sq. km per year, reaching 20,000 sq. km of cleared
forest in 2012 (Hansen et al., 2013).
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1.4.1 Brazil’s conservation history
To understand land and forest use dynamics in Brazil it helps to briefly look
at its economic and political history of the second half of the 20th century. The
industrialization process of the agricultural sector started to accelerate during
the 1950s. Millions of laid-off rural workers migrated to the major cities during
this time. In the 1960s, the increasing industrial demand for raw material and
agricultural produce favored the continuous mechanization of the agricultural
sector. Agricultural expansion pulled migration to the central west and north
of the country, initiating an irreversible conversion of large parts of the Cer-
rado biome into an agricultural landscape.16 During the military government
of the 1970s and 1980s, large scale migration projects were implemented to
colonize the Amazon (Miccolis et al., 2014). Hundreds of thousands of mostly
poor landless farmers were offered ‘uninhabited’ and uncultivated land.17 The
expansion of the agricultural frontier was strongly promoted in the Amazon
by full exemptions from income, import and export taxes and subsidized cred-
its. To connect the frontier with the southern markets, public infrastructure
investments expanded road and energy networks. Given a very difficult envi-
ronment and the fact that property rights could best be secured by clear cutting
the forest, extensive cattle ranching became the prominent form of land use. In
addition, land properties agglomerated in failed settlement projects after set-
tlers had relocated to new agricultural frontiers (Araujo et al., 2009; Fearnside,
2001; Pacheco, 2009). The agro-industry today earns 28% of the country’s GDP,
produces 35% more than the country consumes and exports $76 billion of its
agricultural produce. Brazil produces 31% of the world’s soybeans and 28%
of the world’s beef. It is the largest beef, sugar, coffee, tobacco, orange juice
and broiler chicken producer (Miccolis et al., 2014). The economic and politi-
cal processes resulted in 738,200 sq. km of cleared forest, 20% of the Brazilian
Amazon - twice the size of Germany.
After the military dictatorship, the democratization process led in 1988 to the
“New Citizens’ Constitution”, which allowed for political participation and the
decentralization of power. The development of inclusive institutions resulted
in a rapid economic development of the country (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012). The new constitution acknowledges the right to a healthy environment
and the rights of indigenous people.18
The basis of Brazil’s forest protection is the Forest Code. Established in 1965,
it underwent many reforms and became de facto law in 2001 (Soares-Filho
16 Today 50% of the Cerrado is deforested (Garcia, Ferreira, and Leite, 2011)
17 Pacheco (2009) reports 161,562 settled families in the BLA between 1964 and 1994 through
colonization programs.
18 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988, Art. 255: port.: “Todos têm direito
ao meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado, bem de uso comum do povo e essencial à
sadia qualidade de vida, impondo-se ao poder público e à coletividade o dever de defendê-
lo e preservá-lo para as presentes e futuras gerações.”, engl.: “Everyone has the right to an
ecologically balanced environment, which is a public good for the people’s use and is essential
for a healthy life. The Government and the community have a duty to defend and to preserve
the environment for present and future generations.”
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et al., 2014). This law regulates how much is allowed to be deforested on pri-
vate properties in each of the Brazilian biomes. In the Amazon biome private
properties are only allowed to deforest 20% of the area. Nonetheless, enforce-
ment of the Forest Code before the mid-2000s was limited owing to the lack
of appropriate monitoring tools, insufficient funding of the environmental po-
lice, and low political support (Fearnside, 2001, 2003; Miccolis et al., 2014). The
paradigm shift towards forest conservation began in 2004 after the launch of
an inter-ministerial coordination program, the Plan for Prevention and Control
of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm), by the new workers’ party
led government (cf. Figure 1.2). Among other measures the PPCDAm heavily
relied on the continued expansion of protected areas and indigenous territo-
ries, now covering 54% of the Brazilian Amazon. The launch of a near real-time
monitoring system via satellite (DETER)19 in 2004 and the strengthened fund-
ing and power of the environmental police (IBAMA)20 enabled environmental
authorities to more effectively follow up on illegal forest uses and deforesta-
tion (Börner, Kis-Katos, Hargrave, and König, 2015a). Since 2008, environmen-
tal offenders face restricted public credit access (Assunção, Gandour, Rocha,
and Rocha, 2013b; Nepstad et al., 2014). Furthermore, Brazil has supported
public-private agreements between soy retailers and producers to restrict the
commercialization of produce from deforested areas (Arima, Barreto, Araújo,
and Soares-Filho, 2014; Nepstad et al., 2014).
1.4.2 Researched policies
Since the early 2000s, and in line with its decentralization process, the federal
government increasingly implemented policies that target local governance
at the district level. We chose an anti-corruption policy, a blacklisting policy
and a payment for environmental services program (PES) to investigate the
three policy options stated in the previous section: Corruption auditing, public
disclosure, enabling environmental governance
Corruption auditing. In 2003, Brazil started a policy experiment to inspect
and improve local governance, which serves to address research question RQ1.
The untargeted anti-corruption program aims to reduce fraud and capture
of public funds at the district level. Random audits and investigations of the
districts’ fiscal discipline related to federal government funds are carried out
to improve the local governance. The random selection process results in a
representative sample of districts, for example, in terms of governance quality,
corruption, and the opportunity costs of forest conservation (cf. Figure 1.1).
The publication of audit results, in principle, allows the electorate and the
federal government to punish local leaders for corrupt behavior.
19 DETER, engl.: Near Real-time deforestation detection; port.: Detecção do Desmatamento na
Amazônia Legal em Tempo Real
20 IBAMA, engl.: Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources; port.:
Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis
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Figure 1.2: Brazil’s conservation policies
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Note: PPG7, Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest; SLAPR, Environmental Li-
censing System for Rural Properties, started in the state of Mato Grosso. In 2008, the CAR,
Rural Environmental Cadaster, registration system incorporated the SLAPR system and ex-
tended to the state of Pará (although responsibilities remained at the state level). In 2012 a
nation wide CAR system was launched (cf. Azevedo, 2009; Azevedo et al., 2014); PCDAM,
Plan for prevention and control of deforestation in the Legal Amazon.
Public disclosure. In 2008 Brazil launched an innovative public disclosure pol-
icy, which serves as a case to address research question RQ2 in chapter 3. Out
of 771 districts in the Brazilian Legal Amazon, a small sample of 50 districts
with historically high deforestation rates were publicly ‘blacklisted’. Hence,
the policy predominantly targets districts with low environmental governance
quality and high opportunity costs of forest conservation. As a result, the en-
vironmental police (IBAMA) can focus its enforcement activities on these dis-
tricts. Before, environmentalist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) en-
gaged across the whole Brazilian Amazon, now they can focus on the ‘priority’
districts. Actors of these districts may have concerns about economic conse-
quences and create public-private partnerships to reduce deforestation rates
and improve their environmental governance. Some state-governments, such
as the state of Pará, even started programs granting support to districts that
managed to be removed from the blacklist (Governo do Para).
Enabling environmental governance. In the course of Brazil’s protected area
expansion, the Secretariat for Sustainable Development of the Amazonas state
launched a payment for environmental services program called Bolsa Floresta
to enable more effective local forest governance. Today the program is led by the
Sustainable Amazonas Fund (FAS), a foundation, and covers 15 multiple-use
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reserves. In anticipation of future agricultural frontier expansion, the program
targeted primarily remote reserves with low historical deforestation rates. To
offset the opportunity cost of forest conservation, sustain livelihoods in the
long-run, and build environmental alliances against invasions, FAS provides
conditional payments to over 8,000 households and invests in forest benign
production at the community level. By law, reserve dwellers may only deforest
for subsistence production, however, monitoring and law enforcement capacity
is limited in Brazil’s largest federal state. Therefore, the intervention qualifies
as an alternative strategy to enable the environmental governance of reserve
managers and communities in a context of relatively low opportunity costs.
1.4.3 Current conservation challenges
Since 2012, forest clearing leveled around an annual 4,900 sq. km. It is Brazil’s
declared ambition to curb deforestation rates even further.21 At the current
level of annual forest loss the share of small-scale, supposedly smallholder-
based, deforestation is much higher (Godar, Gardner, Tizado, and Pacheco,
2014), but it is hypothesized that large holders now deforest in small patches,
at a scale below the detection range of the real-time DETER monitoring sys-
tem. In response, the last phase of the PPCDAm (2012-2015) focuses on an
incentive rather than disincentive strategy. Brazil now aims to reform the dis-
organized property system, the environmental regularization system, and to
promote sustainable smallholder agriculture (Ministério do Meio Ambiente,
2013). Since 2012, land holders must register their land in a geo-referenced
rural environmental cadaster (CAR) as a precondition for (1) receiving en-
vironmental licenses, (2) exemption from obsolete environmental fines, and
(3) access to agricultural credit after 2017. The CAR constitutes the basis for
Brazil’s new and future forest conservation strategy. It creates ‘spatial’ liability
for land holders and facilitates the monitoring of environmental compliance.
The reform has significant potential to improve forest governance, but only if
enforcement remains effective will new investments into agricultural produc-
tivity result in ‘land-sparing’ rather than ‘land-sharing’, and curb deforestation
rates (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001).
Despite the above-mentioned environmental policy success, the new gover-
nance setup is continuously challenged. A first concession to agricultural in-
terest groups was the revision of the Forest Code in 2012. The reform exempts
90% of land holders to pay environmental fines and restore areas deforested
before 2008 (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). Economic interest in remote sparsely
populated areas for hydropower plants and mining operations is mounting.
Pledges to the National Congress to degazette and downsize reserves have
reduced the protected areas by 44,100 sq. km since 2008, and are threatening
an additional 21,000 sq. km (Bernard, Penna, and Araújo, 2014; Ferreira et al.,
21 The commitment made at the 15th Convention of the Parties of United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change in 2009, requires Brazil to reduce deforestation to an annual
rate below 3,925 sq. km until 2020 (Ministério do Meio Ambiente, 2013).
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2014). Political pressures against forest conservation increase with increasing
opportunity costs. Since the worldwide economic slowdown, lower demands
for beef and soy have kept world market prices low and decreased the demand
for new land. An increase in world demand for food, feed, fuel, and fibre may
quickly change the picture. In this context, the recently released deforestation
data of INPE shows a 47% increase in 2016 with respect to the 2012-2015 av-
erage. Nonetheless, this level is still relatively low (55% of the historical mean
1988-2003) (cf. INPE, 2016; Nature News, Jeff Tollefson, 2016).22 If this repre-
sents a reversing development due to the political changes remains to be seen.
1.5 organization of the thesis
This thesis is organized in five chapters to address the proposed research ques-
tions. Following this introduction (chapter 1) describing background, frame-
work, research questions and study area, the first research question on the en-
vironmental effects of anti-corruption strategies is addressed in chapter 2. How
naming and shaming policies can lead to forest conservation is addressed in
chapter 3. Chapter 4 answers the third research question on how conservation
incentives can reduce deforestation. Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings
of the thesis and presents policy conclusions.
22 Deforested areas in years 2012-2016 were: 4,571, 5,891, 5,012, 6,207, and 7,989 sq. km, respec-
tively.
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abstract
This chapter highlights the relationship of the recent federal anti-corruption
strategy in Brazil to the environment. We rely on the unique policy experiment
of fully randomized public fiscal audits to asses the overall level of governance
quality at the district level, to relate corruption to deforestation and to identify
causal effects of publicly revealed audit reports on deforestation trends. Public
audits aimed at the implementation and usage of funds designated for gov-
ernmental programs but do not target environmental responsibilities. Despite
being unrelated to environmental issues our governance measures capture go-
vernance quality and corrupt behavior of local administrations. We find that
districts identified as highly corrupt are associated with 25% higher forest
losses between 2002 and 2012. Auditing and publicly reporting corrupt ac-
tivities had no influence on subsequent deforestation, not on average neither
when considering reelection incentives and learning processes from neighbors
and media and judiciary presence. Environmental benefits are cannot be ad-
dressed by reducing overall corruption levels. Illegal deforestation remains to
be better addressed by targeted policies.
JEL Classification: D73, O13, Q23
Keywords: Deforestation, corruption, fiscal audits, Brazil, Amazonas
2.1 introduction
Strict monitoring by the central government and providing corruption informa-
tion to the public offer promising ways to address corruption within the lower
tiers of the government administration (Svensson, 2005; Olken and Pande,
2011). The recent government initiative in Brazil has proven successful in this
context: public information from local fiscal audits has significantly reduced
reelection chances of corrupt local politicians (Ferraz and Finan, 2008), and
electoral accountability in turn has significantly reduced local corruption lev-
els (Ferraz and Finan, 2011).
However, if local agents perform multiple tasks, increased incentives to per-
form well in a certain sphere can lead to a deterioration of performance in an-
other (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). More specifically, increased attention
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to fiscal discipline might shift local corruption to other, less directly observed
activities. This can mainly happen through two channels. Local governments
focusing on administrative reforms might simply lack the capacity to monitor
illegal land use. But the increasing need to observe fiscal discipline might also
lead local administrators to refocus their personal and political interests on
spheres less easily observable by federal fiscal auditors. In order to preserve
their political power, they might start to cater more strongly to the interests of
local landowners and sawmill operators, for instance by tolerating illegal land
grabs, enabling thus the conversion of forested land to cattle pasture or soy-
bean plantations (Fearnside, 2001). Thus, anti-corruption policies focusing on
fiscal discipline could have the undesired side effect of increasing deforestation
in the districts undergoing public fiscal audits.1
The external auditors scrutinize the use of federal funds in all sectors, and
focus on irregularities in public procurement as well as unrealized investments
(reflecting potentially outright theft of federal funds), but the operation of lo-
cal land markets, the presence of illegal settlements, or deforestation outcomes
are not among the issues investigated by the auditors. The increased public
scrutiny can lead to a substitution of attention from or corruption and politi-
cal support seeking activities towards sectors that are less directly observable
within this public audit system, potentially leading among others to increased
deforestation. The question whether this mechanism has played an important
role in explaining deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon over the last decade
lies at the heart of this study.
Preservation of the existing rainforests is one of the major global environ-
mental priorities. The Brazilian Amazon contains 40% of the world’s remain-
ing tropical forests and plays a crucial role in biodiversity preservation as well
as for the global climate system (Kirby et al., 2006). Whereas it is widely docu-
mented that deforestation in Brazil is strongly affected by economic incentives
(Angelsen, 1999; Pfaff, 1999; Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013) as well as con-
flicting regulatory frameworks (Alston, Libecap, and Mueller, 2000; Fearnside,
2001; Ludewigs et al., 2009), the effects of local governance on the deforestation
process remain widely unexplored.2
We use the unique policy experiment of the Brazilian local fiscal audits to
investigate the effects of this anti-corruption strategy on deforestation. Start-
ing with 2003, the Brazilian government implemented a lottery system that
resulted in strict fiscal audits in randomly selected districts. The results of
these audits were subsequently published on the internet and made widely
available to the public. This newly revealed information on local governance
quality has significantly shaped the local political environment and affected
1 Districts or municípios in Portuguese are the smallest administration unit in Brazil, comparable
to counties in the US.
2 The study of Burgess et al. on the effects of decentralization on illegal logging in Indonesia is a
major exception, relating deforestation to the proliferation of newly formed local governments,
fighting for forest resources.
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political outcomes in subsequent mayoral elections (Ferraz and Finan, 2008).3
We use this publicly available information to construct proxies for the over-
all governance quality and corruption at the district level. We combine this
information with yearly satellite data on the deforestation process from the
Brazilian PRODES project in order to investigate the relationship between au-
dits, local governance and deforestation dynamics.
Our work is closely related to several strands of empirical literature. Simi-
larly to Burgess et al. (2012), who link deforestation dynamics in Indonesia to
the proliferation of new districts and the local election cycle, we also address
tropical deforestation from a political economic perspective and offer further
support for local elections affecting deforestation. Our study differs from their
analysis considerably by assessing the effects of one specific anti-corruption
intervention and linking deforestation dynamics with direct measures of go-
vernance quality. Our study also contributes to the literature on the effects of
the Brazilian public fiscal audits on political and governance outcomes, like
mayoral reelection chances (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) and corruption and local
public service delivery (Litschig and Zamboni, 2013). In contrast to these stud-
ies, we address an outcome, deforestation, which is not directly monitored by
the public audits, and hence examine a shift in rent-extraction towards not
audited sectors. Since we measure our main outcome of interest on a yearly
basis, we are also able to describe the time dynamics of the audit effects at
a much finer scale than before-after analyses do. Our analysis also relates to
some of the results of Olken (2007), which indicate a potential shift in corrup-
tion (towards nepotism) in the face of fiscal audits in a road building program
in Indonesia.
We address the relationship between deforestation and local corruption in
three steps. First, we assess the correlation between local governance quality
and average deforestation levels, after having controlled for other fundamental
determinants of deforestation. We do so by relating total deforestation levels
over the time period of 2002 to 2012 in 237 audited districts to the extent of
corruption documented by the auditors. This descriptive analysis shows that
districts with about one standard deviation higher measured corruption levels
experienced up to 25% higher deforestation between 2002 and 2012, and 83%
higher deforestation in years where the audit revealed the misuse of public
funds.
In a second step, we exploit the fully randomized allocation of public au-
dits in order to investigate deforestation outcomes after the fiscal audits have
taken place and the reports have been published. Our results show that public
fiscal audits have lead to no increase in deforestation. Investigating time dy-
namics shows no delayed impacts over time. Because of the fully randomized
3 The same natural experiment of public fiscal audits in Brazil has also been exploited to address
the effects of corruption on schooling outcomes and teacher quality and teaching supplies
Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2012), the role of judicial presence on the overall regulatory quality
(Litschig and Zamboni, 2008), the effects of exogenous shifts in budget size on local corruption
(Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini, 2013), or the effects of later changes in the audit risk
on corruption and waste (Litschig and Zamboni, 2013).
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study design, these results can be interpreted as evidence of no causal relation
between the Brazilian anti-corruption measurement and deforestation as an
non-targeted outcome.
In the last part of the study we investigate various mechanism that could
explain the zero average effect on deforestation by disentangling it into het-
erogeneous auditing findings and political contexts. Local administrations are
imperfectly informed about the scope and severity of the public audit program,
and once audited, update their beliefs about what types of behaviors are scru-
tinized by the federal auditors. The realization that deforestation related issues
are not subject to federal audits can thus lead to a learning process and an in-
crease in deforestation. If believes are updated we expect auditing to increase
deforestation where auditors have detected many irregularities. Similar we ex-
pect audits on neighboring districts to easier transmit information about the
auditing procedure. Results show no differential in deforestation trends after
audits with worse governance findings. Audits on neighboring districts have
no impact on deforestation nor could we explain the insignificant average au-
diting effect with opposed spatial spillovers effects to neighboring districts.
We further investigate the role of the disciplining effects of electoral account-
ability. Mayors, who serve their first term and hence can stand for reelection,
have stronger incentives to improve detected instances of mismanagement and
curb corrupt activities known to the public. Second term mayors may face
lower public scrutiny and no incentives to shift rents from corrupt fiscal activ-
ities towards areas of illegal logging. Ferraz and Finan document less corrupt
violations under first term mayors, nonetheless we do not find a statistically
significant relationship between increases in deforestation and first term may-
ors. Moreover the presence of judicial seats or local radio stations have show
no robust effects.
In what follows, we explain the policy experiment of public audits in more
detail, describe how our corruption proxies were generated and present first
hypotheses on the effects of corruption and public audits on deforestation.
Section 2.3 describes our data and section 2.4 the descriptive evidence on the
correlation between corruption and deforestation. Section 2.5 investigates the
causal effects of public fiscal audits on deforestation, whereas section 2.6 ad-
dresses the potential mechanisms driving these results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 public audits and corruption findings
2.2.1 Public fiscal audits in Brazil
In 2003, as part of its new anti-corruption strategy, the Federal Government
of Brazil introduced the Random Audit Program (Programa de Fiscalização a
partir de Sorteios Públicos) to control the local use of federal funds and the
realization of federal programs. The audited districts are selected by public
lottery, and are subsequently visited by auditors from the Office of the Comp-
troller General (CGU), which is the federal agency for internal control, public
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audits, and corruption prevention. The CGU officers make a detailed assess-
ment of the expenses and procedures of the selected districts and write an
extensive audit report, which is then published online on the CGU’s home-
page.4 Thus, revealed instances of mismanagement of public funds are fully
disclosed to the public.
The public lotteries started in April 2003 and have been carried out since
about 3 to 7 times a year by the Federal Savings Bank, at the same time with
the regular national money lottery. Overall, 34 lotteries were carried out in
the years between 2003 and 2012, resulting in 1876 audit reports. The first 8
lotteries selected 50 districts out of all Brazilian communities with less than
300,000 inhabitants. Their scope was extended by the ninth lottery to districts
with up to 500,000 inhabitants; starting with the tenth lottery 60 districts with
less than 500,000 inhabitants have been selected.5
After a lottery has been carried out by the Office of the Comptroller Gen-
eral, 10 to 15 auditors are send to the districts (Ferraz and Finan, 2008).6 The
auditors control all local accounts and documents to check the usage and right
implementation of federal funds. They conduct a Public Expenditure Tracking
Survey by comparing the governmental funds sent to the districts with the
funds that have reached the entitled entities (health centers, schools, etc.). Si-
multaneously they check the presence and condition of services and construc-
tions, estimate the quantities and value of public goods that have not reached
their intended users, and compare billing prices with market prices. Moreover,
they interview a random sample of community households in order to reveal
instances of nepotism or fraud (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). The CGU hands over
the audit reports to the Tribunal of Accounts (TCU), to public prosecutors, the
district legislative branch and to the media (Ferraz and Finan, 2008).
Generally, reports start with information on the total federal fund use, and
include a listing of all federal programs by their originating ministry as well
as a description of the general objectives of each program, and a detailed as-
sessment of its implementation. Each problem listed by the auditors is related
to non-compliance with a specific governmental law or directive and is out-
lined in detail in the report. The explicit finding is called an irregularity, and
it is accompanied by a description of the facts found and the evidence used,
potentially followed by a statement of the mayor and closed by a final anal-
4 The reports are available under http://www.cgu.gov.br/assuntos/
auditoria-e-fiscalizacao/avaliacao-de-programas-de-governo/
programa-de-fiscalizacao-em-entes-federativos/sorteios-publicos (Accessed on
2016-12-02).
5 Procedures of the first lotteries varied somewhat. The first two lotteries were smaller and had
a preliminary character, including only 5 and 26 districts respectively. The second and third
lottery involved only districts of less than 250,000 inhabitants. Lotteries 9, 11 and 13 excluded
districts under 10,000 inhabitants. However, these minor differences do not affect strongly the
random character of the lotteries.
6 The Office of the Comptroller General, Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU) in Portuguese,
was created by the President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 2003 for public control, correction,
prevention and fight against corruption. Formally under the responsibility of the president it
was transferred in 2016 to the ministry of transparency, inspection and control.
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ysis of the audit team. The irregularities describe various incidences, from
non-competitive public procurement processes, improperly implemented pro-
grams, and dysfunctional local administrative processes, to illicit expenditures,
excessive spending and overpricing of items, lack of documentation, expendi-
tures to family enterprises and other forms of nepotism, the use of federal
funds for private gains or outright disappearance of funds. Whereas some of
the listed irregularities refer to management failures and imply passive waste
(Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2009), others are more clearly identifiable as cor-
ruption.
By constructing our measures of local governance quality, we follow largely
the approach used in the existing literature (e.g. by Ferraz and Finan, 2008,
2011, and Litschig and Zamboni, 2008, 2013), which basically counts corrup-
tion related (or total) irregularities in the reports in some form of other.7 This
approach has been criticized by Olken and Pande (2011) as prone to measure-
ment error, since it might be hard for auditors to discover the actual levels of
corruption in any district. A further issue of concern is whether corrupt local
governments can interfere with the audit reports either by misrepresenting in-
formation or by bribing the auditors. However, given the implementation of
the central auditing procedure, these concerns do not seem to be warranted.
Federal auditors are well-trained and earn highly competitive wages (Ferraz
and Finan, 2008), they are thus likely to be able and willing to detect and re-
port obvious forms of corruption. They are also less prone to collusion with
local governments as they come unexpectedly and stay at the district only
once. They usually work in relatively large groups (about 10 auditors or even
more), so that the whole group would have to be bribed in order to make them
conceal unfavourable findings, which is very improbable (Litschig and Zam-
boni, 2013). The auditors implement a detailed and fairly constant procedure,
controlling the use of all federal funds in a district. They compare the fiscal
accounts with actual realizations of the investments, documenting precisely
(and often with photographs) the completion and usage of various federally
funded facilities and the presence and use of specific investment goods. They
also estimate the actual value of the realized investments, and assess whether
disbursements were made at market prices. Moreover, a wide range of pro-
cedural irregularities gets recorded as well as any further public complaints.
Although this procedure will not be free of measurement error, the arising
measurement error is unlikely to be systematic. We believe that these very de-
tailed public audit reports give a good first assessment of the overall quality
of governance in any district.
The random selection of districts via lotteries results in a random subsample
of all districts; in our specific case this covers 237 not yet completely deforested
districts in the Brazilian Amazon, out of the total of 556.8 Eligibility criteria of
7 Quantifying the share of federal resources affected by corruption (as in Ferraz and Finan, 2011)
is less viable in our case because of structural changes in whether and how affected funds are
reported over the relatively long time period that we use in our study.
8 Out of the 771 districts within the Brazilian Legal Amazon, districts with less than 5% of its
area covered with forest in 2002 are excluded from the analysis.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics on audit reports
Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Government funds [m reais] 17.62 71.61 0.36 1170.57
No. of ministries 9.04 3.04 2.00 17.00
Pages 89.21 42.27 11.00 264.00
No. of programs 23.14 9.20 4.00 58.00
No. corrupt violations 4.94 6.78 0.00 65.00
No. irregularities 60.09 28.60 7.00 160.00
Relative No. irregularities 3.03 1.87 0.24 10.21
Note: Statistics refer to N=227 audit reports for 237 districts in the Brazilian Legal Amazon,
audited before 2012.
the public audits (e.g., having a population below 500,000 or state capitals)
further reduces the sample to 550 districts. Since audits can be considered as
completely random within states and across time, this enables us to use the
information on the corruption findings collected by the auditors and address
the effects of the random audits on subsequent deforestation outcomes.
2.2.2 Constructing measures for local corruption
In an average district in our Amazonas sample, public fiscal audits control
the use of about 17.8m reais, which is disbursed via ca. 9 different ministries
(cf. Table 2.1). These are very substantial amounts; overall, federal funding
accounts for about 45% of district finances.9 Hence, records of the use of these
funds can be expected to reflect very well the governance quality of a district.
We design two main measures of local governance quality based on the audit
reports. Both measures exploit the fact that audit reports broadly retained
their structure over time and auditors follow the same general reporting style,
use similar phrases, and when identifying breaches of law always refer to the
specific laws and directives.
The first one, irregularities, is a rather crude measure which results from
adding up the numbers of reported irregularities in any district and can be
seen as a very broad measure of administrative quality. The sum of all ir-
regularities of course does not exclusively reflect corruption and fraud but
also includes measures of waste, inefficiencies and administrative failures. The
higher the number of such irregularities, the more public resources will be
wasted, either by loss or capture of rents. Thus, this measure is useful for
9 Number refer to 728 out of 771 districts of the Brazilian Legal Amazon. Calculations base on
the accounts of 2013 obtained from the Secretary of National Treasury (Secretaria do Tesouro
Nacional - STN) and its FINBRA ( Finances of Brazil) database. 16% of district finances origi-
nate from state administrations. See also: https://siconfi.tesouro.gov.br/siconfi/pages/
public/consulta_finbra/finbra_list.jsf.
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assessing the overall quality of local government administration. Since local
governments differ strongly in their fiscal size and capacity (the number of
federal programs ranging from 4 to 58, cf. Table 2.1), we normalize this mea-
sure by dividing it through the total number of programs investigated by the
auditors. As Table 2.1 shows, an average audit report records about 60 adminis-
trative irregularities, which results in 3 irregularities per investigated program.
In order to ease interpretation, the subsequent empirical analysis uses a stan-
dardized version of this relative irregularity measure, with mean zero and a
standard deviation of one over all reports.10
By contrast, our second and main measure, corruption, is based on a text min-
ing procedure that counts the number of corruption related expressions within
any report. It thus more specifically reflects the overall extent of corrupt vio-
lations in a district. It is generated by using the Global Regular Expressions
Print (grep) in R to search for 40 different regular expressions within an au-
dit report that inevitably indicate corrupt incidences (R Core Team, 2015).11
We classified the 40 regular expressions used to identify corruption under the
categories of diversion of public funds, over-invoicing, irregular procurement,
advanced payment, fraud, incomplete construction and non-existence of docu-
mentation. All regular expressions as well as the detailed procedures used are
presented in the Appendix A.2.
Diversion of public funds counts expressions describing instances when funds
are used for other purposes, if they have disappeared or if expenditures are
done without any proof of provision or purchase. Irregular procurement refers
to expressions indicating a procurement process without a call for bids or no
minimum number of bids. Over-invoicing is identified whenever payments use
higher than market prices. Advanced payments are illegal transfers to a provi-
der or construction company before goods are delivered or constructions have
been completed, and are nearly always accompanied by abandoned or sloppy
construction sites. Fraud includes illicit expenditures to staff or family mem-
bers, non-existence of invoices, contraction of inexistent firms, inclusion of
illicit regulations in the bidding process and exaggerated expenses for oil and
gasoline. Incomplete constructions arise if the examined buildings do not meet
the funds invested or buildings do not exist. Non-existing documentation inhibits
auditors to analyze what the funds were used for or to find any evidence of
fraud.
An irregularity in an audit report could be identified as corrupt with mul-
tiple expressions in the same paragraph. This could lead to an over-counting
10 Alternatively to the relative number of irregularities, we also coded the share of programs
investigated that have at least one irregularity, which have been favored by Litschig and Zam-
boni and Ferraz and Finan. This second irregularities variable is somewhat more prone to
measurement and encoding error due to structural changes in the presentation of the reports
over the eight years, but overall, it yields qualitatively similar results to our normalized irreg-
ularities measure and hence we do report it separately.
11 Grep originated as a text search command of the Unix operating system that searches for
matches of a string within a text. A regular expression specifies a set of small strings or
characters which can be interconnected by arithmetic functions (see also http://manpages.
ubuntu.com/manpages/precise/en/man1/egrep.1.html).
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Table 2.2: Auditing procedures over time
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
No. audited districts 32 62 38 47 17 18 16 47 0 5
Median audit duration [days] 5 5 5 12 51 49.5 46 47 - 5
Median report length [pages] 69 66.5 82.5 77 83 80.5 85.5 93 - 74
Median No. listed programs 30.5 28 29 22 18 16.5 17.5 17 - 19
Median No. irregularities 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.7 3.6 5.0 4.9 4.6 - 3.7
Median No. corrupt expressions 1 1 5.5 2 4 2.5 5.5 4 - 3
Note: Statistics refer to N=227 audit reports for 237 districts in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. Years refer to
the August-July cycle, with no audits between August 2010 and July 2011.
of expressions and an upward bias in the corruption measurement. We do not
have any reason to suspect these stylistic differences however to be systematic,
and we are convinced that the writing style of the auditors is fairly compara-
ble within specific years. After analyzing in detail the audit reports, we come
to the conclusion that reporting style has changed somewhat in the course of
the time but is structurally highly comparable for reports written within the
same year.12
Table 2.2 documents the changes in the number of irregularities and the
text based corruption measure over time, which show increasing trend in the
intensity of corruption findings. This is unlikely to reflect an overall worsening
of the corruption environment; if anything, existing literature on the effects of
public audits argues that electoral accountability tended to reduce corruption
over time (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Rather, it shows a gradual tightening of the
auditing procedures: Whereas the number of investigated federal programs
even decreased over the time period of our analysis, both the number of total
irregularities and that of corruption related expressions increased considerably,
with major structural breaks occurring in 2005 and 2009. Our subsequent panel
data analysis takes these changes into account by including state specific time
fixed effects in the main specifications, and hence identifying the audit effects
based on within state variation in any given year only. A second way to deal
with the time variation in reporting styles, which we will also pursue, is to
re-normalize the corruption measures on a yearly basis, and thus treat the
worse corruption findings within any year’s distribution as similar to each
other across the years.
For districts that were audited more than once (36 out of 237), we take the
average of the corruption measures in the cross-sectional analysis, and base the
corruption measure on the most recent audit report in the panel data models.
Figure 2.1 shows the spatial distribution of our treatment units as well as the
distribution of our irregularities and corruption measures.
12 Constancy in the writing style is further supported as highly competitive wages earned by the
auditors (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) provide an incentive to stay on the job and write many audit
reports.
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Figure 2.1: Audits and generated governance measures
Note: Maps are based governance measurements constructed with audit reports of the Brazilian Office of the
Comptroller General (CGU). Colored categories refer to the quintiles of the standardized measurements.
2.2.3 General hypotheses
2.2.3.1 Potential links between local governance and deforestation
The legal framework of forest conservation in Brazil is established mainly at
the federal and state level. Currently, considerable parts of the Amazon rainfor-
est are either under federal or state protection, which takes the form of integral
protection (National Parks, Ecological or Biological Reserves) and sustainable
use (National Forests and Extractive Reserves), or under indigenous manage-
ment (Pfaff et al., 2014; Pfaff, Robalino, Herrera, and Sandoval, 2015; Soares-
Filho et al., 2010). In the remaining areas, private landowners are required
to maintain 80% of their land under forest cover. The federal environmental
agency (IBAMA, the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natu-
ral Resources) is responsible for the enforcement of environmental laws, and
has increased its law enforcement activities considerably in the course of the
last decade. From 2002 to 2009, the size of environmental fines administered
per deforested area increased by about 18-fold, which has contributed to the
sizable decrease in deforestation rates during this period, most effective in ar-
eas of large-scale forest clearings (Börner et al., 2015a; Hargrave and Kis-Katos,
2013). The accompanying legal coercions (e.g., confiscations, conditional credit
and market access) convert the policy into a highly cost-effective instrument,
although a surprisingly small fraction of the environmental fines is actually
paid (Börner et al., 2014).
The economic interests of local ruling elites are often aligned towards unsus-
tainable uses of forest, both through capturing economic rents from logging
and through increasing the land available for cattle ranching or soybean plan-
tations (Cabral and Gomes, 2013; Fearnside, 2001; Godar et al., 2014). Since
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farming and logging are typically of central importance for local economies,
economic groups linked to these activities tend to have important political
power at the local level. Local politicians and mayors are themselves often ei-
ther loggers (owners of sawmills) or cattle ranchers (Neves, 2012; Silva, 2009).
But even where politicians themselves are not directly involved in these activi-
ties, they can benefit from close ties to large farmers and sawmill owners, who
play an important role in financing mayoral election campaigns.
Although forest management and the enforcement of environmental laws
are both centralized, and hence not under direct local control, the governance
quality in a district can affect deforestation dynamics in many ways. A corrupt
administration can contribute directly to unsustainable land use by tolerating
the illicit selling of untitled land and supporting large landlords in their vio-
lent expulsion of small farmers (Fearnside, 2001; Ludewigs et al., 2009; Neves,
2012). Large farms, supported by a corrupt administration, have it easier to
convert the land to pasture and start ranching cattle (Pacheco, 2009). A corrupt
administration can also collude with local sawmills fostering illegal logging.
Legal log selling is allowed to an amount of 15 cu. meter per hectare per year,
but falsified documents for further wood can be easily obtained and presented
to the sawmills (Fearnside, 2001). Corrupt administrations are prone to rent ex-
traction in this industry and contribute to deforestation (Amacher, Ollikainen,
and Koskela, 2012). The presence of illegal settlements within the forest is
another driver of deforestation. Once again, local administrations might de-
cide to be more accommodating towards illegal settlers. Indebted landholders
have also the incentive to invite squatters to invade their unused forested land
and to incorporate it into a settlement project, claiming compensation from
the Ministry of Agriculture afterwards (Fearnside, 2001). Moreover, local gov-
ernments can decide whether to support or even try to inhibit federal raids
aiming at the enforcement of environmental laws (Neves, 2012). Depending
on whether local officials cooperate with federal agencies, law enforcement
will be more or less credible to agents and therefore will reach varying lev-
els of effectiveness (Cabral and Gomes, 2013). Corruption on the district level
can also interact with the rural subsidized credit program, PRONAF (National
Program for Family Agriculture), which is designed to help small farmers and
settlers to implement sustainable agriculture. The selection of program benefi-
ciaries ought to be controlled by the local government. However, monitoring
incentives are low, whereas the incentives to defect on the subsidized loans
are great, since the PRONAF credit is tied to the lot rather than to the owner.
This leads to farm abandonment, re-concentration and deforestation of land
(Fearnside, 2001; da S. Martins and da S. Pereira, 2012; Schneider, 1993).
From a longer-term perspective, the failure to implement and maintain a
functioning public infrastructure is also a major channel through which a cor-
rupt district can foster deforestation (Ludewigs et al., 2009). Corrupt admin-
istrations might fail to produce crucial infrastructural services by capturing
government funds as well as rents from the logging industry. The resulting
poor physical as well as health and education infrastructure hinders consider-
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ably the economic and social viability of small settlements. As a result of poor
public services, small-scale farmers tend to abandon their properties or sell
them to neighboring farms, that once again leads to concentration of land and
an acceleration of deforestation. The process of forming protected forest areas
is another channel through which a corrupt administration can contribute to
higher deforestation rates. The central government program “Protected Areas
of Brazil” of the Ministry of Environment orders local governments to con-
tribute to the planning, implementation and management of protected areas
(Barreto and Silva, 2010; Fearnside, 2003; Neves, 2012). A corrupt administra-
tion might yield to lobbying from landholders, settlement projects, or squatter
associations, and show no interest in forest conservation. Corrupt local govern-
ments can also lobby the state legislatures against the enlargement of protected
areas. Some states welcome the involvement of local governments in the man-
agement of protected areas, and also leave them some discretionary power in
their establishment (Fearnside, 2001).
2.2.3.2 Potential effects of public audits on deforestation
The increased public scrutiny resulting from centralized and published fiscal
audits can be expected to lead to improvements in administrative procedures
and governance capacity. After audit information on the levels of corruption
and irregularities in a district gets publicly revealed, a corrupt administration
could be pressured both from its own citizens and the central government or
state judiciaries to improve its governance record. Electoral accountability and
legal prosecution are two powerful institutions that can lead to subsequent
improvement in the observed local governance quality.
Electoral accountability induces improvements in local governance if there
is a fair chance that local constituencies will vote for a different mayor in the
subsequent elections. Ferraz and Finan (2008) document that the findings of
the federal auditors were used by political adversaries before the district elec-
tions. They show that the publication of the audit reports has had a negative
impact on the performance of the incumbent in the subsequent elections, once
he has been revealed as highly corrupt. Ferraz and Finan (2011) find lower cor-
ruption records in districts that had first term mayors, since first term mayors
face reelection incentives and hence are more interested to keep the quality of
public service delivery higher.
The concern of legal prosecution can also induce improvements in local go-
vernance. Audit findings that discover large-scale corruption cases are more
likely to be followed up by the state judiciary, and can even lead to large fines
and incarceration of the public officials. The majority of the findings how-
ever concerns management irregularities or less clear-cut cases of potentially
corrupt activities where state legislatures have ample discretionary power to
decide what cases should be followed up in more detail. Litschig and Zam-
boni (2008) show that the physical presence of the judiciary, in form of the seat
of the judiciary district being within the district, makes public prosecution of
cases more probable and leads to less corruption findings.
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Improvements in governance quality can at the same time interact with the
ongoing deforestation dynamics. The increased public awareness and the in-
creased control by the central government and judiciary could affect the be-
havior of local administration in two different ways. The increased pressure
might improve overall government performance and reduce corruption in sub-
sequent time periods, improve among others the management of local agricul-
ture and lead to a better management of the forest resources in the district.
However, unintended consequences are also equally if not even more likely.
Increased monitoring efforts in a specific sphere of local public finance can
decrease monitoring capacities in other tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Local governments focusing on administrative reform might simply lack the
capacity to address governance issues affecting deforestation. At the same time
they might be tempted to shift corrupt activities from one area to another area
with less public scrutiny. The districts could shift their capture of funds for
example from educational grants or health-care subsidies to more collusion
with players of the agricultural sector, or towards collecting rents from illegal
sawmill operations. This latter mechanism would also be in line with the find-
ings of Burgess et al. (2012), who find a shift towards more deforestation in
Indonesia before elections, especially in areas with less possibilities to extract
rents from other natural resources.
The presence of audit effects on deforestation presupposes that local ad-
ministrations were imperfectly informed about the audits or had imperfect
foresight and failed to adjust their behavior perfectly when the new auditing
program was announced. Were precise information about all the modalities
of the audit programs common knowledge, and were local officials perfectly
foresighted about the chances of any specific activity being detected by the
auditors, they should have adjusted their behavior even before they were ran-
domly selected to be audited. Under perfect information and foresight, we
should see deforestation only be affected by the introduction of the program
in 2003 in both audited and non-audited districts alike, and no further audit
treatment effects should be expected. If however audits induce local adminis-
trations to update their beliefs about what types of activities federal auditors
scrutinize, they will adjust their behavior once learning about the audit modal-
ities. This learning can take place when a district is audited but potentially
also when neighboring districts undergo an audit process.
2.3 data
Our main sample includes all districts in the Brazilian Legal Amazon that
had more than 5% forest cover in 2002 and were observed by the satellite-
based monitoring system of the National Institute for Space Research (INPE).
Since 1988, INPE monitors deforestation in the region annually using image
interpretation of the Landsat satellite, within the so called PRODES project
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(INPE, 2008a).13 From 1988 to 2002 deforestation rates were calculated based
on visual interpretation of satellite imagery. Starting with 2002, imagery in-
terpretation has become partially automatic. PRODES measures annual rates
of forest clearing with a resolution of 30 meters. Using 228 scenes of Land-
sat and CBERS satellites.14 PRODES spatial data on deforestation polygons
is released on the internet for public use. Annual rates for districts are pub-
licly available. Owing to technological advances and the incorporation of new
satellite data into the system the calculation methodology changed over time.
We therefore opt to use the spatial data available and aggregate own rates of
yearly newly deforested district area in square kilometers.15 Annual rates are
computed from August of one year through July of the following year, since
these are the months with the least cloud cover in the region.16 After exclud-
ing six further districts (state capitals and/or districts with population above
500,000) that were exempt from the public audit program entirely, we end up
with a balanced panel of 550 districts over eleven years (from 2002 to 2012).17
Figure 2.2 visualizes the spatial distribution of yearly deforestation rates
(normalized by forest size in 2002). The maps demonstrate large differences in
the deforestation pressure between the peripheral forest (the so-called “defor-
estation arc”) and the less affected central areas. At the same time they show
clearly an overall reduction in deforestation in the second part of the decade,
which has been attributed to falling product prices, and the increasing effec-
tiveness of the environmental police (IBAMA).
We combine this information on deforestation with information on the tim-
ing of the randomized audits in 237 sample districts, as well as with local
governance information derived from the audit reports, which constitute our
main explanatory variables of interest. Further information on local elections,
the mayor’s term limits, the presence of local radio stations and radio penetra-
tion come from the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). In order
to contain measurement error, we use yearly information on cloud coverage
(which affects the observability of deforestation) and the size of district area
13 PRODES project, satellite monitoring system of the Brazilian Amazon Forest, http://www.obt.
inpe.br/prodes/index.php
14 The number of pathrows increased over the time period reaching 228 in 2009. Yearly defor-
estation data are calculated using data of the latest cohort in 2012.
15 Our aggregation method only deviates little from the PRODES method. Main changes are:
1) We do not calculate hypothetical deforestation rates below clouds but choose to con-
trol for cloud cover as a measurement error in regressions. 2) We use only the latest land
use classification map in 2012, which assures a consistent forest cover base for the be-
ginning of our time frame. A detailed description of the methodology can be wound in
Cisneros et al. (2015a), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/asset?unique&id=info:
doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0136402.s016 or in section B.1
16 We measure time according to the deforestation years, and hence also adjust panel control
variables to the same August-July time window.
17 The six excluded districts are Manaus, Belém, São Luís, Proto Velho, Rio Branco Macapá. Boa
Vista, Cuiabá and Palmas were excluded as non-forested districts. Our observations come from
nine Brazilian states: Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Roraima, Rondônia, Tocantins, Mato
Grosso and Maranhão.
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Figure 2.2: Yearly deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon districts
Note: Maps are based on yearly deforestation data from INPE/PRODES normalized by the
remaining forest cover in 2002. Increasing shares are colored from green to red.
not observed by the PRODES project as controls, both of which come from
INPE.
For the descriptive analysis of the long-term relationship between local go-
vernance and deforestation, we take total deforestation between the years 2002
to 2012 as dependent variable, and add further initial and geographic condi-
tions as controls. Data on initial forest size and savanna coverage come from
the PRODES project of INPE. The population and GDP data are acquired from
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the latter is mea-
sured in real per capita terms, deflated by the national consumer price index.
The distance to Brasilia is calculated as the beeline to the district capitals.18
The data on settlement projects are from the Brazilian Agency of Agrarian
Reform (INCRA) and the Institute of Man and Environment in the Amazon
(IMAZON). The data on protected areas come from the Department of Pro-
tected Areas of the Brazilian Environmental Ministry (DAP/MMA). Summary
statistics of the cross-sectional and panel data are presented in Table A.1 and
A.2.
18 Calculations with spatial data are conducted on a PostgreSQL 9.2.3 server with the Post-
GIS 2.0.1 add-on.
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2.4 local governance and deforestation
A first way to assess the relationship between average local governance quality
and deforestation is to regress total deforestation in a district over the time
period between 2002 and 2012 on the average corruption findings from the
audit reports. This approach assumes that the corruption measures based on
punctual audits reflect well the underlying more or less constant corruption en-
vironment.19 Our corruption measures are based on audit reports published
within this time frame, constructed as described in section 2.2. We use both
the number of administrative irregularities listed in a report, normalized by
the total number of investigated programs, and our text-based corruption in-
tensity measure. Whereas the first one depicts general administrative quality
in the district, it is much broader in scope than our direct corruption measure.
We believe, our second measure captures closer the extent of clearly corrupt
violations and hence the corruption environment in the district. To ease inter-
pretation, we standardize both governance measures to have zero mean and
a standard deviation of one. In order to correct for structural shifts in our go-
vernance measures over time, we also test governance variables that have been
standardized yearly and hence reflect the variation in governance measures
within any given audit year.
We estimate linear regression models for a cross section of 237 sample dis-
tricts, explaining deforestation over the whole time period by a list of time
invariant factors and initial conditions.20 We include our two corruption prox-
ies as main variables of interest in regressions of the following form:
lnDi = Xi0β+ γCi + κs + ui. (2.1)
The dependent variable lnDi is the natural logarithm of the total cumulative
deforestation over the years 2002 to 2012 in district i. We proxy for governance
failures Ci by both the relative number of irregularities and our text-based
corruption measure. The vector of initial conditions Xi0 includes three sets of
variables: baseline controls for scale and measurement errors, and two further
sets of geo-climatic factors and initial socio-economic conditions. Differences
across states are captured with state dummies κs.
Table 2.3 shows the results, where the first three specifications use our pre-
ferred text-based corruption measure, and the second three columns the rela-
tive number of irregularities as the main explanatory variable. Panel A presents
the estimated coefficients of the standardized governance variables and all
other controls, whereas panel B shows only the coefficients on the yearly stan-
dardized governance variables from otherwise identical regressions. Specifica-
tions (1) and (4) control only for scale factors (the natural logarithm of initial
forest size), which capture differences in the size of land that can be poten-
tially deforested, and measurement error (the log of the average yearly area
19 At least constant during our time frame 2002-2012
20 We exclude 10 districts from the original sample of 237 audited originally forested districts
due to incomplete data on some of the socio-economic control variables.
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covered by clouds and hence not observable by the satellite project). Columns
(2) and (5) add further controls for savanna coverage (in %), the log distance to
Brasilia, the log of initial population, and the log of initial pc. GDP in agricul-
ture. Some of these variables are truly exogenous capturing geographic factors
(savanna coverage, distance to Brasilia). The other initial conditions are prede-
termined (initial forest size in year 2002, population in 2000 and pc. GDP in
agriculture in 2002) as they cannot be influenced by future deforestation rates.
Savanna share captures the size of district area that was never rainforest and
is hence not monitored by the satellite project.21 The distance to Brasilia serves
as an overall proxy for remoteness, also capturing the distance to the major
markets. Socio-economic initial conditions control for deforestation pressure.
Population pressure is accounted for by initial population size, which can both
increase the demand for agricultural land (Fearnside, 2001), and lead to a frag-
mentation of agricultural lots, potentially inducing deforestation (Ludewigs
et al., 2009). Initial per capita GDP in agriculture controls for the scale of agri-
cultural production in the district, which is also related to the demand for land
and can induce lot consolidation (Ludewigs et al., 2009). Models (3) and (6) ad-
ditionally include initial policy conditions (the size of protected and officially
designated settlement areas) that are potentially interdependent with the cor-
ruption environment. Protected areas are distinguished between multiple-use
reserves, strictly protected reserves and indigenous territories. The designation
of protected areas and settlement projects is under state or federal administra-
tion control. Nonetheless, we expect these variables to be more closely related
to local governance as these policies can be promoted or impeded by local
officials. These policies constitute as channels through which local corruption
could affect the overall deforestation dynamics. The initial size of settlement
projects can be expected to increase deforestation pressure both through land
clearing and by inducing further migration (Fearnside, 2001). By contrast, pro-
tected areas, if effective, should inhibit deforestation.
Standardizing governance measures over all years reveals no significant re-
lation to deforestation level (cf. panel A). Standardizing within each year in-
creases the size of coefficients and measures of corruption as well as irregular-
ities are positively related to deforestation on a 1% to 10% significance level
(cf. panel B). Districts with a one standard deviation higher corruption levels
from the average experience 25% more deforestation.22
All other covariates turn out significant (except indigenous territories) in
explaining deforestation and exhibit the expected signs. The positive signs
of initial forest size, population and agricultural GDP per capita indicate the
presence of scale effects. As expected, less deforestation is measured with in-
creasing average shares of cloud coverage over remaining forests (cloud error),
but also in areas covered by savanna, which are excluded from the satellite
21 Savanna coverage is denoted not-forest area within the data of the PRODES project. The latter
includes also swamp areas but these are comparably few in our region wide analysis.
22 Semi-parametric specifications including a number of quantiles of the governance measures
show that especially the correlation between deforestation and corruption is driven by signifi-
cantly larger deforestation in districts with very high corruption levels.
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Table 2.3: Relationship between total deforestation and corruption
Dependent ln Total deforestation
Governance var. Corruption Rel. irregularities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Gov. variables standardized over all reports
Gov. failures 0.083 0.042 0.069 -0.102 -0.096* -0.055
(0.066) (0.061) (0.060) (0.067) (0.057) (0.057)
Av. cloud error -2.109** -0.776 -0.301 -2.070** -0.724 -0.310
(0.833) (0.909) (0.788) (0.847) (0.905) (0.791)
ln Ini. forest 0.556*** 0.514*** 0.532*** 0.563*** 0.516*** 0.536***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047)
ln Dist. Brasilia -0.994** -0.839** -0.992** -0.842**
(0.482) (0.362) (0.473) (0.365)
ln Savanna area -0.020*** -0.007 -0.020*** -0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
ln Ini. pop. 0.331*** 0.230*** 0.335*** 0.241***
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066)
ln Ini. pc. GDP in Agr. 0.244*** 0.141*** 0.243*** 0.148***
(0.061) (0.054) (0.059) (0.054)
ln Ini. Multiple-use reserve -0.016** -0.015**
(0.007) (0.007)
ln Ini. Strictly protected reserve -0.018** -0.019**
(0.008) (0.008)
ln Ini. Indigenous territroy area -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
ln Ini. Settlement area 0.041*** 0.039***
(0.008) (0.008)
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 237 237 227 237 227 227
Adj. R-sq 0.577 0.630 0.683 0.579 0.634 0.683
Panel B Gov. variables standardized yearly
Gov. failures 0.221** 0.155** 0.165** 0.207*** 0.116* 0.150**
(0.086) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.066) (0.066)
Av. cloud error -2.791*** -1.172* -0.682 -3.082*** -1.333* -0.884
(0.643) (0.680) (0.657) (0.642) (0.691) (0.659)
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 237 237 227 237 227 227
Adj. R-sq 0.312 0.477 0.529 0.309 0.472 0.526
Note: The table reports OLS estimates with the dependent variable being the log of total defor-
ested area over 2002-2012 within the district. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Governance variables are standardized over all reports in the Legal Amazon in panel A and
standardized yearly in panel B. Columns in Panel B include the same additional controls as the
corresponding columns in Panel A. *,**,*** denote significance at 10/5/1% level.
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observations. The coefficient of the distance to Brasilia, proxying for economic
remoteness, shows a large difference between inner areas and the outer defor-
estation arc. We also also find a non-negligible correlation between the initial
size of protected areas (especially multiple-use reserve) and settlement projects
and subsequent deforestation, where the former tends to reduce although the
latter to foster deforestation.
The above estimations assume that detected corruption across our time
frame has a constant component and influences deforestation rates in all years.
We test if corruption levels are also related to deforestation in years close to
the auditing events. Therefore, we construct sums of deforestation within the
audit year plus one or two years (j) before treatment: Sji =
∑j
τ=1Dt−τ, where
t is the audit year of district i. This excludes deforestation occurrences after
treatment and tests if the relation holds for years close to treatment only. We
adapt the above model (2.1) to include state-time dummies κts where t refers
to the auditing year of a district, capturing structural differences across states
and time. We estimate:
lnSji = Xi0β+ γCi + κts+ ui. (2.2)
Table 2.4 shows results on the relationship between deforestation and corrup-
tion levels in years close to audits. Using the broader governance measure,
irregularities, the relation to deforestation is insignificant, regardless of the
standardization method (columns 4 to 6). Whereas using the more specific cor-
ruption measurement, all specifications show positive and significant relations
between the severity findings and deforestation (columns 1 to 3). Standardized
over all reports coefficients are significant on a 5% level, whereas standardized
within each years coefficients sizes decrease but keep significant on a 5% to 1%
level. Forest losses in years close to the audit are 61% to 83% higher in districts
with one standard deviation higher corruption findings. Revealing higher coef-
ficients when using as outcome variables only deforestation occurrences close
to audits confers the idea that corruption is better related to years before audit
than to the full time frame.
The above models depict a highly significant correlation between deforesta-
tion and our corruption measurement of local governance, even after control-
ling for major determinants of deforestation. However, these regressions can-
not be considered causal. For instance, the measured coefficient could be af-
fected by reverse causality if the demand for favors from the administration
increases with increasing forest clearing, in which case estimated coefficients
capture the total strength of the interrelationship. A potentially more serious
concern in terms of the endogeneity of the local governance variables is the
possibility of omitted variable bias. The economic structure of a district should
be a main driver of deforestation, but it is difficult to control for characteristics
of a district economy like the composition or the distribution of wealth and
power. We control to some extent for the level of economic activity in a district
with initial GDP per person in agriculture. Infrastructure or road density and
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Table 2.4: Relationship of near audit deforestation and corruption
Dependent ln Aggregated deforestation
Governance var. Corruption Rel. irregularities
Years before audit t t, t, t t, t
t-1 t-1, t-1 t-1
t-2 t-2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Gov. variables standardized over all reports
Governance failures 0.608** 0.598** 0.609** -0.145 -0.189 -0.151
(0.308) (0.303) (0.310) (0.258) (0.247) (0.271)
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 265 265 235 265 265 235
Cluster 227 227 212 227 227 212
Adj. R-sq 0.305 0.330 0.315 0.280 0.305 0.289
Panel B Gov. variables standardized yearly
Governance failures 0.537** 0.480* 0.525* -0.116 -0.142 -0.116
(0.259) (0.253) (0.286) (0.189) (0.186) (0.210)
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 265 265 235 265 265 235
Cluster 227 227 212 227 227 212
Adj. R-sq 0.302 0.324 0.309 0.281 0.306 0.289
Note: The table reports OLS estimates with the dependent variable being the
log of aggregated deforested area over zero to two years before an audit took
place within the districts. 36 districts were audited twice or three times hence
clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Governance variables are
standardized over all reports in the Legal Amazon in panel A and standardized
yearly in panel B. Additional controls include covariates of specification (3) in
Table 2.3. *,**,*** denote significance at 10/5/1% level.
road quality could also be important omitted variables, although the sign of
the bias is unclear. Roads are often identified as a major determinant of illegal
occupation of land and deforestation (Angelsen, 1999; Pacheco, 2009). How-
ever, lack of proper infrastructure can also lead to abandonment of land and
re-concentration of plots (Ludewigs et al., 2009).
Given these limitations, regressions of total deforestation on governance
measures do not lend themselves to a causal interpretation. Nonetheless, they
show some evidence for a relationship between deforestation and the auditors’
corruption findings in a district.
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2.5 public audit effects on deforestation
The publication of the random audit reports allows us to study the effects
of publicly revealed central audits on deforestation. As explained before, in-
creased scrutiny of the fiscal governance procedures by auditors can induce a
shift of corrupt activities to other, less observed spheres. Land use decisions,
which are not directly observed by the auditors but can directly affect defor-
estation, offer local administrations ample opportunities for generating illegal
revenues or political support.
We investigate both the average effect of the audits on deforestation in the
following years and the adjustment of deforestation dynamics following the
report. We assume that the treatment effect of the audits starts as soon as the
audits have taken place. Reports contain some information on the beginning
and end of the auditing process, as well as a date of the publication of the re-
port. On average, auditing starts 15 days after the lottery and takes ca. 24 days.
The publishing dates of the reports often contradict with the time frame of
the auditing process. Without any concrete information about the publishing
procedure we rely on the official dates of the lotteries as the beginning of the
auditing effect. A differential effect between the audit and the publication of
the reports can not be estimated because of the small time lag between these
events. The underlying panel data model can be written in the following form:
lnDit = γ1Ait +X ′itβ+ κst +αi + it (2.3)
where the dependent variable lnDit stands for the natural logarithm of the
newly deforested area in district i in year t, and Ait denotes the audit treat-
ment.23 The vector Xit includes the proxy for measurement error: the yearly
share of forest area covered by clouds. Cloud coverage affects the yearly pre-
cision of the observations on deforestation. The implied measurement errors
can be substantial — on average 15% of the forest area is unobservable because
of clouds — and the inclusion of this variable can be expected to increase the
precision of the estimate.
In these specifications we do not include any further policy variables or eco-
nomic controls as they are most likely jointly determined with deforestation.
State-time fixed effects, denoted by κst, control for average changes in environ-
mental and other economic policies (notably, changes in rural credit policies
and the increasing stringency of the environmental police), as well as macroe-
conomic shocks and average fluctuations in agricultural product prices, all of
which can affect deforestation decisions. In our preferred specifications, we
allow the time effects to be state-specific and hence identify the audit effects
based on variations in deforestation of districts within the same state. All time
23 The auditing dummy Ait turns one with the beginning of the subsequent year (August to July
period) in which the lottery took place.
40 environmental effects of anti-corruption strategies
invariant locally idiosyncratic factors affecting deforestation are captured by
the district fixed effects αi.
The centralized fiscal audit and the subsequent publishing of the audit re-
port in a given district constitutes our treatment indicator Ait. In case of re-
peated audits (33 districts in our sample have been audited twice and four
district even three times), the treatment variable measures the number of au-
dits that have been carried out until the given year. Lotteries and audits were
conducted throughout the year and we cannot expect an audit to take effect on
the accumulated deforestation of the full year. We therefore set the treatment
indicator between zero and one according to the share of the year it could still
have taken an influence on deforestation. We specify this treatment effect in
various forms, capturing either the average effect for all the years after the au-
dits or yearly treatment effects. Were the governance environment to improve
in all respects after increased scrutiny, this would be reflected in negative γˆ1
coefficients. However, if increased public attention on the management of local
district finances leads to a diversion of corrupt activities toward less observed
sectors, deforestation will increase, yielding a positive γˆ1.
We estimate Equation 2.3 in a first difference form, eliminating the district
fixed effects αi through a difference specification.24 The average effect of the
audit treatment is captured by estimating the following model:
∆ lnDit = γ1∆Ait +∆X ′itβ+ κst + υit, (2.4)
where γ1 measures the average audit effect on deforestation in all years fol-
lowing the audit. In all models, we cluster standard errors at district level,
allowing thus for any form of autocorrelation within a district.
The first difference estimates of the average public fiscal audit effects are
presented in Table 2.5. Column (1) shows the results from regressing first dif-
ferences of deforestation on the treatment indicator only. The treatment coeffi-
cient is insignificant and close to zero. The measurement error proxy (clouds),
included as a further control starting with column (2), turns out as highly
significant on a 1% level. Its negative coefficient is close to one and rightly
indicates that with an increase of 100% in the area covered by clouds detected
deforestation falls to zero. Column (3) adds year fixed effects that capture
common shocks, whereas column (4), our preferred specification, allows the
year effects to vary across the nine states, capturing thus state-wise differences
not only in the overall economic and policy environment, but also potential
differences in the implementation of the audits or the strictness of the pros-
ecution. When allowing for variations within years and states the size of the
treatment coefficient increases but stays statistically insignificant. The two ad-
ditional columns (5, 6) control for lottery round and district specific trends
by adding λi · t or λl · t to Equation 2.3, and hence λi or λl to Equation 2.4.
The first, λi, can account for district specific differences in the growth rates
24 The Harris-Tzavalis unit root test for short panels confirms very strongly the stationarity of
our deforestation data (Harris and Tzavalis, 1999).
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Table 2.5: Effects of public fiscal audits on yearly deforestation (FD estimates)
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Audit -0.008 0.000 -0.074 -0.107 -0.162 -0.161
(0.112) (0.111) (0.117) (0.123) (0.136) (0.146)
∆ Cloud error -0.979*** -0.932*** -1.101*** -1.109*** -1.148***
(0.167) (0.172) (0.181) (0.182) (0.200)
Year effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Lottery spec. trends No No No No Yes No
Munic. spec. trends No No No No No Yes
R-sq. 0.000 0.007 0.056 0.139 0.136 0.076
Note: The table reports first difference estimates, with the dependent variable being
the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Robust standard errors, clus-
tered at the district level, are reported in parentheses. The results refer to N = 5500
observations, for 550 originally forested districts. *,**,*** denote significance at the
10/5/1% level.
of deforestation; the second, λl captures all potential structural differences be-
tween the audit procedures following different lottery rounds. The inclusion of
these differential trends increases further the size of audit effects though ren-
ders no significance. We also investigate the effects of the audits on deforesta-
tion dynamics more explicitly. Repeating the analysis with different outcome
measures of forest conservation reveal similar results. Replacing the logarithm
of yearly deforestation with logarithms of yearly forest cover, fire incidence
detected by satellite images, or public rural credit show similar insignificant
results.25 Moreover using rates of deforestation over district area, over unpro-
tected area or remaining forest area has no influence on the significance of the
audit coefficient.
Figure 2.3 investigates the time pattern of the treatment effects more explic-
itly by decomposing the yearly dynamics of the public audit effects on defor-
estation. For this purpose, we split the treatment effect into a set of dummy
variables that capture how many years (j) have past since the audit:26
∆ lnDit =
6∑
j=0
γj∆Aijt +∆X ′itβ+ κst + υit. (2.5)
We follow the effects for up to six years after the audit year, which is the longest
time-period that we can observe after the first 2003 audits. For districts with
multiple audit treatments, the time dummies record the passing of time after
25 Credit access is typically associated with increases in deforestation.
26 With Aijt = Ait−j and filling up missing values with zeros before audit start.
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Figure 2.3: Yearly dynamics of audit effects on deforestation
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Note: The graphs report treatment coefficients and 90% confidence intervals as estimated by
equation (2.5). The left panel shows the yearly increment of the audit effect, the right panel
shows the total effect of an audit for each year after it took place, computed as a linear combi-
nation of the yearly incremental effects.
each audit. The yearly coefficients show that the null effect of the auditing on
deforestation evenly distributed over all years after the audit. The sign of the
coefficients switch over the years form negative to positive and back to nega-
tive. Despite a significantly positive coefficient in third year after auditing, we
cannot conclude any influence on deforestation rates. Overall, the cumulative
audit effect stays insignificant over all years.27
Regressions on potential misspecifiactions of the treatment timing in Ta-
ble 2.6 show that specifying incorrectly the timing of the audit treatment does
not yield significant treatment effects. For this purpose, we rerun the regres-
sion specified in Equation 2.4 (including state-year fixed effects) for re-defined
treatment variables that have been shifted by one to four years as compared
with the timing of the actual randomized treatment. We see that from the seven
reported treatment regressions 7 out of eight that shift the treatment to placebo
years turn out to be insignificant.28
The above results of the effects of public fiscal audits fail to show a causal
impact on deforestation rates. The audit treatment has been fully randomized
and covers the full Brazilian Amazon over 10 years. The large heterogeneity
over time and space in could diverging effects through potential impact chan-
nels of auditing in the next section.
27 We compute the cumulative audit effect as a linear combination of the estimated yearly effects
over the analyzed time period.
28 The positively significant coefficient in specification (8) for a treatment start after years could
best be attributed to a random data peculiarity.
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Table 2.6: Placebo treatment regressions (FD estimates)
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
Treatment year (t− 4) (t− 3) (t− 2) (t− 1) (t) (t+ 1) (t+ 2) (t+ 3) (t+ 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆ Audit -0.002 -0.076 0.061 -0.014 0.125 0.058 0.117 0.287* 0.294
(0.111) (0.121) (0.088) (0.090) (0.122) (0.139) (0.125) (0.163) (0.183)
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cloud error Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports first difference estimates, with the dependent variable being the change in the
log of yearly newly deforested area. The different columns present treatment effect estimates where
the actual treatment in year t has been shifted to t− 4 to t+ 4 for all districts. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1%
level.
2.6 potential channels
Public audits could affect deforestation through several channels. In order to
shed light on potential effects hidden within the insignificant average we inves-
tigate various interaction effects that can highlight differential effects of these
public audits, depending on the governance quality, neighborhood spillovers
and learning, political structure and electoral environment, or information dis-
semination in the audited districts. This approach has the limitation that lot-
tery draws were not randomized along some of the dimensions that we are
examining, most importantly, governance quality, but also media presence or
other socio-economic factors. In these cases, we cannot claim the same causal
link for the differential audit effects as with the overall audit effect. Other vari-
ables are less affected by this issue. Neighboring audits are subject to the same
randomization process and can be considered as fully exogenous, especially
once the common state-year variation, capturing also the progress of the audit-
ing process, is controlled for. Whether mayors serve their first or second term,
and hence are subject to reelection incentives, is also mainly path-dependent
and can be considered as good as random in our context. Overall, though less
strongly causal, the further evidence tests some potential mechanisms at play.
2.6.1 The role of local corruption and mismanagement
The effects of public audits on local administrations’ behavior can be expected
to depend on the local governance environment as well as the actual find-
ings of the auditors. If auditors are effective in discovering mismanagement
and corrupt practices, which is very likely given the very thorough auditing
procedures, the audit reports should reflect quite well the quality of local go-
vernance. If the audit report turns out to be very unfavorable, local officials
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can face increasing pressure, both from their political adversaries (Ferraz and
Finan, 2008), or from the judiciary (Litschig and Zamboni, 2008). As a con-
sequence, local governance quality can be expected to increase in the long
term. As described before, this can happen when very corrupt mayors lose
elections (electoral mechanism) or if local officials adjust their behavior in or-
der to comply more strongly with federal legislation in uneasiness of future
retributions (expected punishment mechanism). At the same time, however,
freshly audited local administrations might shift their rent seeking activities
towards spheres that are not monitored by this audit program. Local admin-
istrators who are more involved in corrupt activities could be more strongly
tempted to resort to other means of generating income when facing an increase
in fiscal scrutiny, for instance through promoting illegal land use. Moreover, if
the public pressure to reduce local corruption and mismanagement increases
with the severity of the corruption findings, this will reinforce the incentive to
search for political support among local landlords, leading potentially to more
deforestation.
In order to see whether deforestation increases in more corrupt districts,
we re-estimate Equation 2.4 by allowing treatment effects to vary with the
corruption findings in the reports Cit:
∆ lnDit = γ1∆Ait + δ1∆Ait ·Cit +∆X ′itβ+ κst + υit. (2.6)
To the extent that the audit based governance measures reflect the local cor-
ruption environment, we expect to see a larger audit response in more corrupt
districts. As before, we use both a measure of overall management related ir-
regularities and of more specifically corruption related findings to assess local
governance quality. The audit reports give us a measure of the quality of go-
vernance in the years preceding a given audit year. In case of repeated audits,
we substitute the new reported corruption level once revealed. Since auditing
and reporting procedures changed over the time period of seven years some-
what (cf. section 2.2), we apply two different procedures to scale governance
measures. First, we standardize corruption measures, which are normalized to
have zero mean and a standard deviation of one over all reports on districts
within the Legal Amazon. Second, since findings of corruption and manage-
ment irregularities increased consistently over the years (cf. Table 2.2), we also
experiment with governance measures that have been standardized year-by-
year. This second normalization only exploits the within-year variation across
the audited districts, and hence purges the governance proxies of all influences
that might come from structural changes in the reporting procedures over time.
Third, we split the treatment effect into two, for districts with above and below
median governance quality.
Treatment interactions with the two governance proxies (documented in Ta-
ble 2.7) turn out overall insignificant. Whereas models (1) and (2) standardize
corruption measures over the whole time period, columns (3) and (4) report
yearly standardized corruption measures. Columns (5) and (6) split the au-
dit effects into two, for districts with high and low governance quality. The
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first four columns show no average effect on districts deforestation. The in-
teractions with the governance variables meant to capture an increasing audit
effect with higher corruption or irregularity measures revealed to the public.
The overall insignificant coefficients indicate to no effect with decreasing go-
vernance quality. Splitting the treatment effect into two in columns (5) and (6),
for districts with higher/lower than median corruption findings/irregularities,
likewise derive into an insignificant relation although the difference between
the two treatment coefficients are sizable.
Table 2.7: Differential audit effects by governance quality (FD estimates)
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
Governance var. Standardized Yearly standard. Categories of
Corr. Irreg. Corr. Irreg. Corr. Irreg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Audit 0.125 0.124 0.126 0.130
(0.122) (0.114) (0.122) (0.123)
∆ (Audit × Gov. failures) -0.007 -0.012 0.032 -0.141
(0.060) (0.105) (0.095) (0.088)
∆ (Audit × -0.045 -0.031
Good governance (κ1)) (0.126) (0.078)
∆ (Audit × -0.220 -0.209
Bad governance (κ2)) (0.202) (0.187)
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sq. 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.138
Note: The table reports first difference estimates, with the dependent variable being
the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Corr. abbreviates the corrup-
tion measurement, Irreg. represents the relative number of irregularities per pro-
gram audited. Standardized governance variables are standardized over all reports
to have a zero mean and standard deviation of one. Yearly standardized variables
have a zero mean and standard deviation of one for all reports from the same year.
Good/bad governance are indicator variables for governance findings above/below
the median. For corruption, this indicates more than 3 corrupt expressions, for ir-
regularities, more than 2.6 irregularities per investigated program. Further controls
include first differences in Cloud error. The results refer to N = 5500 observations,
for 550 districts. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are reported
in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level.
2.6.2 Learning and neighborhood effects
The unexpected anti-corruption measurement could have stronger effects in
its initial phase. After audits take place, district officials update their beliefs
about the likelihood that specific forms of corruption or mismanagement are
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going to be discovered by the federal auditors as well as about the potential
costs of these activities. Among others, they might realize that deforestation
related activities are not among the audited outcomes.
If learning and the updating of prior beliefs play an important role we ex-
pect the auditing program to take greater influence in the initial years of the
program. Further, the analysis of neighborhood effects can provide useful ev-
idence on this mechanism. Before the district gets audited, local governments
might be only imperfectly informed about the exact auditing procedures, the
scope of the investigations, the thoroughness of the auditors and hence their
likelihood to discover specific forms of mismanagement and corruption. How-
ever, since information flows relatively easily between direct neighbors, local
governments should also be able to learn from the audit experiences of neigh-
boring districts and update their beliefs about the modalities of public audits.
We would thus expect that local administrations will adjust their behavior not
only after a public audit of their own books and procedures but also after
audits of neighboring districts took place. If during the first years of the pro-
gram audits lead to a shift in the deforestation trend at the local level either
by shifting attention to fiscal management or shifting corrupt activities to non-
audited fields, learning about the audits of other districts should also shift the
the deforestation trend.
We analyze changing audit impact over time by dividing the audit effect into
33 auditing dummies for each lottery. The auditing effect Ait in Equation 2.4
is replaced by the interactions with lottery dummies λl:
∆ lnDit = ∆Ait λl γ+∆X ′itβ+ κst + υit. (2.7)
Figure 2.4 graphically depicts the the coefficient vector γ of auditing effects
across lotteries. The graph shows an somewhat erratic path of effect sizes,
switching from positive to negative coefficients. The impacts of the prelimi-
nary first two lotteries are insignificant. Coefficients are negative up to lottery
5. Between lottery 6 and 11 coefficients stay positive over a longer period, with
a 10% significance in lotteries 8 and 10. Subsequently, signs in lotteries 12 to
33 switch between positive and negative and only reach significance in rounds
15, 17, and 22. Low significance levels arise from the small size of each inter-
vention cohort. Only 7 to 13 districts are audited within the Brazilian Amazon
per lottery.29 Owing to the sporadic significance levels and unclear impact di-
rections we cannot interpret these result as causal. If any learning effect took
place it must have had a delayed start with the sixth lottery, which took place
in October 2003 half year after the first lottery.30
We address learning from neighbors by including the change in neighbor-
ing audits, measured by the number of neighboring districts that got newly
29 The first two lotteries only selected 1 and 7 districts our sample, respectively.
30 The sixth lottery lies within the 2004 deforestation year period (August-July) and therefore
takes effect from 2005.
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Figure 2.4: Audit effects on deforestation by lottery
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Note: The graph reports treatment coefficients by lottery round and 90% confidence intervals
as estimated by Equation 2.7.
audited in a specific year
∑
A−it, into the difference Equation 2.4 as a further
control:31
∆ lnDit = γ1∆Ait + θ1∆
∑
A−it +∆X ′itβ+ κst + υit. (2.8)
Since audits are randomized at the state level, neighboring audits can also be
treated as exogenous and estimated in first difference form. We expect learn-
ing from own audits as well as learning from neighboring audits to shift de-
forestation patterns. The coefficients γ1 and θ1 should point to the same di-
rection having either both positive or negative signs. However, learning from
neighbors should play a smaller role as soon as the district itself gets audited.
And learning from own audits should have lower effects when neighbors were
31 For the spatial analysis, we had to exclude one control unit that had no direct neighbor in our
sample of forested districts.
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previously audited: we incorporate this idea by adding a further interaction
between own and neighboring audits:32
∆ lnDit = γ1∆Ait+θ1∆
∑
A−it+µ1∆Ait ·∆
∑
A−it+∆X ′itβ+κst+υit. (2.9)
Moreover, neighboring audits can affect deforestation not only through learn-
ing from neighbors’ experiences, but also by fostering deforestation in neigh-
boring districts. Since deforestation is a spatially diffuse process, neighboring
deforestation can have spillover effects also on its own (cf. Hargrave and Kis-
Katos, 2013; Robalino and Pfaff, 2012). To additionally control for this channel,
we add to Equation 2.9 a spatial lag in deforestation, weighting the changes in
the neighboring deforestation vector ∆ lnD−it with a vector of spatial contigu-
ity W, which is normalized so that spatial weights sum up to one:
∆ lnDit =γ1∆Ait + θ1∆
∑
A−it + µ1∆Ait ·∆
∑
A−it + λW ′∆ lnD−it+
∆X ′itβ+ κst + υit.
(2.10)
The introduction of the spatially lagged dependent variable as a further ex-
planatory factor raises however endogeneity concerns. This is the reason why
we also re-estimate the spatial panel equation with a spatial panel GMM pro-
cedure, instrumenting for the endogenous spatial lag within the model.33
Table 2.8 presents no evidence for learning from neighboring audits. Col-
umn (2) shows that one additional audit in a neighboring district in a given
year has no effect on deforestation. The interaction between own and neighbor-
hood audits is significantly positive in column (3). Nonetheless, the combined
effect of own, neighbor and interaction effect remains insignificant. The en-
dogenous spatial lag turns out significant in specification (4) and it reduces
the audit effects on deforestation in size and renders the neighbor audit ef-
fect insignificant. Addressing the endogeneity of the spatial lag in a spatial
GMM procedure in column (5) increases the spatial lag coefficient and yields
negatively significant audit effects and a significant neighbor interaction ef-
fect. Adjusting for potential spatial autocorrelation of the error terms (column
6) largely reduces the coefficient sizes and yields once again insignificant im-
pacts.
32 If corruption activities are shifted promptly by the first audits, learning might only be
induced through the first auditing treatment. We test this by leaving all secondary own
and neighboring audits ineffective, recoding the audit indicators as: Asit = I(Ait > 0)and
As−it = I(
∑
A−it > 0) and estimating:
∆ lnDit = γ1 ∆Asit + θ1∆A
s
−it + µ1∆A
s
it ·∆As−it +∆X ′it β+ κst + υit.
Results show no qualitative differences in comparison with estimating Equation 2.9.
33 We perform the spatial panel regressions in R, whereas all other models are estimated in the
statistical package Stata™. In the spatial panel GMM we apply a fixed effect transformation,
instead of the first difference form. For reasons of convergence, in the spatial GMM only time
fixed effects but no state-time fixed effects are included. For the spatial analysis, we also had
to exclude two further districts that had no direct neighbors in the sample.
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Table 2.8: Neighboring spillovers from public fiscal audits
Dependent ln Deforestation
Model FD FD FD FD FE GMM FE GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Audit -0.125 -0.129 -0.266 -0.222 -0.258*** -0.099
(0.122) (0.122) (0.169) (0.145) (0.098) (0.074)
Neighb. audits 0.001 -0.026 -0.038 0.022 0.008
(0.043) (0.046) (0.042) (0.025) (0.017)
Audit × 0.080* 0.061 0.068** 0.078
Neighb. audits (0.046) (0.040) (0.028) (0.018)
Spatial lag 0.905*** 0.963*** 1.024***
(0.069) (0.049) (0.129)
Spatial error -0.887
Cloud error -1.099*** -1.100*** -1.100*** -0.421** 0.026 -0.031
(0.179) (0.180) (0.180) (0.178) (0.133) (0.065)
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 5500 5490 5490 5490 6039 6039
No. districts 550 549 549 549 549 549
R-sq. 0.218 0.221 0.222 0.348
σ2 1.922 1.322
Note: Columns (1) to (4) report OLS estimates in first difference form, with robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the district level. Columns (5) and (6) report spatial panel GMM
estimates of a fixed effect transformation, correcting for spatial dependence. These latter
results are estimated in R with the splm package from Millo and Piras (2012); all other
empirical results in this chapter are estimated in Stata™. *,**,*** denote significance at the
10/5/1% level.
We used lottery specific estimates and neighborhood estimates as tests for
differential learning processes. Disentangling the zero average led to no con-
sistently diverging effects of auditing on deforestation.
2.6.3 Electoral considerations
Reelection considerations could offer us an important explanation for the ob-
served reaction of deforestation to public audits. Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011)
document that for Brazil as a whole, electoral accountability has played an
important role both in explaining differences in district corruption levels, and
in the effects of the publicly revealed audit information. In districts that got
audited before the 2004 local elections, more corrupt mayors had significantly
worse re-election chances than in districts that got audited after the elections
(Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Moreover, because of a two-term limitation for may-
ors, first term mayors face larger incentives to perform well in order to be
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reelected. As a result, corruption levels measured by the audits turn out gener-
ally lower in districts with mayors who serve their first term (Ferraz and Finan,
2011). Similar findings can also be replicated within our sample of Amazonas
districts.
Table 2.9 shows that the probability of a mayor’s reelection in the district
elections of 2004 or 2008 was not affected by audits per se, but was reduced
if audits resulted in high corruption findings. Highly corrupt administrations
seem to experience significantly better chances of reelection. Though this ad-
vantage is reduced to zero when audits revealed corruption before elections.
We restrict our attention to those Amazonas districts that were audited for the
first time within a two-year window before the two district election rounds,
and where the incumbent was standing for reelection. We estimate the prob-
ability of reelection of the incumbent mayor separately for the two election
rounds and for the pooled sample of 188 districts. We measure local gover-
nance by corruption findings of the audit reports from just before the elections.
The coefficient on corruption shows that, as long as not audited, more corrupt
mayors were also more probable to be reelected, for 2008 and the pooled sam-
ple. The interaction between audit and corruption findings is negative and
significant for 2004, and the pooled sample. Auditing thereby offsets the re-
election advantage of corrupt administrations. This corroborates the findings
of Ferraz and Finan, by showing that in the Amazon districts audit reports
had similar effects as in Brazil as a whole, and mayoral chances of reelection
declined significantly with negative corruption findings.34
The above results, together with the more detailed evidence on Brazil as a
whole by Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011), indicate that electoral accountability
restricts rent extraction by elected officials. However, electoral considerations
can also have the opposite effect, especially in the case of rents that do not
worsen and potentially even improve the reelection chances of mayors in office.
If rent extraction through illegal deforestation benefits many local players, the
median voter might be in favor of more leniency towards deforestation. Once
audited, mayors facing reelection incentives might be in even larger need of
the support of local loggers or squatters, and hence might decide to foster or
tolerate more deforestation. We would thus expect that electoral considerations
should affect the local administrations’ response to the audits. Mayors who
face reelection incentives, should react more strongly to negative reports than
mayors who cannot be reelected. In Brazil, mayors face a term limit regulation
that restricts their mayoral activities to two consecutive terms. Although they
could still return to local politics after a break, this is a rather rare event: only
12% of second term mayors in the 2001-2004 term were reelected in 2008, and
only further 9% of them were running for a higher office (Ferraz and Finan,
2011, p. 1281). The term limit rule seems thus to effectively shape the political
horizon of the mayors.
34 The same results cannot be replicated when using our irregularities measure instead of cor-
ruption findings. We also do not see statistically significant differences in corruption findings
between first- and second-term mayors.
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Table 2.9: Audit reports and the probability of reelection
Dependent Second-term mayor
Election period 2004 2008 2004 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Audit -0.040 -0.070 -0.057 -0.041 -0.064 -0.064
(0.106) (0.102) (0.097) (0.099) (0.073) (0.073)
Corruption 0.039 0.093*** 0.070*
(0.071) (0.033) (0.036)
(Audit × Corruption) -0.252*** -0.126 -0.202**
(0.096) (0.140) (0.082)
No. observations 94 94 125 125 219 219
No. districts 94 94 125 125 188 188
R-sq. 0.002 0.045 0.003 0.030 0.004 0.029
Note: The table reports linear probability models estimated with OLS, explaining the
probability of mayoral reelection. The sample is restricted to originally forested Amazonas
districts that were audited within two years before the mayoral elections and where the
mayor was running for reelection. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for the
incumbent mayor winning the second term. The corruption measures are standardized
over all reports to have a zero mean and standard deviation of one. Clustered standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Linear
combination of all coefficients in columns (2), (4) and (6) are -0.283*** (0.107), -0.074 (0.173)
and -0.196* (0.101), respectively.
We address the effects of mayoral reelection incentives on deforestation by
introducing an indicator variable for the mayor serving his or her first term
FTit into Equation 2.4 and interacting it with the public audit treatment.35 In
further specifications, we differentiate between the mayoral reelection incen-
tives depending on the governance findings of the audit reports Cit, by intro-
ducing a triple interaction between audits, first term mayors, and governance
findings:36
∆ lnDit =φ1∆Ait +φ2∆FTit +φ3∆(Ait × FTit)+
φ4∆(Ait ×Cit) +φ5∆(Ait ×Cit × FTit)+
∆X ′itβ+ κst + υit.
(2.11)
We would expect worse governance findings leading mayors to re-adjust their
behavior more strongly if they stand for reelection, yielding a positive φ5 if
audits induce fiscal discipline and a negative φ5 if audits shift corrupt activities
35 In years when a change in mayors or mayoral terms takes place, our first term mayor variable
records the share of the August-July deforestation year for which the district was governed by
a first-term mayor.
36 For the electoral incentives analysis, we had to exclude one control unit for which we could
not complete information on the incumbent mayor during our time frame.
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Table 2.10: Public audit effects and mayoral term limits
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
Governance variable Standard. Standard. yearly
Corr. Irreg. Corr. Irreg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Audit -0.198 -0.269 -0.239 -0.267 -0.249 -0.278
(0.135) (0.175) (0.163) (0.175) (0.167) (0.169)
∆ First term mayor -0.024 -0.027 -0.026 -0.028 -0.026 -0.027
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
∆ (Audit × First term mayor) 0.106 0.086 0.100 0.091 0.124
(0.207) (0.192) (0.209) (0.199) (0.199)
∆ (Audit × Gov. failures) -0.123 -0.057 -0.109 -0.084
(0.175) (0.108) (0.176) (0.191)
∆ (Audit × Gov. failures -0.039 0.141 0.069 0.289
× First term mayor) (0.251) (0.255) (0.236) (0.256)
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 4990 4990 4990 4990 4990 4990
No. districts 499 499 499 499 499 499
R-sq 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151
Note: The table reports first difference OLS estimates, with the dependent variable
being the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Standardized gover-
nance variables have a zero mean and standard deviation of one for all reports. Corr.
abbreviates the corruption measurement, Irreg. represents the relative number of ir-
regularities per program audited. Further controls include first differences in Clouds
error Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are reported in parenthe-
ses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level.
towards deforesting sectors. The results of these regressions are documented
in Table 2.10. The coefficient on first term mayors is negative but insignificant:
deforestation is not lower under first term mayors per se (column 1). Similarly,
audits do not affect deforestation differently in districts with first or second
term mayors (column 2).
Columns (3) to (6) present no results which would indicate electoral incen-
tives in audited districts with high governance failures. Deforestation contin-
ues unaffected if mayors are audited with high corruption finding. Even when
these mayors face reelection incentives deforestation stays unaffected with the
triple interaction being insignificant.
Once again, these results cannot support the notion that in the face of in-
creased public scrutiny, there is a substitution of illegal activities towards less
closely observed areas. Reelection incentives have no play in this process: may-
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ors who can stand for reelection are equally unaffected by audit reports than
second term mayors.
2.6.4 Public and legislative pressures
Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) argue that information dissemination plays an
important role in explaining the audit effects on local governance, and find
especially larger audit effects in districts with a local radio station that can
disseminate news. We cannot confirm these effects strongly in our sample. In
order to test for this effect, we control for the presence of local radio stations
by an indicator variable which takes one if the district had a radio station ei-
ther in 2004 or in 2009.37 In Table 2.11 we split the effect of audit treatment
(and governance interactions) for districts with and without radio stations. We
do not find a significant detrimental audit effect in districts with radio sta-
tions, and no significant effect in districts without a radio station. Nonetheless,
the coefficient with radio stations is positive and the coefficient without ra-
dio stations is negative. Both are not statistically different from zero though
statistically different from each other. With 5% significance, audits in districts
with radio stations experience approximately 33% higher deforestation levels
than audited districts without radio stations.38 This finding is in line with the
literature that would predict that audits are only relevant if audit information
gets disseminated by the local media. Differentiating, between districts with
and without radio stations and with respect to corruption findings (columns 2)
show insignificant coefficients. In column (3) we interact with the standardized
number of findings on mismanagement in the reports. For districts with radio
stations, the increase in revealed irregularities leads to a significant increase in
deforestation rates by 20.5%. However, the radio station variable might have
several drawbacks. First of all, it is not randomly distributed over the audited
districts and might pick up also the effects of other confounding economic
factors. Secondly, information is only available for one or two years over the
whole time period and thus cannot capture well changes in the media environ-
ment. Since only a smaller share of urbanized Amazonas districts do actually
have a radio station, it is possible that these variables are not the best proxies
for the quality of information flows in this area.
Litschig and Zamboni (2008) show that judicial presence in a district reduces
the likelihood that audits will discover administrative irregularities by about
0.3 standard deviations, although it does not affect corruption on the inten-
sive margin. In order to test for the importance of this channel, we assembled
information on the presence of a judicial seat within the district in 1999 and
37 IBGE recorded the presence of local radio stations in 2004 and 2009; over this time period
11.3% of districts in our sample switched from no station to having a radio station or the other
way around, whereas only 13.4 % have had consistently access to local radio and 24.7% had
at least once a radio station.
38 The difference audit coefficients in districts with radio stations versus no radio stations is -
0.350 = -0.217 - 0.133. The impact of these indicator variables on deforestation can be calculated
as [e−0.217 − 1] − [e0.133] = −0.337.
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Table 2.11: Public audit effects and radio stations
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
Governance variable Standard.
Corr. Irreg.
(1) (2) (3)
(a) ∆ (Audit × No radio station) -0.217 -0.206 -0.217
(0.158) (0.147) (0.157)
(b) ∆ (Audit × Radio station) 0.133 0.107 0.095
(0.096) (0.084) (0.085)
(c) ∆ (Audit × Gov. failures × No radio station) -0.061 -0.253
(0.155) (0.170)
(d) ∆ (Audit × Gov. failures × Radio station) 0.091 0.187*
(0.142) (0.109)
p-value of test (a) = (b) 0.047 0.052 0.070
p-value of test (c) = (d) 0.466 0.032
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Cloud error Yes Yes Yes
No. districts 550 550 550
No. observations 5500 5500 5500
R-sq 0.139 0.138 0.139
Note: The table reports first difference OLS estimates, with the dependent
variable being the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Yearly
standardized governance variables have a zero mean and standard devia-
tion of one for all reports from the same year. The omitted category are
districts and years without audit. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
district level, are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the
10/5/1% level.
2012. While in 1999 about 51% of Amazonas districts had judiciary seats, this
number increased to 61% by the end of the period.39 Since yearly data on
judiciary presence throughout the whole period are unavailable, we build the
interaction terms in two ways: both based on historical (1999) and recent (2012)
information. When splitting the districts into two categories, with and without
direct judiciary presence in 1999, districts do not differ with respect to the de-
forestation after audits (cf. Table 2.12). Using the judiciary presence in 2012
(cf. Table 2.13), districts with judiciary presence experience diverging effects of
public audits on deforestation. Measuring governance quality by the standard-
ized number of irregularities found in reports, deforestation rates significantly
fall after audits in districts with no judiciary seat. A counter-intuitive result,
which we cannot explain by theory. Nonetheless, districts judiciary seats ex-
39 11% of districts in our sample established a judiciary seat between 1999 and 2012 and 1.8%
ceased to have a judiciary seat.
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Table 2.12: Public audit effects and judiciary presence (1999)
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
Governance variable Standard.
Corr. Irreg.
(1) (2) (3)
(a) ∆ (Audit × No judiciary seat) -0.105 -0.111 -0.090
(0.166) (0.174) (0.155)
(b) ∆ (Audit × Judiciary seat) -0.152 -0.139 -0.161
(0.175) (0.138) (0.170)
(c) ∆ (Audit × Gov. failures × No judiciary seat) 0.042 -0.322
(0.078) (0.234)
(d) ∆ (Audit × Gov. failures × Judiciary seat) -0.047 0.113
(0.192) (0.086)
p-value of test (a) = (b) 0.840 0.897 0.753
p-value of test (c) = (d) 0.663 0.248
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Cloud error Yes Yes Yes
No. districts 535 535 535
No. observations 5350 5350 5350
R-sq 0.139 0.139 0.139
Note: The table reports first difference OLS estimates, with the dependent
variable being the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Yearly
standardized governance variables have a zero mean and standard devia-
tion of one for all reports from the same year. The presence of judiciary
seat is measured in 1999. Further controls include first differences in ln
Clouds and ln Not observed. Robust standard errors, clustered at the dis-
trict level, are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the
10/5/1% level.
perience significantly higher deforestation rates after auditing. This is in line
with the expectations from the literature, but just as in the case of radio sta-
tions, the difference between the two groups of districts is not statistically
significant. The difference also remains when differentiating further judicial
effects by mayors who can seek reelection (cf. column 4-5) We thus find some
statistically significant difference in the adverse audit effects on deforestation
with respect to the potential strength of the threat of judiciary prosecution. A
limitation of this approach remains that since the placement of judiciary seats
cannot be considered as random, this selection bias might affect our estimates.
Overall, the results on media and judiciary presence point into the direc-
tion which could be expected based on findings of previous literature but all
differences are only statistically significant at lower thresholds.
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Table 2.13: Public audit effects and judiciary presence (2012)
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
Governance variable Standard. Standard.
Corr. Irreg. Corr. Irreg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) ∆ (Audit × No judiciary seat) -0.218 -0.221 -0.241 -0.213 -0.231
(0.208) (0.212) (0.209) (0.214) (0.216)
(b) ∆ (Audit × Judiciary seat) 0.047 0.017 0.028 0.027 0.031
(0.087) (0.088) (0.082) (0.090) (0.082)
(c) ∆ (Audit × Gov. failures × No judiciary seat) 0.050 -0.719* 0.030 -0.561*
(0.076) (0.390) (0.076) (0.303)
(d) ∆ (Audit × Gov. failures × Judiciary seat) -0.094 0.146** -0.096 0.040
(0.080) (0.072) (0.140) (0.119)
(e) ∆ (Audit × Gov. failures × No judiciary seat 0.032 -0.216
× First term mayor) (0.107) (0.587)
(f) ∆ (Audit × Gov. failures × Judiciary seat 0.272* -0.163
× First term mayor) (0.159) (0.162)
p-value of test (a) = (b) 0.233 0.291 0.227
p-value of test (c) = (d) 0.680 0.079
p-value of test (a) + (c) = 0 0.283 0.093
p-value of test (b) + (d) = 0 0.293 0.161
p-value of test (a) + (c) = (b) + (d) 0.133 0.052
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cloud error Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. districts 534 534 534 534 534
No. observations 5340 5340 5340 5340 5340
R-sq 0.145 0.145 0.147 0.147 0.147
Note: The table reports first difference OLS estimates, with the dependent variable being the
change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Yearly standardized governance variables have
a zero mean and standard deviation of one for all reports from the same year. The presence of judi-
ciary seat is measured in 2012. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are reported
in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level.
2.6.5 Unbalances after random assignment
The Brazilian random audit program was selected districts by lotteries be-
tween 2003 and 2012, which allowed us to analyze the effects of the program.
Nonetheless, remaining imbalances of important covariates related to treat-
ment could have biased our results. Above, we used political and electoral
characteristics to evaluate heterogeneous auditing effects. In this section we
evaluate the random characteristic of the program along these observable char-
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Figure 2.5: Covariate balance after matching
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.
acteristics and reduce remaining imbalances with a matching procedure. Both
average and heterogeneous effects are estimated.
We use genetic matching to reduce differences of covariate distributions be-
tween treated and control districts (Sekhon, 2011).40 Following Ho, Imai, King,
and Stuart (2007) a combination of matching with post-matching parametric
analyses is advantageous even where treatment was assigned randomly. Be-
fore and after balances are depict in Figure 2.5. Confirming the goodness of
the randomization the unmatched sample reveals low imbalances. Almost all
differences between the control and treatment group are below the commonly
used threshold of 0.25 standard deviations (Ho et al., 2007). After matching dif-
ferences are largely reduced towards zero. Close to perfect balance is achieved
for the political indicators, first term incumbent mayor and presence of a judi-
ciary seat.41
Table 2.14 shows estimates on average and heterogeneous auditing effects on
deforestation. In column (1) we firstly report the estimate on the unmatched
40 The genetic matching procedure finds controls based on an evolutionary algorithm, which
weights the observable covariates of the sample.
41 Genetic matching performed best in reducing imbalances with our sample confirming Dia-
mond and Sekhon’s 2013 development of the method.
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Table 2.14: Audit effects after matching
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
Unmatched Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Audit -0.162 -0.170 -0.162 -0.325 -0.058
(0.131) (0.135) (0.133) (0.189) (0.160)
∆ (Audit × -0.141
Stand. corruption findings) (0.109)
∆ First term mayor -0.031
(0.059)
∆ (Audit × 0.225
First term mayor) (0.211)
∆ (Audit × -0.218
Judiciary seat in 1999) (0.255)
State-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4630 4060 4060 4060 4060
Cluster 463 406 334 334 334
R-sq. 0.143 0.193 0.193 0.192 0.193
Note: The table reports first difference estimates, with the dependent variable
being the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Further controls in-
cludes first differences in Cloud error. Robust standard errors, clustered at the dis-
trict level, are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1%
level.
reduced sample, owing the lack of complete data in all districts.42 The auditing
coefficient is consistent to previous estimates, negative and insignificant. After
matching column (2) shows a similar sized insignificant auditing effect. This
hints to the fact that balances where already strong to begin with, meaning the
covariate distributions between controls and treatment groups were already
overlapping to a large extent. Further, interactions in columns (3) to (5) with
corruption findings, or our political indicators, first term mayors and judiciary
presence confirm forest cover loss to have no causal relation with the auditing
program.
2.7 conclusion
This chapter addressed the relation between corruption and deforestation and
investigated evasive effects of a federal anti-corruption program, which has
42 Owing to the incomplete information across covariates our sample reduces to 463 districts,
excluding 34 audited and 53 non-audited units.
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the goal of fighting corruption in district administration, on deforestation in
the Brazilian Amazon. For this purpose we connected yearly panel data on
deforestation dynamics from the PRODES project (for the years 2002-2012)
with information derived from the local fiscal audit program for 237 originally
forested Amazon districts. We used the public audit reports to construct and
overall measure of administrative quality by counting irregularities reported
by the auditors, as well as a more specific text-search-based semantic measure
of corruption intensity. On average, the descriptive evidence shows that over
the observed eight years, deforestation was higher in districts with a worse
corruption environment, and the relationship holds even when more socio-
economic controls are included.
The random fiscal audits, implemented by a national lottery, offer a unique
opportunity to assess the effects of anti-corruption initiatives on sectors not
directly audited/monitored within the program. We exploit the random dis-
tribution of the audits across 550 eligible and originally forested Amazon dis-
tricts as well as the random timing of the audits. We regress the size of yearly
newly deforested area on the public fiscal audit treatment in a first difference
framework that controls for district and state-year fixed effects. The results fail
to show any increase in deforestation after audits. This result stands in con-
trast to a previously unpublished version of this analysis (Cisneros et al., 2013)
presented publicly on several occasions where we had found a significant shift
after audits.43
We test several channels through which audits can have diverging effects on
deforestation. No differences occur in districts with worse corruption records
and we fail to confirm the hypothesis of learning though neighboring audits
where local administrations update their expectations and hence change their
behavior. Auditing seems to have played an important role on reelection out-
comes in the Brazilian Legal Amazon, confirming the study of Ferraz and
Finan (2008) who use the sample of Brazil. Nevertheless, when mayors face
reelection incentives, audit reports have likewise no influence on a subsequent
increase or decrease in deforestation.
The auditing program did target outcomes of government programs in in-
frastructure, health, education, etc. but did not target environmental perfor-
mance. Top-down monitoring and increased public scrutiny coupled with elec-
toral accountability mechanisms should ideally lead to overall improvements
in the governance performance of local governments. Nonetheless, incentives
to improve governance are stronger in areas where public scrutiny exists and
performance is measured. On the contrary potential unintended consequences
of anti-corruption activities, which can cause rent extraction could increase
in sectors less directly observed by the auditors and the public. The inability
to detect a shift to the forest sector could be explained by its incapacity to
43 Presented at the Conference on Development Economics and Policy (Ausschuss für Entwick-
lungsländer, AEL) 2012, Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) 2013
and the Conference of Biodiversity and Economics for Conservation (BIOECON) 2013.
Different analytical results are attributed to the update and extension of deforestation data of
the years 2010 to 2012, as well as a different coding for the beginning of auditing impacts.
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compensate forgone rents caused by the public auditing. Differently, corrupt
and audited local governments might experience high pressures to improve fis-
cal procedures and mitigate the legal consequences rather than trying to find
new sources of income. Such results do not question the benefits of central
and public monitoring in the fight against corruption, they show however that
anti-corruption strategies are unlikely to be successful in non-targeted areas.
Targeted policies for forest conservation implemented by the federal govern-
ment during the last decade have shown to be highly effective. The large ex-
pansion of the protected area network, field-based law enforcement operations
based on real-time satellite information about deforestation hotspots, credit re-
strictions to non-compliant farmers with the Brazilian Forest Code, as well as
cross-compliance incentives in form of blacklisting and shaming the highest
deforesting districts have significantly contributed to the 80% overall decline
in deforestation rates since 2004 (Arima et al., 2014; Assunção et al., 2013b; Cis-
neros et al., 2015a; Nolte, Agrawal, Silvius, and Soares-Filho, 2013; Soares-Filho
et al., 2010). Anti-corruption strategies could resolve the relationship of local
corruption and deforestation when embracing a multidimensional approach,
targeting local environmental performance.
3
N A M I N G A N D S H A M I N G F O R C O N S E RVAT I O N
abstract
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has dropped substantially after a peak
of over 27,000 sq. km in 2004. Starting in 2008, the Brazilian Ministry of the
Environment has regularly published blacklists of critical districts with high
annual forest loss. Farms in blacklisted districts face additional administrative
hurdles to obtain authorization for clearing forests. In this chapter we add
to the existing literature on evaluating the Brazilian anti-deforestation poli-
cies by specifically quantifying the impact of blacklisting on deforestation. We
first use spatial matching techniques using a set of covariates that includes
official blacklisting criteria to identify control districts. We then explore the ef-
fect of blacklisting on change in deforestation in double difference regressions
with panel data covering the period from 2002 to 2012. Multiple robustness
checks are conducted including an analysis of potential causal mechanisms
behind the success of the Blacklist. We find that the blacklist has considerably
reduced deforestation in the affected districts even after controlling for the
potential mechanism effects of field-based enforcement, environmental regis-
tration campaigns, and rural credit.
3.1 introduction
Brazil stands out as one of the few countries in the world where tropical defor-
estation rates have dropped over the past decade (Hansen et al., 2013). Emerg-
ing evidence from quasi-experimental evaluation studies on the effectiveness
of Brazil’s post-2004 strategy to combat Amazon deforestation unambiguously
suggests that environmental policy has come to play a major role in determin-
ing land use decisions in the region (Arima et al., 2014; Assunção, Gandour,
and Rocha, 2012; Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013; Maia et al., 2011; Soares-Filho
et al., 2010). In 2004, the Brazilian government has launched a Plan to Com-
bat Deforestation in the Amazon (PPCDAM in its Portuguese acronym). The
first two PPCDAM operated in 2004-08 and 2009-11, respectively, and the third
PPCDAM ends in 2015. Clearly, the drop in Amazon deforestation from over
27,000 sq. km in 2004 to less than 10,000 sq. km since 2009 results from a
myriad of factors including the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis on
international commodity demand (Canova and Hickey, 2012). Arima et al.
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(2014) provide a detailed account of the Brazilian environmental policy con-
text including statistical analysis of the overall effect of the most recent policy
measures on deforestation in the Amazon region.
3.2 blacklisting in brazil
Here we build on the approach chosen by Arima et al. to study whether and
how the list of priority municipalities (henceforth “district blacklist”) issued
by the Brazilian Ministry of Environment since 2008 played a measurable role
in reducing Amazon forest loss. Brazil has pioneered the use of blacklisting
as a forest conservation policy strategy and understanding its effect can help
us to assess the potential of transparency and accountability initiatives in the
conservation sector. We find that, on average, blacklisted districts have experi-
enced distinctly larger reductions in deforestation than comparable non-listed
districts and produce evidence that this difference is partially a genuine effect
of blacklisting.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we provide a brief background of
the Brazilian forest policy context and describe key elements of the Brazilian
blacklisting strategy. We also discuss the potential mechanisms and pathways
through which blacklisting might have contributed to reducing deforestation
beyond the combined effect of other policy instruments. Next we summarize
our empirical strategy to estimate the effect of blacklisting on deforestation,
highlighting the main differences between our approach and strategy used
in Arima et al. (2014). After documenting our data sources we present main
results and robustness checks. Subsequently, we discuss potential caveats of
our analysis in the context of the emerging literature evaluating conservation
programs and provide conclusions and implications for conservation policy
design.
3.3 forest policy background
Apart from a substantial expansion of the region’s protected area network
(Soares-Filho et al., 2010), field-based law enforcement operations targeted at
deforestation hot-spots by using remote sensing technologies have shown to be
important short-term success factors to forest conservation (Hargrave and Kis-
Katos, 2013). One of the reasons for the increased effectiveness of field-based
enforcement has been an intense collaboration between the Brazilian Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (IBAMA) and the state-level public prosecutors.
Public prosecutors have been shown to exert positive effects on environmental
policy outcomes by enhancing legal coercion (Müller, 2010). Especially in the
state of Pará, the public prosecutors have been involved in enforcing property
embargoes issued by IBAMA, where for example the MP’s have engaged with
meat packers and supermarket chains that were previously purchasing beef
from illegal sources (Arima et al., 2014).
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In addition, several Amazon states pioneered by the State of Mato Grosso,
introduced so called Rural Environmental Registries (CAR in its Portuguese
Acronym) that were recently combined in a federal registration system. Through
the CAR, landholders with and without formal property rights declare the
size and spatial boundaries of their land holdings, which enhances the govern-
ment’s ability to monitor compliance with the Brazilian Forest Code Börner
et al. (2014).
Complementary to government actions, measures to contain the effect of
cropland expansion were also taken by the private sector (Lambin et al., 2014).
The so called “Soy Moratorium” was an agreement among major soy bean
traders to not buy soy grown on land that was cleared after July 2006. Eval-
uations of the Soy Moratorium have produced mixed results, with indirect
land use change potentially compromising its effectiveness (Arima et al., 2014;
Gibbs et al., 2015).
Between late 2007 and early 2008, Brazil introduced additional measures to
reinforce field-based enforcement action. First, resolution 3.545 published in
2008 by the Brazilian Monetary Council (Conselho Monetário Nacional) limits
credit access to farms that are non-compliant with the Brazilian Forest Code
and conditions future credit access on proofs of compliance with environmen-
tal legislation. Assunção et al. (2013b) estimate that this measure has avoided
2,700 sq. km of deforestation between 2009 and 2011. Second, the Presiden-
tial Decree 6.321 (December 2007) created the legal basis for the Blacklist that
contains districts with outstanding historical deforestation rates. In blacklisted
districts, stricter rules with regard to the authorization of forest clearing ap-
plied and defined administrative targets had to be fulfilled in order to qualify
for a removal from the list.
Both decrees essentially operate as cross-compliance measures by making
access to credit (resolution 3.555) or authorization of forest clearings (Decree
6.321) conditional on compliance with forest law and registration requirements
respectively. A major difference between the decrees is that the credit restric-
tion applies to the whole Amazon biome, whereas only a subset of Amazon
districts is blacklisted. This difference allows us to adopt the empirical strategy
outlined in section 3.4.
History and impact logic of the Brazilian district blacklist. Decree 6.321,
published in December 2007, clearly defines the objective of the Blacklist as a
strategy to monitor and control illegal deforestation and prevent land degra-
dation. It states that the list is to be updated annually based on official defor-
estation statistics and specifies the complementary roles of IBAMA and the
National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCRA) in monitoring and register-
ing landholdings in the blacklisted districts. Three criteria are put forward as
being used to compose the blacklist, namely:
1. The total deforested area
2. The total deforested area in the preceding three years
3. The increase of deforestation of minimum three out of the past five years
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Figure 3.1: History of district blacklisting and blacklist criteria.
Note: Positive numbers in parentheses depict additions to the blacklist. Negative numbers
depict removals.
Figure 3.1 schematically depicts how the Blacklist has evolved since the publi-
cation of Decree 6.321.
In January 2008, the first Blacklist was published covering 36 districts. Seven
districts were added in both 2009 and 2011. The criteria for the removal from
the Blacklist were introduced in 2009. Removal was conditioned on registering
at least 80% of the eligible area (mostly privately claimed land) under the
CAR. Moreover, annual deforestation had to be kept below 40 sq. km. Only six
districts were removed as of 2012.
District blacklisting probably qualifies as the most innovative element in
Brazil’s multi-instrument conservation policy mix. To our knowledge no other
country has yet applied a similar institutional cross-compliance mechanism in
the forestry sector. The impact pathway of blacklisting is still unclear and very
little research on blacklisting as a governance mechanism exists. Jacobs and
Anechiarico (1992) argue that contractor blacklisting is a sensible and ethically
justifiable strategy to protect government organizations from fraud. China has
experimented with an environmental disclosure policy including publication
of lists of environmental regulation violators. A recent study found that this
blacklisting strategy has helped in engaging civil society stakeholders in envi-
ronmental governance (Tan, 2014). The study, however, concluded that effects
on behavioral change have been limited because of the country’s authoritarian
structure. In 2010, a synthesis report by the Transparency and Accountability
Initiative lists several largely untested assumptions regarding the impact chan-
nels of public disclosure policies. These include greater accountability through
transparency and stimulation of action among a wide range of stakeholders.
The report found that public disclosure policies have considerable potential to
improve governance in sectors such as public service delivery, natural resource
governance and donor aid (McGee and Gavent, 2010). Similar findings on pub-
lic disclosure policies are reported by Blackman (2010) and Tietenberg (1998).
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Among the potential impact channels of public disclosure policies, building
internal and external pressure in favor of desired action was likely to be the
most important motivation behind the Brazilian Blacklist.
A multi-institutional evaluation of the Brazilian government’s Plan to Com-
bat Deforestation in the Amazon (PPCDAM) concluded that “the priority
list [blacklist]. . . turned out to be a cost-effective means to stimulate co-
responsibility of district-level political elites-deforestation was ultimately also
a problem of mayors and the local society” (Maia et al., 2011, p. 41). Three
distinct types of mechanisms have been recognized playing an important role:
1. Administrative disincentive: economic burden of administrative com-
pliance measures motivate local stakeholders to take action. Specifically,
landholdings in the blacklisted districts are required to obtain a georef-
erenced certification with INCRA as a precondition for authorized forest
clearings.
2. Reputational risk: Public disclosure motivates action by public and pri-
vate stakeholders as well as the civil society at district-level to “defend”
the reputation of the district. The driving force behind this motivation
could, for example, be concern about losing future business opportuni-
ties or increased environmental monitoring and enforcement action.
3. External support/pressure: Blacklisted districts may crowd in financial
and logistic support from international NGO and public administrations
creating incentives for improvements in local governance. On the other
hand, blacklisted districts may also have attracted additional attention by
national and subnational law enforcement agencies, such as the Brazilian
Environmental Protection Agency (IBAMA).
We hypothesize that the administrative disincentive itself has played a minor
role in promoting forest conservation. The Blacklist introduces additional cost
to farmers that depend on legal clearing permissions because of the obligation
to register with INCRA. In consequence legal clearing rates may reduce. In
districts where a considerable share of the forest and agriculture-based econ-
omy relies on legal forest use and conversion, the moratorium on new licenses
for legal clearings may thus have increased registrations and reduced defor-
estation rates. On the other hand, if most of the land users in a district rely
predominantly on illegal deforestation, additional conditions attached to ob-
taining environmental licenses will, all else equal, only have small effects on
land users’ behavior.
Regarding the conditions to be removed from the blacklist, conditions such
as the 80% CAR registration target are considered to be separate from the ad-
ministrative disincentive channel. The reason for this is that these conditions
do not exercise direct restrictions on the political administration nor on indi-
vidual land users. Nonetheless, these rules generate costs if local stakeholders
take action towards getting off the list. Such actions could be induced through
both the reputational risk and through external support/pressure channels.
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There is anecdotal evidence that reputational risk has played a significant
role in bringing down deforestation in some of the blacklisted districts. In the
district Paragominas (state of Pará), for example, a local stakeholder initia-
tive to expand CAR registration and reduce deforestation rates was formed
when the district appeared on the 2008 Blacklist (Viana et al., 2012). One of
the motivations for the leaders of this initiative was reportedly the objective of
“. . . reverting the negative image bestowed by being on the red-list [meaning
blacklist]” (Viana et al., 2012, p. 23). Inspired by the “success” of Paragomi-
nas, the state of Pará launched a public support program (the Green Districts
Program) for districts that achieved removal from the Blacklist. Similar factors
played a role in the district Brasil Novo that was removed from the list in 2013
(Environmental Secretary of Brazil Novo-public event, Brasilia, 7.10.2013).
The third group of mechanisms-external support/pressure could also have
played an important role. Both national and international NGOs have concen-
trated efforts to support CAR registration in blacklisted districts in collabo-
ration with local and state-level government agencies. Support included both
technical-scientific and local logistic measures to enable CAR registration at
higher rates (The Nature Conservancy-interview, Belém, 4.10.2013). CAR reg-
istration exposes landholders to greater scrutiny by authorities and supporting
NGO’s and thus also a higher risk of being held responsible for illegal defor-
estation. A recent study on the effect of CAR on deforestation has nonetheless
produced ambiguous results with respect to deforestation outcomes (Azevedo
et al., 2014). In addition, blacklisted districts have been subject to more intense
enforcement activities by IBAMA during (but also before) the Blacklist was
published. Moreover, blacklisting could have influenced rural credit flows into
blacklisted districts as suggested by article 11 of Decree 6.321.
The empirical strategy described below is designed to measure the overall
effect of the blacklisting policy on deforestation and to capture the causal ef-
fect of the third (and to some extent the second) group of mechanisms. The
Brazilian blacklisting policy may have had a bearing on all three mechanism
categories. But, the reputational risk and external support/pressure channels
most closely represent the impact theory of public disclosure policies as dis-
cussed above (Tietenberg, 1998).
3.4 empirical strategy
The methodological challenge of evaluating the effect of the Blacklist on defor-
estation in the blacklisted districts consists of identifying a counterfactual sce-
nario of what would have happened in the absence of the Blacklist (Khandker,
Koolwal, and Samad, 2010). From the previous section, we know that blacklist-
ing was not random. Instead, regulators have used defined selection criteria
that were linked to historical deforestation. Regression Discontinuity Design
(RDD) is a commonly used evaluation technique for interventions where the
selection mechanism is known (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001) how-
ever unfortunately, only the three official criteria were made public, but not
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the exact approach, e.g., weighting used to arrive at the published blacklists.
Although past deforestation highly correlates with selection, it is not possible
to reproduce the first list of 36 districts based on the three published selection
criteria alone. Considering the first Blacklist criterion (see also Figure B.1), the
36 districts with the highest total forest loss as of 2007 include only 20 of the
blacklisted districts. The 36 largest deforesters during the years 2005 to 2007
(second criterion) comprise only 25 of the blacklisted districts. Finally, 206 dis-
tricts fulfill the criterion of three years of increments in deforestation during
the past five years (2003-2007) and only 14 of them are blacklisted. Three black-
listed districts (Ulianópolis Paranaíta, Porto dos Gaúchos) did not fulfill any
of the three criteria. Thus, we can only speculate which other criteria could
have played a role in composing the Blacklist. Moreover, our sample of treated
districts is too small for informative local linear regression analyses in a RDD.
Our approach relies on panel data with annual observations of deforesta-
tion and other covariates over eleven years that complement the relatively low
number of treated observations, i.e., only 50 districts were blacklisted as of
2012. Since most of our data are available only at district level, we choose the
district as our unit of analysis. We first use a first difference (FD) estimation
model to eliminate unobserved time-invariant district-level effects on defor-
estation. Second, we use matching on pre-Blacklist characteristics to reduce
model-dependence and the selection bias resulting from targeting the Blacklist
to districts with high deforestation rates (Ho et al., 2007). We abstain from esti-
mating treatment effects directly from the matched dataset, because we expect
a limited degree of common support. Instead we re-estimate our FD model
using the matched dataset. Third, we follow the strategy documented in Fer-
raro and Hanauer (2014b) to estimate the net treatment effect of blacklisting,
i.e., the treatment effect after controlling for potential changes in external pres-
sure and support measures (see previous section). This approach essentially
blocks the effect that blacklist-induced changes in field-based enforcement in-
tensity, rates of CAR registration, and rural credit flows could have had on
deforestation in blacklisted districts. The remaining effect is called the net av-
erage treatment effect and captures all impact mechanisms other than the three
above-mentioned causal mechanisms.
Following Jalan and Ravallion (1998), we derive the double difference estima-
tion model for our purpose as follows. Using yearly log deforestation (lnDit)
as the outcome variable, the panel fixed effect can be written as:
lnDit = + βBit + X ′it γ+ tZ
′
i δ+ ηt + αi + tκs + uit (3.1)
where Bit is the treatment variable indicating whether district i has been black-
listed at any time t, Xit is the vector for time-varying covariates, and Zi is a
vector of time-invariant covariates or the so-called “initial conditions”. Initial
conditions are interacted with the time variable t and thus remain in equation
3.2 below even after taking first differences. The underlying rationale is that
the deforestation trend is likely to be affected by pre-treatment local condi-
tions (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998). αi is the district-specific fixed effect, which
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captures all time-invariant locally idiosyncratic influences on deforestation,
year-specific effects ηt control for yearly changes to the deforestation trend,
common to all districts, notably macroeconomic or environmental shocks and
changes in the Brazilian environmental policies. State-specific effects κs cap-
ture differences in the implementation of federal laws on the state level. uit
denotes the error term. Both fixed effect and first difference estimators can be
used, but we proceed with the first difference estimator that is less prone to
serial correlation (Verbeek, 2008, p. 349). Taking first differences, equation 3.1
becomes:
∆lnDit = + β∆Bit + ∆X ′it γ+ Z
′
i δ+ ∆ηt + κs + ∆uit (3.2)
here the district-specific fixed effect is canceled out and the initial conditions
stay in the equation as time-invariant covariates (∆t = 1). In the first difference
form, the year specific effects to the trend are transformed to standard year
dummies ∆ηt.
The treatment coefficient β measures the average treatment effect, i.e., the
average change in deforestation due to blacklisting for all years after treatment
(shift in deforestation trend). Deforestation is measured over the period from
August to July (see S1 Text). Treatment indicators have to account for the fact
that blacklists were released at different points in the year. The first list of 36
districts was published at the end of January 2008 (see Figure 3.1). Hence, we
set treatment Bit to 0.5 to represent the six months during which blacklisting
could have affected deforestation in 2012 (see equation 3.3). The second and
fifth blacklists were published at the end of March 2009 and end of April 2011
and the respective treatments are set to 0.25 and 0.17. The 7th Blacklist was
published in October 2012 and thus is outside our analytical timeframe. Six
districts were released from the Blacklist during our time period. We do not
expect the blacklisting effect on deforestation to vanish immediately after a
district has been released from the list. Especially the second and third of the
three potential impact channels discussed above are likely to result in longer
term effects on deforestation dynamics. Moreover, off-listing is conditioned
on having at least 80% of the eligible land registered under the CAR-a mea-
sure that effectively improves the government’s ability to monitor land cover
change in the long run, also after a district was released from the list. Our
treatment variable is thus coded as follows:
Bit =

[0, 1] in 1st year of blacklisting
1 in 2nd and all subsequent years after blacklisting
0 otherwise
(3.3)
i.e., treatment is coded between 0 and 1 when blacklisting occurs after the start
date of the period over which deforestation is measured (August 1st-July 31st).
Confounding factors that could affect deforestation are considered in the
covariates vectors Xit and Zi of equation 3.2. Our choice of covariates is based
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on previous empirical work on tropical deforestation in the Amazon region
and beyond (Aguiar, Câmara, and Escada, 2007; Andersen, 1996; Araujo et al.,
2009; Arima, Simmons, Walker, and Cochrane, 2007; Hargrave and Kis-Katos,
2013; Pfaff, 1999; Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998).
Among time-invariant covariates, we consider various measures of defor-
estation and forest cover up until before the first Blacklist in 2008 and control
for district size and population density. Moreover, we control for farm char-
acteristics, indicators of agricultural intensification and average land values,
which have shown to be important predictors of deforestation in previous
studies (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001; Pfaff, 1999). Initial forest cover and
average travel distance are only used in matching but omitted in regression
analyses to avoid multi-collinearity. Since clouds represent a significant source
of measurement error in remotely sensed deforestation data, we include cloud
cover over remaining forests in all regression analysis.
Among time varying predictors, we consider GDP per capita, timber and soy
prices (zero in districts without soy production) (cf. Hargrave and Kis-Katos,
2013), and the area of settlements, protected areas, and indigenous territories
in each district. All these tenure categories have been found to affect deforesta-
tion rates in previous studies (Ezzine-de Blas et al., 2011; Soares-Filho et al.,
2010). In addition, we control for political factors by introducing dummy vari-
ables indicating whether districts are governed by the same political party as
the president of Brazil (Brazilian Social Democracy Party in 2002 and Brazilian
Workers Party from 2003 to 2012). In causal mechanism analyses, we consider
yearly data on the number of field-based inspections registered by the environ-
mental protection agency, the percentage of land coverage of CAR registrations
and the annual rural credit issued by the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB).
Since the group of potential control districts is likely to exhibit lower pre-
treatment levels in deforestation than the treated districts, we rely on the dou-
ble difference method to estimate the treatment effect of blacklisting [3, 20]. A
critical assumption of the double difference method is that treated and con-
trol observations exhibit parallel time trends in the outcome variable (time-
invariant heterogeneity). In other words, in the absence of blacklisting, we
assume that treated and control districts would have had the same change in
deforestation over time even though they exhibit different absolute levels in
forest loss.
To ensure pre-treatment parallel time trends between control districts and
blacklisted districts and to also cope with selection bias of the policy we rely
on matching to filter out inappropriate controls. Matching is a frequently used
quasi-experimental evaluation technique in the presence of unknown selection
mechanisms (Andam et al., 2008; Gaveau et al., 2009; Ho et al., 2007; Honey-
Rosés, Baylis, and Ramírez, 2011; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Matching re-
lies on propensity scores or other distance measures that are derived from
observed characteristics of treated and untreated observations (here districts).
Treated observations are paired with “similar” non-treated (or control) obser-
vations to reduce the bias in treatment effect estimations. A strong assumption
70 naming and shaming for conservation
Figure 3.2: Average change in deforestation after 2008
Note: Deforestation is measured in percentage deforestation over the district
area. The change refers to the average difference between the time periods
2003 to 2007 and 2008 to 2012.
of the matching estimator is unconfoundedness, i.e., one assumes that no other
than the observed criteria were relevant in selecting districts into the Blacklist.
Moreover, matching requires that there is a considerable region of overlap in
the distance measures or propensity scores of treated and untreated observa-
tions of the sample. Whereas we are able to control for a large number of
potential selection criteria (see below), our sample of non-blacklisted districts
is unlikely to be a satisfactory pool of potential controls because most black-
listed districts have indeed been amongst the highest deforesting districts in
the Brazilian Amazon region before the Blacklist was enacted (see Figure 3.2).
Matching can help us to identify similar control observations and thus repre-
sents a sensible preprocessing step in our evaluation strategy (Ho et al., 2007).
We use 1 to 1 matching on the covariate distance between districts weighted
by the inverse-variance with replacement. As described above we cannot ex-
plicitly know how the selection of blacklisted districts took place. In addition
to the three official selection criteria we thus also rely on pre-treatment district
characteristics as matching covariates.
The official blacklisting criteria are defined as accumulated deforested area
in 2007, deforested area in 2005, 2006 and 2007 and the number of times de-
forestation increased over the past five years. We further use district size, the
remaining forest cover as a percentage of a district area in 2007, and the aver-
age distance to the district capital estimated by Nelson (2008) to account for
deforestation potential and accessibility. To control for socio-economic factors
we include population density in 2007 and construct indices for farm density,
the share of small farms, percentage of land holders with legal land titles, the
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share of farm area within a district, and cattle stocking rates from the 2006
Agricultural Census. From the same source we calculated the average land
value per hectare and the number of tractors per farm to control for conser-
vation opportunity costs and capitalization levels. Further we control for GDP
per capita in 2005, 2006 and 2007. To capture potential political selection de-
terminants we also use the dummy on district mayors’ political affiliations in
2007 as explained above.
Details on the approaches used to analyze, dynamic treatment effects, spa-
tial spillovers and causal mechanism effects are provided in the respective
subsections.
3.5 study area and data
Our study area is located in the Legal Brazilian Amazon, an area of approx-
imately 5m sq. km that extends into nine Brazilian states. Figure 3.2 depicts
the study area highlighting changes in average deforestation in blacklisted and
non-blacklisted districts after the cutoff point in 2008, when the Decree 6.321
was enacted.
From Figure 3.2 it becomes clear that the blacklisted districts have expe-
rienced the largest reductions in annual deforestation from the period 2003-
2007 to the period 2008-2012. Large increases in average deforestation almost
exclusively occurred in non-blacklisted districts, but many also experienced
reductions in forest loss.
The Brazilian Legal Amazon district database from the Brazilian Institute for
Geography and Statistics (IBGE) covers 771 districts. All variables are defined
according to official 2007 administrative boundaries as put forward by IBGE.
To avoid bias, we exclude from our sample 273 districts (none of which was
blacklisted) with less than 10% forest cover in 2002. Most of these districts
are located in the Amazon/Cerrado ecotone. We further exclude six districts
because of missing data. This leaves us with a database of 492 districts (see
Figure B.2).
To ensure consistency with 2007 administrative boundaries and control for
cloud-related measurement errors we construct our dependent variable, an-
nual deforestation, from INPE’s (Brazilian Space Research Center) publicly
available vector dataset for 2012. Details on how deforestation, forest, and
cloud cover are defined are provided in the supplementary file S1 Text.
Table B.1 summarizes the data sources used in this study. Table B.2 presents
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the panel data analysis and Table
B.3 presents means and differences in means of matching variables.
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3.6 results
3.6.1 Descriptive analysis and baseline regressions
Figure 3.3 depicts average deforestation (left panel) and average yearly changes
in forest loss for blacklisted and non-blacklisted districts during our study
period. Average deforestation in blacklisted districts exhibits a much faster
decrease than deforestation in untreated districts, but substantial decreases
already occurred before the Blacklist was enacted in 2008, for example between
2004 and 2005. The right panel of Figure 3.3 shows that average year-to-year
decreases in deforestation were constantly larger in blacklisted than in control
districts after 2005.
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Figure 3.3: Deforestation in treatment and control districts
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Note: Average yearly deforestation levels on the left panel and average
change in deforestation on the right panel. Solid lines depict averages of
the blacklisted districts (50). The dashed lines show averages of all non-
blacklisted districts (442). The dotted lines show averages of the matched
control sample (50).
We start our analysis with all observations in a series of three baseline
models using the specification in equation 3.2 and gradually adding covariate
groups (summary in Table 3.1, complete results in Table B.4). Complementary
estimation results are summarized in S2 Text.
All three models yield similar results with large and highly significant aver-
age treatment effects. The first model only includes cloud cover, year dummies
and state dummies. Cloud cover is highly significant and with a coefficient
close to -1. An increase in one percentage point of cloud cover is therefore
associated with an almost 1% decrease in detected deforest area. The second
model includes time-invariant effects of initial conditions that determine the
deforestation trend in each district. Our third and preferred model includes
time varying effects. Among the time-invariant covariates the share of small
farmers and the cattle stocking rate, are negatively associated with increases
in deforestation. Among time varying covariates, the timber price is negative
and the settlement area is positively associated with deforestation. Hargrave
and Kis-Katos (2013) report similar results with regard to timber prices and
argue that high value timber could boost long-term investment in forest and
therefore contribute to lower deforestation. However, the models in Table 3.1
are bound to overestimate the effect of blacklisting on deforestation, because
the control group contains many districts with virtually no deforestation dur-
ing the observation period. We thus proceed to pre-process our dataset using
matching on pre-treatment characteristics as outlined earlier.
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Table 3.1: Effect of blacklisting on deforestation (full sample)
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Blacklistedit -0.803*** -0.992 -0.998***
(0.192) (0.205) (0.204)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes
Observations 4920 4920 4920
Cluster 492 492 492
Adj. R-squared 0.064 0.065 0.064
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with the depen-
dent variable being the change in the log of yearly newly defor-
ested area. Standard errors, clustered at district level, are reported
in parentheses. Time-invariant and variant controls include first
differences of the variables reported in S2 Table. *** denotes sig-
nificance at the 1% level.
3.6.2 Post-matching regressions
Matching is implemented in R using the “Matching” package (Sekhon, 2011)
and the inverse-variance weights of the covariates. We find control districts
by matching each blacklisted district with one non-blacklisted district using
replacement. This results in 50 pairs with 50 treated districts and a set of 50
paired control observations that consist of 26 unique districts (see Figure 3.4).
Most pairs turn out to be direct neighbors. A comparison of the covariate bal-
ance before and after matching is provided in Table B.3. For all variables, the
standard mean difference has greatly improved after matching. However, sig-
nificant imbalances still exist and thus a simple comparison between average
deforestation in blacklisted with matched non-blacklisted groups would prob-
ably be biased. Figure 3.3 further compares average year-to-year changes in de-
forestation and deforestation trends separately for blacklisted, non-blacklisted
and matched non-blacklisted districts. After matching, treated and control dis-
tricts exhibit similar pre-Blacklist deforestation trends (see test documentation
and results in S3 Text). This gives us confidence that the critical assumption
for our subsequent double difference regression is likely to hold.
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Figure 3.4: Blacklisted and matched control districts
Note: Paired control districts are found with 1 to 1 matching with replace-
ment using inverse-variance weights.
We use the matched dataset to re-estimate baseline models (1-3) in Table
3.1. Results are presented in Table 3.2 (see Table B.5 for complete results). Post-
matching, the magnitude of the blacklisting impact on deforestation drastically
decreases by more than 70% to values below 0.3. The coefficient of blacklisting
in model 1 is insignificant after matching. In model 2 and 3 we include again
the official selection criteria, and all matching variables. Our preferred model
(3) includes all yearly information that could affect year to year changes in
deforestation. After controlling for the remaining differences in the covariates
the blacklisting indicator is significant. The coefficient of 0.294 suggests an av-
erage treatment effect of a 25% decrease in deforestation in blacklisted district
as a result of blacklisting in each subsequent year after treatment (Halvorsen
and Palmquist, 1980).
3.6.3 Dynamic treatment effects
As discussed previously, several blacklists were published over time and some
districts were removed from the lists in the process. Delayed response to
treatment can lead to substantial differences in treatment effects in the post-
treatment periods (Laporte and Windmeijer, 2005). Whereas such differences
do not change our conclusion with regard to the overall effect of blacklisting,
knowledge about how the effect evolves over time (dynamic treatment effect)
can be helpful for the design of a blacklisting policy. In this section we test
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Table 3.2: Effect of blacklisting on deforestation (matched sample)
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Blacklistedit -0.249 -0..276* -0.297*
(0.150) (0.153) (0.155)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000
Cluster 76 76 76
Adj. R-squared 0.251 0.245 0.258
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with the dependent
variable being the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area.
Standard errors, clustered at district level, are reported in parentheses.
Time invariant and time-variant controls include first differences of the
variables reported in S2 Table. Observations are selected by a 1:1 clos-
est neighbor matching using inverse-variance variance weights, with
replacement. * denotes significance at the 10% level.
whether the size of treatment effects varies over time. We split the original
blacklisting indicator into multiple treatment indicators as follows:
∆lnDit = +
3∑
k=0
∆B ′kit βk + ∆X
′
it γ+ Z
′
i δ+ ∆ηt + κs + ∆uit (3.4)
Bkit it is based on the original Blacklist dummy of equation 3.2, with the dif-
ference that B0it it overtakes only the value in year k after the treatment year
and stays 0 otherwise. Thereby we split the original effect into 4 components.
B0it it is between 0 and 1 as for the year of blacklisting and zero for all subse-
quent years. The treatment variables B1it, B
2
it and B
3
it it are set to one only in
the first, second and third year after blacklisting respectively, for each black-
listed district. We thereby capture the effect of blacklisting over the years. The
treatment coefficients β0 to β3 can be interpreted as the average effect of black-
listing on deforestation for the respective year after blacklisting. Results are
shown in Table 3.3. All models (1-3) produce negative and insignificant esti-
mates for blacklisting in its initial year, but significant effects in the first and
second year after treatment. For the initial year, the treatment variable is set
to have only a partial effect on the overall deforestation within a district. The
blacklisting effect of the initial year is thus insignificant as the change in the
treatment variable is small in the beginning. Further, when blacklisting started
after the dry-season, we would expect to find no effect in the first year if de-
forestation mainly occurs during the dry-season. The second year effects show
twice as large coefficients as the first year effects. This indicates that blacklist-
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Table 3.3: Dynamic effects of blacklisting
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Blacklist effect in t -0.399 -0..399 -0.372
(0.314) (0.316) (0.155)
∆ Blacklist effect in t+ 1 -0.249 -0..212* -0.230*
(0.212*) (0.124) (0.126)
∆ Blacklist effect in t+ 2 -0.123*** -0..482*** -0.461***
(0.156) (0.158) (0.156)
∆ Blacklist effect in t+ 3 -0.291* -0..291* -0.264
(0.159) (0.161) (0.160)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000
Cluster 76 76 76
Adj. R-squared 0.258 0.253 0.264
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with
the dependent variable being the change in the log
of yearly newly deforested area. Standard errors, clus-
tered at district level, are reported in parentheses. Time-
invariant and time-variant controls include first differ-
ences of the variables reported in S2 Table. Observa-
tions are selected by a 1:1 closest neighbor matching us-
ing inverse-variance variance weights, with replacement.
*,*** denote significance at the 10/1% level.
ing effects have materialized only slowly over time, which may be attributed
to the gradual roll out of external support measures in the field.
3.6.4 Spatial spillover effects
Spatial spillover effects, such as leakage or deterrence, could bias our treat-
ment effect estimation. In our sample, 132 out of the 442 non-blacklisted dis-
tricts share at least one point on their border with another blacklisted district,
i.e., they are direct neighbors. Leakage could take place if the Blacklist encour-
aged deforestation agents to move to neighboring non-blacklisted districts. Yet,
it is also possible that having a blacklisted neighboring district deters land
users in non-blacklisted districts from deforesting. In the case of leakage from
blacklisted to neighboring non-blacklisted districts we would overestimate the
effect of blacklisting on deforestation as 46 out of the 50 matched control dis-
tricts are direct neighbors. If deterrence effects of blacklisting were leading to
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Table 3.4: Spatial spillover effects of blacklisting
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Neighbor of Blacklistedit -0.159 -0..158 -0.148
(0.106) (0.106) (0.108)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000
Cluster 76 76 76
Adj. R-squared 0.080 0.081 0.081
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with
the dependent variable being the change in the log of
yearly newly deforested area. Standard errors, clustered
at district level, are reported in parentheses. Time invari-
ant and time-variant controls include first differences of
the variables reported in S2 Table. Observations are se-
lected by a 1:1 closest neighbor matching using inverse-
variance variance weights, with replacement. Estimated
coefficients have p-values larger than 0.1.
more conservation in neighboring districts, we would underestimate the effect
of blacklisting both in blacklisted districts and at the regional scale.
To test for spillover effects one approach is to include an additional dummy
in equation 3.2 which indicates whether a district has a neighboring district
that is treated at a given point in time. However, neighbors of blacklisted dis-
tricts are subject to the same selection bias as blacklisted districts. Moreover,
such an approach would rely on merely four control districts in our matched
dataset, which do not have a blacklisted neighbor.
Instead, we analyze spillover effects by excluding all blacklisted districts
from the sample and interpreting non-blacklisted neighbors (NBi) of black-
listed districts as if treated. We rerun our matching analysis and conduct the
post-matching regression by estimating:
∆lnDit|B=0 = + φ∆NBit + ∆X
′
it γ+ Z
′
i δ+ ∆ηt + κs + ∆uit (3.5)
Our interest lies in the effect of blacklisting on neighboring districts that have
not been blacklisted, φ. The neighbor effectNBit is set equal to one when it has
at least one blacklisted direct neighbor in a given year, otherwise it equals zero.
Table 3.4 reports the results for model specifications (1-3) as in the previous
section.
In all 3 specifications the coefficient of the treatment indicator is negative
but insignificant. The treatment effects estimated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are
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thus unlikely to be biased by spatial spillover effects from blacklisted to non-
blacklisted neighboring districts.
3.6.5 Robustness
In the previous sections we have estimated the impact of the blacklisting policy
on deforestation. A comparison of the results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 suggests
that we would have overestimated the blacklisting effect without matching as
a preprocessing step. Here we evaluate the robustness of our findings vis-à-
vis alternative matching techniques and run a series of placebo tests to gain
confidence in our estimated treatment effects.
We first test whether our results are robust to the use of alternative matching
techniques. We compare the results from our preferred matching approach to
(1), a one-to-one matching on the Mahalanobis distance, (2) a one-to-one match-
ing on propensity scores, (3) a one-to-two matching using the inverse-variance
weights, and (4) a one-to-one matching with the inverse variance weights, but
using only the three official blacklisting criteria provided in Decree 6.321. Re-
sults are presented in Table B.6. The blacklisting effect is robust in all spec-
ifications. All impact estimates are highly significant and larger than in our
preferred estimation method. Our preferred method, the one-to-one matching
with replacement on the covariate distance, weighted by the inverse-variance,
based on an extended set of controls turns out to be the most conservative
version to estimate the effect of blacklisting.
Secondly, we run a placebo analysis where we assume that blacklisting
started prior to the actual start date. We shift the start date of the blacklist-
ing policy successively to one, two, and three years before actual treatment.
Results are shown in Table B.7. Column 4 repeats the main results of column 3
in Table 3.2. In column 3 we estimate the effect of blacklisting had it occurred
in the previous year. Columns 2 and 1 show results of shifting treatment two
and three years back, respectively. As expected, none of the placebo treatments
are significant; indicating that the treatment effect identified earlier (Table 3.2)
is not merely a result of preexisting differences between treated and control
districts.
The results above make us confident in interpreting the observed estimates
of Table 3.2 as a causal effect of the blacklisting policy on deforestation.
3.6.6 The net treatment effect of blacklisting
Above we have produced evidence that blacklisting has led to a significant
reduction in deforestation after 2007 on top of the existing decreasing trend.
However, the analysis so far does not allow for conclusions with respect to the
causal channels involved. In section 3.1 we have discussed potential impact
channels that could have played a role in reinforcing the effectiveness of black-
listing: (1) Administrative disincentives, (2) reputational risk, and (3) external
support/ pressure. Given district level information about changes in indicators
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of these channels, we can empirically assess their role as causal mechanisms
behind the conservation effect of the Blacklist (Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014b).
Here we follow the approach used by Ferraro and Hanauer (2014b) to iden-
tify the net treatment effect of blacklisting, i.e., the effect of blacklisting in the
absence of effects via selected mechanisms. We consider three causal mecha-
nisms measured annually and at district level, (1) the amount of documented
environmental fines issued by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency
(IBAMA), (2) the percentage of eligible area under CAR registration, and (3)
the amount of official rural credit flows. We thus hypothesize that blacklisting
has affected deforestation by boosting field-based enforcement action, moti-
vating farmers to register under the CAR system, and restricting access to
public rural credit. We have measured the joint effect of all potential mech-
anism by estimating the average treatment effect (ATT) in Table 3.2. The ef-
fect that is caused by blacklist-induced changes in the three above-mentioned
mechanisms is called the Mechanism Average Treatment effect on the Treated
(MATT). The sum of all remaining mechanism effects is the Net Average Treat-
ment effect on the Treated (NATT). The ATT is thus composed of MATT and
NATT. Our main interest in this analysis is to find the NATT that remains after
controlling for the MATT. The conventional approach to control for mechanism
effects is to include the variables into equation 3.2 as explanatory factors. We
follow this procedure in a first step and estimate the following model where
Mit represents the mechanism values of environmental fines, CAR registra-
tions, and public rural credit for district i in year t.1
∆lnDit = + β∆Bit + ∆X ′it γ+ Z
′
i δ+ ∆M
′
itλ+ ∆ηt + κs + εit (3.6)
Whereas we control for annual changes in the mechanisms in equation 3.6,
our estimator may still be biased if these mechanisms were actually affected
by blacklisting (Rosenbaum, 1984). To avoid this bias and separate the NATT
from the ATT we need an empirical approach that allows us to determine (a)
what the level of our mechanism indicators would have been in the absence
of blacklisting, and (b) what the effect of blacklisting would have been, had
the Blacklist not affected the mechanisms. Based on a method proposed by
Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009), Ferraro and Hanauer (2014b) have recently
addressed similar questions in the context of protected areas.
Beyond the assumptions made up to this point, two additional assumptions
are necessary to estimate the MATT and NATT (Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014b):
(1) Selection has not been influenced by expectations that blacklisting will shift
the mechanisms. In our setting, this means that conditional on observed black-
listing criteria, the possibility of increased density of field inspections, higher
efforts in registering landholdings into CAR, and tighter restrictions on public
credit does not affect the selection into the Blacklist. Note that this assump-
tion is is different from the expectation that the blacklisting policy as such
may alter these mechanisms. (2) Changes in the mechanisms have the same
1 Cisneros et al. (2015a) falsely use ηt instead of ∆ηt in equation 3.6.
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effect on deforestation in districts where blacklisting has affected the mecha-
nisms and in districts where it has not affected the mechanisms. The second
assumption could theoretically be violated, for example, if field inspections
in blacklisted districts would somehow have been of a different nature than
inspections in other districts. To gauge the potential mechanism effects, we
estimate the NATT with the mechanism effect blocked, i.e., setting field in-
spections, CAR registrations, and public rural credit of blacklisted districts to
their counterfactual levels. The difference between the overall average treat-
ment effect measured in Table 3.2 and the NATT is the joint effect of the three
mechanisms.
The implementation involves three steps (note that we use a hat to indicate
estimated coefficients and a tilde to indicate predicted values):
1. Estimating counterfactual mechanism values. Closely following Ferraro
and Hanauer (2014b) we use two alternative approaches to estimate coun-
terfactual mechanism values. (a) replacing the real values of the mecha-
nisms after treatment with the values of the paired matched control dis-
tricts (paired values). (b) using the matched control sample and estimate
the influence of our covariate set on each mechanism (estimated values,
see equation 3.7 below).2
∆Mit|Bi=0 = + ∆X
′
it γ
1 + Z ′i δ
1 + ∆η1t + κ
1
s + ∆uit (3.7)
We predict counterfactual mechanism values (M˜it) with the point esti-
mates (γˆ,δˆ) for blacklisted districts, but only for the years after blacklist-
ing had started. Therefore the new predicted mechanism vector has the
properties: (M˜it|Bit = 0) = (Mit|Bit = 0). This step creates mechanism
values that would have been realized in blacklisted districts if blacklisting
had not influenced the mechanism policies.
2. Counterfactual deforestation values. Under the second assumption, we
estimate how much deforestation would have occurred in blacklisted dis-
tricts if blacklisting had not influenced mechanisms. We first estimate the
influence of the real mechanism values on the subsample of the black-
listed districts after blacklisting as follows3:
∆ lnDit|Bit=1 = + ∆X
′
it γ
2 + Z ′i δ
2 + ∆M ′it λ+ ∆η
2
t + κ
2
s + ∆uit(3.8)
With the point estimates (γˆ2,γˆ2,λˆ) and the counterfactual mechanism
values (M˜it) we predict the counterfactual deforestation levels (D˜it) for
the blacklisted districts after blacklisting. Under the assumptions made
2 For convenience we do not change the letters of the residual terms. Correct would be the use
of different letters for all equations.
3 Superscript numbers above coefficients indicate different estimates for the equations 3.7, 3.8,
3.9
82 naming and shaming for conservation
above, the counterfactual deforestation represents the level of deforesta-
tion had there been no change in field inspections, CAR registrations and
public rural credits as a result of blacklisting.
3. Estimating the NATT involves re-estimating model (3) from Table 3.2
using the counterfactual deforestation levels estimated in the previous
step as follows:
∆ ln D˜it = + β∆Bit + ∆X ′it γ
3 + Z ′i δ
3 + ∆η3t + κ
3
s + ∆uit (3.9)
After blocking the influence of blacklisting on the mechanisms, we expect to
find counterfactual levels with decreased fines, lower CAR registrations and
higher amounts of public credit, relative to the observed (real) values. Using
the counterfactual mechanism values, we expect to predict higher counterfac-
tual deforestation rates than the observed rates of deforestation. Assuming a
high share of the mechanism effects (MATT) within the overall effect of black-
listing (ATT), we expect to find lower and even insignificant estimates of the
remaining NATT.
Results from estimating equation 3.7 are presented in Table B.8. Statistics on
the real and counterfactual values of the blacklisted districts after 2007 are pre-
sented in Table 3.5. The mean and standard deviation of the real mechanism
values are reported in column (1). The two approaches used to determine coun-
terfactual mechanism values do not yield fully consistent results. With paired
values, we unexpectedly find counterfactual rural credit levels to be lower than
with blacklisting. With estimated values, counterfactual environmental fine
levels are higher than with blacklisting, contrary to our expectation. Differ-
ences vis-à-vis observed values with blacklisting are small, however, and the
estimated counterfactual deforestation levels (equation 3.8) are higher than ob-
served deforestation for the blacklisted districts independent of the approach
used to estimate counterfactual mechanism values.
The results of the mechanism analysis are shown in Table 3.6. In column 1 we
repeat the result of our ATT estimation in Table 3.2 (column 3). In columns 2-5
we add mechanism effects as explanatory variables to the regression. In order
to avoid reverse causality between deforestation and environmental fines we
use lagged time values for environmental fines. Differences in the mechanism
values between blacklisted and non-blacklisted matched district are small (Ta-
ble 3.5). The mechanism coefficients thus tend to have small and insignificant
coefficients. This exercise does not alter the estimate of the blacklisting effect
vis-à-vis the results in Table 3.2. The coefficient remains at a 10% significance
level with a negative estimate close to -0.3.
Columns 6 and 7 show results after using the paired and estimated mech-
anism counterfactuals, respectively, to estimate counterfactual deforestation.
The new estimates represent the NATT of blacklisting, which is still negative
and significant, but somewhat smaller than the ATT estimated in Table 3.2. The
joint effect of the three potential causal mechanisms we studied thus seems to
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Table 3.5: Statistics on counterfactual mechanism values
Counterfactual Counterfactual
Variable Statistic Observed values paired values estimated values
Lagged No. of Mean 58.15 47.73 71.16
environmental fines St.dev. (70.58) (72.85) (117.94)
Car area coverage [%] Mean 19.40 14.94 17.15
St.dev. (18.81) (16.52) (14.69)
Lagged No. of Mean 26.61 20..21 653.20
environmental fines St.dev. (29.24) (25.92) (6528.55)
Note: Statistics show observed (real) and counterfactual values estimated as described
in section 5 on the blacklisted districts between the years 2008 to 2012. Paired values are
adopted form the corresponding paired matched controls district of each blacklisted
districts. Estimated values are based on estimations of mechanisms on the covariates.
be relatively small compared to the other two potential impact channels (ad-
ministrative disincentive and reputational risk) discussed above.
3.7 discussion
We have found a robust and significant negative effect of district blacklisting
on deforestation. As outlined in the introduction, there are several theoretical
pathways to explain this result, including administrative disincentives, repu-
tational risks, and external support/pressure from both government and non-
governmental organizations. We have implemented an innovative econometric
method to block three potential causal mechanisms related mainly to the the-
oretical impact channel “external pressure/ support” that have shown to be
relevant factors in Brazil’s overall strategy to reduce Amazon deforestation [5,
12]. Namely, environmental fines, geo-referenced land use registrations, and
public credits. As causal mechanisms, however, these factors turned out to be
of marginal importance in explaining deforestation reductions in the black-
listed districts. Clearly, this does not undermine the important role that any of
these policy instruments plays in Brazil’s national strategy to reduce tropical
deforestation. In fact, fine-based law enforcement, land registry (CAR), and
rural credit policies, including the credit restriction imposed by the Brazilian
Monetary Council in 2008 (Assunção et al., 2013b), apply to all districts in the
Brazilian Amazon. They may only have played a more important role in black-
listed districts if blacklisting caused quantitative or qualitative shifts in their
implementation. We emphasize that our mechanism analysis only captures
quantitative changes in these policy components. Administrative disincentives
and reputational risk in addition to qualitative changes in external support/-
pressure channels thus remain potentially effective drivers behind the effect of
the Brazilian Blacklist that could be explored in further research. Moreover, ad-
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Table 3.6: Net average treatment effect of blacklisting
∆ ln counterf.
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation Deforestation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ Blacklistedit -0.297* -0..299* -0.298* -0.297* -0.299* -0.224** -0.211**
(0.155) (0.156) (0.154) (0.155) (0.156) (0.100) (0.103)
∆ ln No. of finesit-1 0.003 0.003
(0.028) (0.028)
∆ CAR area coverit -0.042 -0.043
(0.491) (0.155)
∆ ln Total rural creditit 0.010 0.010
0.060 (0.060)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Cluster 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Adj. R-squared 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.256 0.308 0.313
Note: The table reports first difference estimates. Columns 1-5 use the change in log of yearly
newly deforested area as the dependent variable. Columns 6 and 7 use the change in log of coun-
terfactual deforestation in the blacklisted observations. Counterfactual deforestation in column
6 is constructed form paired control matches. Counterfactual deforestation in column 7 is esti-
mated based on the set paired control matches. Standard errors, clustered at district level, are
reported in parentheses. Time-invariant and time-variant controls include first differences of the
variables reported in S2 Table. Observations are selected by a 1:1 closest neighbor matching using
inverse-variance weights, with replacement. * ,** denote significance at the 10/5% level.
ditional causal mechanisms may exist that we were not able to capture because
of data limitations. These include, for example, increases in external pressure
on embargoed producers through so called compliance commitments issued
by public prosecutors.
Like any quasi-experimental evaluation, our analysis remains prone to un-
observable bias. We control for a wide range of factors comprising physical,
socio-economic and political indicators. Owing to limited common support,
this bias could not be fully corrected for by matching, which is why we only
rely on matching as a pre-processing technique (Ho et al., 2007). We rely on
the ’weaker’ assumption of parallel time trends and control for all unobserved
fixed effects.
The selection of districts to the Blacklist is endogenously determined by
deforestation which could violate the parallel time trend assumption. With-
out treatment, the decrease in deforestation rates of blacklisted districts could
have materialized at a much slower pace than of control districts (see Figure
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B.5 panel a). The probable bias from using inadequate controls with lower de-
forestation and more rapid drops deforestation rates would lead us to under
rather than overestimate the conservation effect of blacklisting.
A common evaluation pitfall that would also violate the parallel time trend
assumption and lead us to overestimate the Blacklist effect is the “Ashenfel-
ter’s or pre-program dip”. It can occur if selection is affected by unusual pre-
program changes in the outcome variable (Heckman and Smith, 1999). In our
case, a pre-Blacklist peak in deforestation could hypothetically have resulted
in a selection of districts that would have exhibited much faster decreases in
deforestation - even in the absence of blacklisting - than any potential control
district (see Figure B.5, panel b). Whereas we cannot completely rule out such
a phenomenon, we argue that it is unlikely to play a major role in explain-
ing our findings. First, because we control for past increases in deforestation
rates in our matching exercise and formally tested the hypothesis of equal
pre-program deforestation trends in treated and control districts. Secondly,
because the Blacklist was enacted five years after average deforestation had
peaked in the blacklisted districts (see Figure 3.3). In the two years prior to the
publication of the blacklist, deforestation trends had instead been rather stable.
And thirdly, the blacklisted districts have been leading deforestation rankings
even prior to our observation period. Hence, and as supported by our placebo
treatment analysis (Table B.7), the substantial drop in average forest loss in
these districts after 2008 can hardly be attributed solely to normalization after
an unusual peak.
We are thus confident that our analysis correctly identifies the Blacklist as
an environmental governance measure that made a substantial complementary
contribution to bringing deforestation down in the Brazilian Amazon region.
3.8 conclusions
In this study we have used a quasi-experimental evaluation design to gauge
the potential contribution of district blacklisting to the drop in deforestation
rates in the Brazilian Amazon. Blacklisting has previously been used and
studied in other environmental governance contexts, such as pollution control
(McGee and Gavent, 2010).
We find that the average effect of blacklisting on deforestation in blacklisted
districts ranges between roughly 13-36% considering standard errors (see Ta-
ble 3.2, model 3). This corresponds to an absolute reduction in deforestation
of 600-6,750 sq. km (4,022 sq. km on average) from 2008 to 2012. This is far
less than the 59,511 sq. km cumulative conservation effect of improved field-
based enforcement calculated by Assunção, Gandour, and Rocha (2013a) for
the period from 2007 to 2011. However, it is more than the amount of avoided
deforestation (2,700 sq. km) that Assunção et al. (2013b) attribute to the credit
restrictions that were enacted in 2008. Compared with Arima et al. (2014) who
report a range from 2,304 to 11,653 sq. km, our ATT and NATT estimates lie at
86 naming and shaming for conservation
the lower end and are thus also much more conservative than the 11,396 sq. km
estimated by Assunção and Rocha (2014).
In other words, between 2008 and 2012, the decision to bolster the Brazilian
anti-deforestation campaign by district blacklisting has conserved an amount
of forest cover that is almost equivalent to the current average annual forest
loss, i.e., 4,848 sq. km in 2014 according to official INPE statistics.
At the federal level, the incremental administrative costs of maintaining the
Blacklist have probably been low given that no significant additional gover-
nance and implementation structure had to be put in place. However, the
Blacklist has reportedly induced a substantial amount of local level transac-
tion costs and operational expenses by supporting NGOs and state-level gov-
ernment organizations. Putting a price tag on the Brazilian blacklisting experi-
ence therefore is not a straightforward exercise.
Relating to the effectiveness of blacklisting, this also depends on factors out-
side the control of the federal government. Here, one must also concede that
the policy has shortcomings. For example, some states have not yet fully devel-
oped capacities to implement CAR registries at relevant scales. In such cases it
seems unrealistic that districts can achieve the 80% CAR target to be removed
from the list, which could undermine incentives to engage in alternative dis-
trict level efforts to reduce deforestation. Conversely, on the positive side, the
Blacklist has also inspired state-level initiatives, such as the Green Municipali-
ties Program (PMV) in the state of Pará, to reward good forest stewardship in
districts that voluntarily comply with the criteria for removal from the Black-
list.
Given the scarce evidence on the effectiveness of transparency and account-
ability measures in conservation, our results should encourage experimenta-
tion with blacklisting as a complementary forest conservation measure. Clearly,
a country’s administrative structure is likely to affect outcomes in significant
ways. For example, Brazilian districts (i.e. municipalities) have much less legal
autonomy in environmental policy than in the more decentralized governance
structure of other tropical forest countries, such as Indonesia (Luttrell, Resosu-
darmo, Muharrom, Brockhaus, and Seymour, 2014; Burgess et al., 2012). The
effectiveness of the diverse potential impact channels of blacklisting may thus
differ substantially depending on the ability of local stakeholders to organize
themselves towards the goal of being removed from a Blacklist.
From the government’s point of view, as well as in the context of an interna-
tional mechanism to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
(REDD+), blacklisting appears to be a low-cost and no-regret option to increase
compliance with existing forest law. Overall costs to land users clearly depend
on the kind of action that blacklisting evokes at the local and district level.
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abstract
Incentive-based conservation programs are a promising approach to preserve
remaining tropical rain forest cover and guarantee the supply of important
environmental services. Pilot projects, often in the context of REDD+ schemes,
focus on protection areas with low economic potential and low demographic
densities. The success of such projects is judged by their additional conser-
vation effects beyond the effect of the protected area status. The ability of
additional conservation effects depends on the economic context of protected
areas. We explain context dependent outcomes with a conceptual framework
of protected area instruments. When evaluating the impact the methodologi-
cal challenge arises, of how to separate the effect of the incentive component
from the impact of the protected area status. Our analysis focuses on the Bolsa
Floresta Program (BFP) which offers community support for generating sus-
tainable income activities and provides payments for environmental services.
The program includes over 9,000 inhabitants in 15 out of 61 multiple-use re-
serves in the Brazilian state of Amazonas. In order to identify the effect of
the reserve status and the effect of the incentive scheme, we use yearly in-
formation on a grid-based data structure. Potential control grid cells lie in
extractive reserves not covered by the BFP. The selection bias of reserves’ and
BFP’s siting is minimized by matching treated and control grid cells on charac-
teristics of temporally and spatially lagged deforestation and other covariates.
Though, no program wide additional conservation effects can be detected, low
heterogeneous effects are prevalent. For protected areas, under high economic
pressures from outside but traditionally low deforestation rates, the BFP had
significant positive conservation effects beyond the protection status. In con-
texts of high economic pressures and traditionally higher deforestation rates
the effects opposed and the BFP lead to very low but significantly negative con-
servation outcomes. Our results confirm that incentive projects can increase the
conservation capacity of protected areas where design elements are adapted
to the context of deforestation pressures.
88 conservation incentives for protected area management
4.1 introduction
Protected areas (PAs) play a key role in the preservation of biodiversity-rich
landscapes and forest carbon. Using counterfactual evaluation methods,1 strong
evidence underscores the effectiveness of PAs in conserving forests worldwide
(Joppa and Pfaff, 2010; Nelson and Chomitz, 2011), and particularly in Brazil
(Soares-Filho et al., 2010). Brazil’s foundation of forest conservation is its PA
system. 2.6m sq. km, or 52% of the Brazilian Legal Amazon, are covered by PAs
and indigenous territories - an increase from 34% in 2004 (see Figure 4.1).2
Annual deforestation in Brazil fell dramatically by some 80% during 2004-12
(from 27,000 to 5,000 sq. km), while leveling off hereafter (Hansen et al., 2013).
This is attributed to both economic and political factors (Canova and Hickey,
2012; Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013). In 2004, the Plan to Combat Deforestation
in the Amazon launched and was key to curbing deforestation in subsequent
years. Quasi-experimental evidence underlines the important contribution of
Brazilian policies (Arima et al., 2014; Assunção et al., 2012; Maia et al., 2011).
Furthermore, the 2012 new forest law, and investments in infrastructure, min-
ing and hydropower remain imminent threats (Ferreira et al., 2014; Miccolis
et al., 2014; Soares-Filho et al., 2014).
It has also been argued that the sole focus on command-and-control mea-
sures (PA, forest-law enforcement) in Brazilian forest conservation policies will
not be sustainable: some carrots (i.e., incentives) would have to be added to
pre-existing sticks (i.e., disincentives) to avoid excessive welfare losses for land
users, which could lead to a political backlash for conservation (Nepstad et al.,
2014). The question then becomes how to design a policy mix of carrots and
sticks so as to adequately balance environmental impacts with equity objec-
tives (Börner, Marinho, and Wunder, 2015b).
In that sense, payments for environmental services (PES) have become an
increasingly important environmental management instrument, including oc-
casionally in PAs (Honey-Rosés et al., 2011; Wunder et al., 2008). In Latin
America, Brazil has been a latecomer in PES development, but has since picked
up markedly, led by watershed schemes in the Atlantic Forest biome and car-
bon initiatives in the Amazon (Pagiola, Carrascosa von Glehn, and Taffarello,
2013). A systematic review of rigorous forest-based PES evaluation studies
worldwide showed relatively low additionality (Samii et al., 2014). But because
of its demanding methodological selection filter, this study ended up with a
very small and arguably biased sample: barely a dozen of studies on Costa
Rica and Mexico made the threshold. A new collection of conservation impact
1 Ferraro (2009) describe counterfactual thinking: “Impact evaluations assess the degree to
which changes in outcomes can be attributed to a program, policy, or intervention [...]. An
answer requires knowing what outcomes would have looked like in the absence of the inter-
vention”.
2 The Brazilian National System of Protected Areas (Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conser-
vación, SNUC) classifies two types of protected areas, namely sustainable use reserves (áreas
do uso sustentavel) and integral protected reserves (área de proteção integral), which are also
denoted as multiple-use reserves and strictly protected areas.
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Figure 4.1: Protected areas in Brazil
Note: Note: The Figure depicts the protected areas in Brazil founded until August 2004 (left)
and August 2012 (right). Multiple-use reserves are depicted light green. Strictly protected
areas are depicted in dark green. Indigenous territories are depicted in orange. See also video
(ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tdgth77U5Ig) on the evolution of protected areas in Brazil
created by Elías Cisneros and Johannes Schielein in 2014.
studies adds rigorous studies with a somewhat more optimistic outlook on the
effectiveness of PES (Börner et al., 2016).
With respect to PAs and PES combined, Honey-Rosés et al. (2011) showed
for a case in Mexico that this mix had high conservation effects vis-à-vis unpro-
tected areas, but the authors could not distinguish the effect of the PES intro-
duction from that of the pre-existing PA. To our knowledge, only Clements and
Milner-Gulland (2014) empirically analyzed the additionality of conditional
payments within PAs: Conditional payments in Cambodia reduced deforesta-
tion rates significantly within the treated communities, as well as increasing
the wellbeing of participating households, compared with a control group of
PA residents that had not received payments.
The Bolsa Floresta Program (BFP) aims to foster forest-friendly develop-
ment in 16 multiple-use reserves (in Port.: áreas de uso sustentável), of the
Amazonas state. The multiple-use reserves are a subcategory of the PA sys-
tem in Brazil that allows traditional resident populations to pursue livelihood
strategies with benign environmental impacts inside the PA. BFP includes a
PES program for families within PAs, the payment of which is conditional
upon compliance with rules that are slightly more restrictive than multiple-
use reserve rules (Börner et al., 2013). Incentives also include more traditional
integrated conservation and development (ICDP) components, such as social
services (health, education), alternative forest-friendly productive investments,
and organizational support. The BFP is thus an example par excellence of the
aforementioned policy mixes, adding carrots to preexisting sticks.
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The main environmental effectiveness question is thus to what extent the in-
centives provided through BFP have conserved additional forest, beyond what
would have been saved solely from having these areas under multiple-use re-
serve protection. We investigate the conservation effects of the BFP across 15
PAs covered by the program up to 2012.3 We use quasi-experimental empirical
methods and time series data. We consider the program’s effects on remotely
sensed deforested areas, forest degradation, and fire incidence, respectively.
Our analysis considers the full program over 10m hectares, but can only mea-
sure the initial effects of the program, as the program started in 2008 and data
for this analysis is available from 2003 to 2012.4 Hence by the nature of our
analysis, we cannot capture impacts on behavioral or attitudinal changes of
participants, nor the development targets set out by the program. Nonetheless,
we extend the analysis from the usual average changes at the reserve level
and investigate forest changes within different economic contexts both within
around the reserves.
Section 4.2 gives an overview of the various program components of the BFP.
Section 4.3 describes a range of specific policy instruments and their mech-
anisms available to reserve managers and relates these to the BFP. Section
4.4 deduces context depended hypotheses of program’s impact. The empirical
strategy for the evaluation of the program is described in section 4.5. Data
sources and their processing are depicted in section 4.6. Section 4.7 presents
the results, whereas 4.9 discusses caveats and section 4.10 concludes.
4.2 the bolsa floresta program
The Bolsa Floresta Program (BFP) is one of Latin America’s largest PES pro-
grams, with over 9,000 participating families and an area of more than 10m
ha. The program started in 2007 as an initiative of the Secretary for Sustain-
able Development of Amazonas. The program is under the patronage of the
Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (Fundação Amazonas Sustentável, FAS). The
long term goal of the BFP is to protect its reserves against external and internal
economic pressures and to increase residents’ welfare. The program is imple-
mented within 16 out of 61 multiple-use reserves within the state of Amazonas
(see Figure 4.2).5
The BFP aims to increase environmental awareness and to build conserva-
tion alliances with the inhabitants of the PAs. In order to achieve its goals, the
BFP includes payments to participating households, community support for
sustainable economic income activities as well as investment in social infras-
tructure and organizational support. The program is organized into four com-
3 On reserve, the Environmental Protection Area (APA) Rio Negro was divided into two re-
serves, resulting in the 16 reserves under the BFP today.
4 The National institute of Spatial Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, INPE) pro-
vides full access to its deforestation database through 2015 as of the date of this study (April
2016), but it was not feasible to process the high resolution data (30 by 30 meter) beyond 2012.
5 For the empirical analysis 15 reserves are considered as covered by the BFP at the end of our
timeframe in 2012.
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Figure 4.2: Protected areas and the Bolsa Floresta program
Note: Figure shows the extent of protected areas until 2012. Few reserves
were created after 2012, mainly by splitting already existing reserves, in-
cluding one reserve covered by the BFP.
ponents. The PES component (Bolsa Floresta Familia), a social development
component (Bolsa Floresta Social), a community governance capacity building
component (Bolsa Floresta Associação), and a sustainable income component
(Bolsa Floresta Renda).
The first component to be rolled out to all participating families is the Bolsa
Floresta Familia component (family component) - a conditional payment to in-
dividual participating families for environmental services. All families living
within the targeted reserves for longer than two years can participate. 6 Each
family receives a monthly payment of 50 reais,7 paid to the female household
head or wife. The disbursement of the payments starts after signing a commit-
ment to comply with the rules of the BFP. The restrictions of the BFP advance
beyond the reserve rules, and include the prohibition of new clearing in pri-
mary forests and the attendance of all children in schools. Participation rates
range from 70 to 100%, today covering over 9,400 families (Newton, Nichols,
Endo, and Peres, 2012).
6 Further stipulations require that beneficiaries be older than 18 years of age, to discourage
early childbirth. Widowers or fathers who care for school age children are also permitted to
participate.
7 1 real converts to e0.51 or $0.66. 50 reais equals e25.61 or $32.90 based on av-
erage exchange rates of 2012. (https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/ert/GUI/Pages/
CountryDataBase.aspx)
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Investments to the local infrastructure are realized through the Bolsa Flo-
resta Social component (social component). Through this channel the BFP con-
ducts basic service infrastructure investments within the communities of a
reserve. Yearly investments, amounting up to 350 reais per family, flow into
the establishment of electricity, water supply, sanitation and communications
systems (Börner et al., 2013).
The Bolsa Floresta Associação (association component) component aims to
support local associations and collaborations among communities and part-
nerships with other organizations and local governments. The program pro-
motes meetings within communities and reserves in order to build leadership
capacity and promote participation, secure social justice and the interests of
all inhabitants. The annual grants amount to 10% of all Bolsa Floresta Familia
Payments, and can be used autonomously by the communities (Börner et al.,
2013; FAS, 2013; Newton et al., 2012).
The BFP expanded after the first year with its Bolsa Floresta Renda (in-
come component). This component aims to foster sustainable forest friendly pro-
duction systems. Each community within the reserve decides independently
which investments to conduct. Technical assistance on new production sys-
tems is provided by FAS staff. The most frequent investments include poultry,
nuts, natural oil production, agroforestry, fruit production, and tourism. An-
nual investments of approximately 350 reais per family aim to increase the
productivity of supported activities while introducing new income generating
opportunities (Newton et al., 2012). The idea is that the increased productiv-
ity shifts families’ income sources towards more forest-friendly activities. The
master thesis of Swartz (2015) analyzes the income component with data on
over 200 households living on both banks of the Rio Negro.8 On both sides of
the river, households participate in the BFP, though by the time of the survey
the income component had only started on the southern side of the river. For
the short time period households benefited from the income component, the
study could not find a statistically robust difference in income or asset levels
between both groups.
The BFP is therefore composed of a PES to the individual families of the
reserves, complemented by community development investments. The social,
association and income components are added on top of the voluntary partic-
ipation of inhabitants in the family component. We define this type of condi-
tional payments as a PES+ program where additional investment components
are added to a PES scheme. The total support provided by the BFP in the
Rio Negro Sustainable Development Reserve was calculated at 1,413 reais per
household per year (FAS, 2013). Newton et al. (2012) measured an average
annual BFP support to families of 1,300 reais in the multiple-use reserve of
Uacari.
8 The RDS Rio Negro reserve on the southern river bank and the APA Rio Negro reserve on the
northern river bank.
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Before turning to the hypotheses on BFP’s impacts on forest conservation, it is
important to first compare the program with the policy instruments commonly
available to PA managers. Available instruments to inhabited multiple-use re-
serves can be grouped into monitoring and enforcement, integrated conserva-
tion and development programs (ICDPs), conditional payments or payments
for environmental services (PES), and the establishment of residential monitor-
ing and enforcement.
The instruments aim to reduce forest-harming outcomes such as deforesta-
tion, logging, game hunting, and over-exploitation of other natural resources
(such as fish stocks). Although these activities produce economic gains, they
can also cause economic and social risks. From the perspective of individual
households, activities that harm the forest are often more profitable than those
that conserve it. If they were to implement forest-friendly activities, they would
thus face an opportunity cost.
As both PA residents and outsiders can obtain economic gains from forest-
harming activities, PA managers and conservation non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) often try to reduce the opportunity cost of conservation. Resi-
dents have direct interests in the forest resources available to them. Individuals
living outside of reserves have interests on the forest resources as they also rep-
resent possible economic gains, though outsiders have to compete or collude
with residents either by migration or invasion. Any instrument has its advan-
tages and disadvantages in reducing the opportunity costs for residents and
for outsiders to conserve the forest.
A PA monitoring and enforcement infrastructure is the first instrument avail-
able to their managers. The employment of rangers is typically used in strictly
protected wildlife and natural reserves such as parks and biological refuges.
Both enforce the rule of law by detecting violations and issuing fines to per-
petrators. These activities increase the risk of detection and, coerced through
fines, increase the costs of forest harming activities and therefore reduce their
benefits. This instrument serves to reduce internal and external opportunity
costs for conservation.
The BFP does not execute direct monitoring and enforcement activities. None-
theless, monitoring is conducted indirectly by the staff members of the FAS.
Staff members frequently visit communities for the subscription of new fam-
ilies to the program or for technical assistance to the supported production
lines (income component). Local violations against the BFP rules can easily be
detected and reported to the FAS headquarters. The BFP issued warnings to
4.6% of participants through 2013 (Börner et al., 2013). Although we do not
have any information on the suspension of payments as a direct enforcement
instrument, it is credible to assume that the expectation of punishment exists.
Integrated conservation and development programs (ICDPs) implemented by the
reserve management and its partners target internal opportunity costs within
multiple-use protected areas. They aim to shift inhabitant’s income sources
94 conservation incentives for protected area management
towards sustainable forest friendly activities and to increase welfare. The pol-
icy assumes that inhabitants lack technical knowledge or investment capaci-
ties to shift into sustainable income sources. The idea of ICDP investments
is that once forest friendly production systems are installed, they crowd out
forest-harming activities. Nonetheless, following Weber, Sills, Bauch, and Pat-
tanayak (2011) and Bauch, Sills, and Pattanayak (2014) gains in production
efficiency can have two diverging effects: (1) they can lead to increased pro-
duction and divert labor away from forest-harming activities and into forest-
friendly activities, whose rate of return has increased; (2) they can result in
reduced labor needs for production in forest-friendly activity, freeing labor for
forest-harming activities. Which of these effects predominates depends on a
multitude of factors among which are: access to labor markets, markets to sell
products, leisure preferences, etc. The outcomes on the opportunity costs of
conservation are ambiguous and will depend on the specific context.
The BFP incorporates a variety of investments with its social, association
and income components. Investments focus on infrastructure (water, sanita-
tion), education, healthcare and forest-friendly production systems. The latter
is most related with the idea of shifting residents’ income base toward forest-
friendly production. The program components fit the definition and goals of
ICDPs. The impact of the BFP on the opportunity costs of conservation will
first depend on the labor productivity of the supported production practices.
But more importantly it will depend on each community’s and reserve’s con-
text: How high the gains from forest harming activities are and if outside labor
and goods markets exist.
Conditional payments or payments for environmental services (PES) are the third
conservation instrument available to protected area managers. In the case of
protected areas, the environmental service provided can be defined as the com-
pliance with the reserve rules or inclusion of additional conservation rules
(Wunder, 2005). Irrespective of both cases the success of PES generally de-
pends on whether the payments offset the opportunity costs of conservation
and on the existence of a credible monitoring and enforcement system.
The BFP’s focus lies in the participation of families within their conditional
payments component (family component). Families receive monthly 50 reais
per month conditioned on their compliance with the BFP rules. As described
in the previous section, these rules are somewhat stricter than the rules of
the PAs. Börner et al. (2013) and Newton et al. (2012) show that payments
are most probably sufficient to offset the opportunity costs of conservation.
As described above, the conditionality condition of the BFP is fulfilled with an
indirect monitoring and enforcement via warnings of suspension from the pro-
gram. In consequence, the PES component of the BFP reduces the opportunity
costs of conservation and moves residential activities towards forest conserva-
tion.
Monitoring & enforcement efforts by residents themselves can be induced infor-
mally by conditional payment schemes or ICDPs (Robinson, Albers, Ngeleza,
and Lokina, 2014). Violations against protected area rules (e.g., logging, clear
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cut forest patches, etc.) are very difficult to attribute to specific actors. Vio-
lations are mostly never observed as they occur, but with a time delay. This
makes it often impossible to attribute illegal outcomes to specific residents or
non-residents, especially in PAs where clearly defined property rights and li-
ability rules are missing. However, violations are attributable to communities
and reserves where they are sighted. PA management could choose to hold
residents collectively responsible, and suspend single communities or reserves
from the PES program. In consequence, participants complying with the rules
of the PES will unjustly face a risk of losing their payments due to others’ non-
compliance. The risk of losing future payments leads participants to monitor
and enforce compliance (1) among their fellow residents and (2) against out-
sider invasions and illegal settlers.9 Both forms of control, will take increasing
effect with an increasing number of participants holding positive expected ben-
efits from compliance. Accordingly, internal opportunity costs of conservation
of residents decrease due to the additional social costs of non-compliance and
the external opportunity costs of outsiders increase as the risk of detection and
denunciation by residents increases. It is important to notice that residential
monitoring can only develop if collusion with outsiders does not create higher
benefits than the PES and associated benefits.
The BFP effort unintentionally induces monitoring and enforcement in its
targeted reserves. The regular visits of staff members to the benefiting commu-
nities allow the FAS to observe changes in compliance with the BFP rules. The
FAS cannot attribute violations to individual families and has to be careful to
maintain the trust built with the residents. Nonetheless, the BFP could decide
to cease or to fadeout their support to communities with continuous violations.
The high participation rates suggest that communities have a strong interest
to maintain their status within the BFP. Non-participating families must subor-
dinate to the dominant compliance strategy of participants. The BFP’s explicit
long-term goal is to build what they call ’conservation alliances’ with the re-
serve dwellers. The FAS installed radio telephones in all reserve centers which
facilitate communication and can be used to assure timely report of invasions
from outsiders. Thereby, the conditions for an induced monitoring and enforce-
ment activity by residents are present within BFP reserves.
The link between instruments and conservation outcomes are depicted in
Figure 4.3. These mechanisms are:
M1 Compensations: The conditional payments to families at least compen-
sate the opportunity costs of additional forest conservation. In conse-
quence forest-harming activities by residents decrease, which reduces
deforestation and forest degradation.
M2 Indirect monitoring: PA monitoring activities are introduced through
the execution of the BFP. The increased probability of punishment de-
9 Enforcement could be exerted by social sanctions. However, if there are gainers from non-
compliance and losers from compliance, a Coasean bargaining solution among residents might
exist.
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Figure 4.3: Instruments and mechanisms for protected area management
Forest conservation within protected areas (PAs) 
“External” risk of
‐deforestation
‐logging
‐hunting
“Internal” risk of 
‐deforestation
‐logging
‐hunting
Conservation 
outcomes
Instruments
PA monitoring 
and 
enforcement
ICDP PES
Internal 
opportunity costs
of forest 
conservation
External 
opportunity costs 
of forest 
conservation
Residential 
M&E
M2
Mechanisms
creases the profitability of forest harming activities, thereby reducing the
incentives for deforestation by residents.
M3 Mutual monitoring: Compliant residents’ interest in maintaining the
benefit flow of the BFP translates into a mutual monitoring and social
sanctioning of non-compliant residents. This increases the costs of forest
harming activities resulting in decreased incentives for deforestation by
residents.
M4 Conservation alliance: Compliant residents’ interest in maintaining the
benefit flow of the BFP translates into an increased monitoring and re-
porting of non-residents’ invasions - under the condition that partici-
pants receive higher gains from the program than from collusion with
outsiders.
M5 Forest friendly production: Investments into forest friendly production
lines divert production factors away from forest harming activities - un-
der the conditions that saved resources are used for increased production
rather than increased leisure time and a sufficient market demand for the
goods produced exists.
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4.4 intervention hypotheses
The mechanisms of decreased opportunity costs (M1), increased expected pun-
ishment (M2) and increased mutual monitoring (M3) lead us to our first hy-
pothesis:
H1 The Bolsa Floresta Program has a positive impact on forest conservation.
Compensations (M1), indirect monitoring (M2) by the FAS and mutual mon-
itoring (M3) lower the opportunity costs of conservation to BFP participants
in the treated reserves. In consequence, forest conservation is increasingly re-
warding to participants and forest conservation outcomes improve.
The average effect of the BFP program (H1) varies across the targeted 15
reserves. Some protected areas are under higher deforestation pressures than
others. All mechanisms are dependent on the context, specifically on the op-
portunity costs of forest conservation residents are facing and on the opportu-
nity costs non-residents have of staying out of reserves. We operationalize the
mechanisms by considering the internal and external deforestation pressures
of each reserve. The internal deforestation pressure relates to the opportunity
cost of conservation residence face. The external deforestation pressure relates
to the opportunity costs outsiders face. Distinguishing between high and low
external or internal pressures we relate to the following four hypotheses:
H2.1 In a context of low internal and low external pressures on multiple-use
reserve forests the BFP has no effect on forest conservation: Such con-
texts have traditionally few forest-harming activities inside and outside
of reserves, compliance levels of residents and outsiders are high. The
mechanisms compensation (M1), indirect monitoring (M2), and mutual
monitoring (M3) are unable to increase forest conservation because defor-
estation is too low to be lowered further. Similarly, conservation alliances
(M4) are unable to reduce the threat from outside invasions as there are
no such invasions. Forest friendly production (M5) is unable to crowd
out forest harming activities as activities are already forest friendly.
H2.2 In a context of low internal and high external pressures on the reserves’
forests the BFP increases forest conservation. Where residents have low
economic opportunity costs of conservation and compliance levels are
high the mechanisms of indirect monitoring (M2) and mutual residential
monitoring (M3) are unable to further increase compliance behavior. But
outsiders face high benefits of invasion, and a combination of compen-
sations (M1), benign forest production (M5) and environmental alliances
(M4) can be highly effective in increasing residents’ incentives to defend
the natural resources against outsiders.
H2.3 In a context of high internal and low external pressures on the reserves’
forests the BFP has a positive effect on forest conservation. In such con-
texts residents traditionally engage in forest harming activities, and out-
siders face low economic interests on the forest resources. Forest alliances
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(M4) have little effect as invasions are few. Mutual monitoring (M3) is un-
likely to emerge as in these contexts a majority of residents seem to gain
from forest harming activities. Investments in forest friendly production
(M5) might increase labor productivity but labor may shift to the more
profitable forest harming activities. Nonetheless, external economic pres-
sures are low and the BFP should be able to shift behaviors towards
forest friendly activities with a combination of compensations (M1) and
a strong indirect monitoring (M2).
H2.4 In a context of high internal and high external pressures on the re-
serves’ forests the BFP has a negative impact effect on forest conservation.
In such contexts residents and outsiders gain high benefits from forest
harming activities. Compensations (M1) with indirect monitoring (M2)
are unable to offset the opportunity costs of conservation and mutual resi-
dential monitoring (M3) is unlikely to emerge as everyone gains from for-
est harming activities. Furthermore, environmental alliances (M4) are im-
probable as collusion with outsiders brings higher benefits. These mech-
anisms are ineffective and the BFP has no positive effect through them.
Nonetheless, the investments taken with compensations (M1) and the
forest friendly production (M5) help residents to capitalize. Households
divert the saved resources and labor input from the development aid to-
wards higher production of forest harming activities. In consequence, the
BFP unintentionally decreases forest conservation outcomes.
4.5 evaluation methodology and data
The impact of the BFP on forest conservation depends on its ability to provide
additional conservation outcomes - an additional conservation effect beyond
that derived from having placed the landscape under a PA category (multiple-
use reserve). This analysis focuses on the comparison of reserves with the
BFP against reserves without the BFP on observed biophysical outcomes (de-
forestation, forest degradation and fire incidence). The conservation effect of
the BFP is defined as the difference between the observed outcomes and the
unobserved outcomes that would have occurred if the policy had not been
implemented. This unobserved outcome is defined as the counterfactual to
the treated group. The BFP has actively selected 15 out of 61 multiple-use re-
serves within Amazonas. The unselected reserves serve as a base to construct
the counterfactual scenario of what would have been the outcome without the
intervention. As the BFP has not chosen randomly among the reserves it is
best to assume that the treated 15 reserves systematically differ from the non-
selected reserves. E.g., it might be that the treated reserves experience higher
deforestation rates even without the intervention, or vice versa. Comparing
the BFP reserves with the full set of non-participating reserves would produce
biased results. In consequence, we would fail to measure potentially positive
conservation effects.
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Quasi-experimental evaluation designs aim to construct a credible counter-
factual scenario to the treated group. ’Matching’ is a prominent quasi-experimental
method in spatial environmental applications to overcome selection biases (An-
dam et al., 2008; Gaveau et al., 2009; Honey-Rosés et al., 2011; Pfaff et al., 2015).
Matching reduces any potential selection bias by finding for each treated unit
the most similar untreated unit considering observable characteristics before
the intervention started. As Pfaff et al. (2015) figuratively describe this strategy
as the comparison of “apples-to-apples” by leaving out the peaches.
This analysis deals with the selection bias of the BFP in three steps. First,
we “slice” all reserves into smaller spatial units of 5 to 5 km.10 This procedure
helps to better capture the large variety of environmental and economic char-
acteristics across and within each of the reserves. In the second step the pool of
control cells is reduced to only include cells that are similar to the treated BFP
cells. With nearest neighbor ’matching’ techniques we construct a sample of
control cells most akin to the BFP cells in terms of pre-treatment deforestation
trends, socio-economic indices and geo-environmental characteristics. This re-
duces potential biases from observable characteristics. The third step exploits
the panel data available and the fact that BFP started in different years in differ-
ent reserves. Fixed Effects (FE) estimations serve to reduce the risk of potential
biases surging form unobservable time-invariant factors. The combination of
all 3 methods is rarely found in environmental impact evaluations due to ei-
ther a lack of information or data processing capacity. The combination of
matching with panel data estimations promises to find accurate causal rela-
tions in comparison to the ’gold standard’ of experimental evaluation Ferraro
and Miranda (2014).
4.5.1 Slicing the reserves
To capture the spatial diversity and deforestation pressures within reserves we
create a higher spatial resolution for the analysis. We intersect a grid with the
administrative boundaries of all multiple-use reserves, which gives us a mul-
titude of cells in each reserve (see Figure 4.4). The size chosen for the grid is
0.045 by 0.045 degrees which correspond to 5 by 5 km rectangles at the equator.
Owing to our vectored data structure the resulting spatial units range between
0 and 25 sq. km. Especially at the border of reserves, cells are only a fraction
of the original grid. We keep all units of the slicing process, fully covered
and partially covered cells. This technique avoids a potential bias from loss
of information or misattribution at the border. Often grid cells at bordering
regions are excluded as they overlay several administrational units. Reserve
borders are often drawn at natural boundaries like rivers or roads at which
human activities and deforestation accumulate. Keeping all units avoids los-
10 The 5 to 5 km grid cells are artificial data containers and do not affect the resolution of the
spatial data. E.g., the 30meters resolution of the deforestation data from PRODES remains but
each pixel is assigned to a cell. The spatial data aggregation to a lower resolution of 5 to 5 km
grid cells serves to avoid biases from e.g., spatial autocorrelation addressed in section 4.9.
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Figure 4.4: The spatial slicing of protected areas
Note: The Figure depicts the slicing of reserves into spatial units of 5 to
5 km. The dashed reserves are the RDS do Rio Negro (south) and APA
Rio Negro (north). RDS (Sustainable Development Reserve) and APA (En-
vironmental Protection Area) are two subtypes of the multiple-use reserves
category in the Brazilian protected area system.
ing important information. Simultaneously the irregular cell structure allows
to rightly attributing deforestation patches to their according administrational
unit. Furthermore the size of our cells is a compromise between spatial pre-
cision and spatial autocorrelation. Using a lower spatial resolution would fail
to capture the spatial diversity, and a higher spatial resolution risks creating
redundant observations and spatial autocorrelation within the data. We only
exclude very small units that are covered by only 5% of the slicing grid units.
The 61 reserves are thereby divided into 14,397 grid cells. Spatial information
on outcomes and controls are intersected and attributed to these smaller units,
making the analysis spatially explicit (see section 4.6 below).
4.5.2 Constructing counterfactual observations
The second step of our estimation analysis consists of finding counterfactual
cells that are the most similar to BFP cells before the intervention started.
Guided by our theoretical framework we want to find control cells that ex-
perienced equal internal and external deforestation pressures. Matching tech-
niques are implemented to find for each treated unit (’apples’) the most similar
control unit (’peaches that are almost apples’) out of the full set of controls.
Similarity of deforestation pressures is approximated with observable pre-
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treatment environmental and socio-economic characteristics. Pressures from
within and from outside of reserves are considered using variables on tree
data levels, cell characteristics, reserve characteristics and district characteris-
tics (see Figure C.1) Tables C.1 and C.2 list the data class, level and sources of
each covariate.. The selected control cells from non-BFP reserves represent the
counterfactual behavior of the treated cells that would have occurred without
the intervention.
Matching is implemented with Sekhon’s 2011 ’Matching’ package, using
a 1to1 nearest neighbor matching technique with replacement on the Maha-
lanobis distance. We implement two additional non-standard restrictions to
the matching algorithm. First, each cell can cover an area of 5 to 100% of its
slicing grid cell (5 to 5 km). In order to avoid matches between observations
with different sizes, we restrict the algorithm to find only pairs within a mar-
gin around 5 percentage points on this variable. Second, the age of treated
and control reserves varies significantly and some reserves were founded at
the very outset of the BFP while others are much older. To avoid control re-
serves that were founded later than the BFP started, we restrict the procedure
to only find control matches from reserves founded before a BFP started. A
detailed summary of all covariates used in the matching procedure are shown
in Table C.3. The Table describes the attribute class of each factor (natural, eco-
nomic or political), reports the data level (cell, reserve or district) and classifies
the drivers of deforestation (internal or external).
Characteristics of the natural environment are considered at the cell level with
pre-existing deforestation trends, pre-existing number of fire incidents, initial
forest cover, secondary vegetation, non-forest area (swamps and bush land
areas) and water bodies (lakes and rivers). The economic environment is con-
sidered on a cell level with infrastructural indices (distances to roads, rivers,
and district capitals). Economic activities are controlled for on a cell level with
remotely sensed land use classes (agricultural land, mixed occupation, sec-
ondary vegetation, pasture and urban land). Economic interests form outside
of reserves are approximated with official statistics at the district level (popula-
tion density, GDP per capita, GDP per capita from agriculture, the percentage
area under farms, the share of small farms, the average tractors per farm and
an average timber price). Furthermore, we include an index of land specula-
tion at a cell level based on Bowman et al.’s (2012) spatial model of extensive
cattle profitability.
The political conservation environment is measured with data on settlement
projects and data on further protected areas surrounding each cell. Settlement
projects are a major influence, as they often take on characteristics in oppo-
sition to conservation although more recent efforts to establish “sustainable
settlements” in the Amazon may change this situation (Ludewigs et al., 2009).
We use an binary indicator to determine whether or not a cell is covered by
a settlement project. A favorable conservation environment is considered with
distances to the next strictly protected reserve and the next indigenous area.
The conservation quality of each reserve is partly controlled for by the size and
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years of existence of the respective reserve. Distances of each cell to its own
reserve border capture the relative internal position and reflect the degree of
exposure to external deforestation pressures. Finally, we include indices on the
narrower spatial context using neighborhood characteristics of adjacent cells.
Matching estimators are based on two strong assumptions: unconfounded-
ness and common support. Unconfoundedness can be described by the fact
that the selection of the reserves was solely dependent on the observable char-
acteristics. Common support is a requirement of overlapping distributions of
the distance measure or propensity scores between the control group and the
treatment group. After personal discussions with the head of FAS (Virgílio
Viana) and implementing agents we are confident that we have not missed out
any relevant factor of the selection process.11 The importance of the match-
ing assumptions for causal interpretations is alleviated, as our analysis relies
on panel data estimations to find the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT), described below.
4.5.3 Regression analysis
The third step aims to reduce the risk of potential biases surging from un-
observable characteristics. After selecting an adequate control group with the
previous matching procedure we exploit our panel database. We implement
Fixed Effects (FE) regressions of the yearly outcome variables at the start of
the BFP. The BFP started in 9 reserves in 2008, and added 5 more in 2009 and
one in 2010. The different timing of treatment start allows us to filter out po-
tential confounding factors that are unobserved and invariant over time. Our
panel model is:
lnDEFirdt = C ′it β+ γPESrt + D
′
dt δ+ µi + κr + σd + ηt + εirdt (4.1)
The outcome variable ln DEFirdt represents the annual logarithmic deforesta-
tion within each cell i in year t that resides in reserve r and is located within
district d. Further analyses replace the deforestation outcome newly degraded
forest areas or fire incidences. Our dataset runs from 2003 to 2012. Owing to
data limitations, the analysis of forest degradation only includes years from
2007 to 2012. Yearly deforestation depends on individual cell characteristics,
reserve characteristics, district characteristics, and the policy intervention of
the BFP. The treatment dummy is denoted as PESrt, turning one from year t
onwards in which a reserve r starts to enroll in the BFP. Varying observable fac-
tors on the cell level and district level are denoted by Cit and Ddt, respectively.
Under individual cell characteristics we consider yearly detected cloud cover-
age, which acts as a measurement error of the remotely sensed deforestation.
Varying external pressures on forested areas are considered with yearly lagged
district characteristics on GDP per capita, GDP per capita in the agricultural
sector and average timber prices.
11 Visits to the FAS headquarters of FAS in Manaus was visited in July and November 2013.
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Our panel model considers observable and unobservable fixed effects, which
determine the yearly deforestation rates. Fixed factors can be classified into
individual level characteristics µi, reserve level characteristics κr and district
level characteristics σd. Year fixed effects common to all regions and cells of
the study area are captured with dummies for each year, ηt. The year fixed
effects control for variations in the overall macroeconomic environment and
changes in the implementation of environmental laws from the state or federal
government. The idiosyncratic error term is denoted as εirdt.
Regressing equation 4.1 would be prone to serial correlation and would fail
to control for unobserved fixed effects, which simultaneously shift deforesta-
tion and treatment. We use a fixed effects (FE) estimation approach to assess
the impact of the BFP on our outcome variables. Other studies on forest conser-
vation use first-difference (FD) estimation approaches. FE and FD approaches
both exclude the unobservable fixed effects on the cell, reserve and district
levels (part of µi, κr, σd). In comparison, the FE estimator is more efficient
if the idiosyncratic error term εirdt is not serially correlated, and the FD esti-
mator is more efficient if the error term follows a random walk (Wooldridge,
2010). Most observations reveal only peaks of logging at some point within
our timeframe. With no clear trend in the dependent variables, this confirms
our preference for FE specifications, as follows:
˜lnDEFirdt = C˜ ′it β+ γ P˜ESrt + D˜
′
dt δ+ η˜t + ε˜irdt (4.2)
Equation 4.2 results from subtracting the means over time within each cell
from equation 4.1.12 This procedure excludes both observable and unobserv-
able fixed effects. The loss of information from the excluded fixed observable
factors is limited, as we have controlled for these with matching as a pre-
estimation technique.
Our interest lies in the parameter γ measuring the ATT on deforestation
within each grid cell. For the interpretation of the ATT as a causal relationship
empirical methods rely on its standard error. The standard error is the estimate
of the dispersion from the mean given by the sample. Therefore its calculation
relies on the assumptions of the data structure at hand. Dividing the reserves
into smaller spatial units creates a non-random selection process within our
data generation. Meaning, the cells within each reserve are not independent
of each other, they are subordinate to the same administration (e.g., manage-
ment quality) and are treated or not treated simultaneously. The intra-class
correlation within reserves violates the standard assumption of independent
observations (E[εirdt, εjrdt] = 0). Standard errors relying on the assumption of
independence assumption are largely underestimated and lead to high but un-
true significance levels (Cameron and Miller, 2015). To correct for the group
structure of our data we cluster the standard errors on the reserve level, fol-
lowing the suggestion from Angrist and Pischke (2009).
12 Procedure is clarified in Appendix C.3.
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4.6 data
4.6.1 Outcome variables
Our outcome variables are yearly deforestation, forest degradation, and num-
ber of fires per cell. Spatial data processing is conducted on a PostgresSQL
9.2.3 data server with a PostGIS 2.0.1 spatial extension. Deforestation, forest
degradation, and fire incidence data are downloaded in shape file format at its
fullest resolution from the web-site of the National Institute of Spatial Research
(Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, INPE).13 INPE’s deforestation mea-
surement is based on Landsat imagery, and deforestation patches are defined
as clear-cut deforestation - the complete loss of tree cover on a 30 m resolution.
Reliable deforestation data are available from 2003 on and our time-frame ends
in 2012.
INPE uses the August to July cycle for its yearly measurements - exploiting
the relatively cloud-free dry period of the year.14 INPE started to record forest
degradation data in 2007, therefore few observations are available from before
the Program started in 2008. As consequence, this analysis relies more strongly
on matching assumptions rather than FE assumptions.
The number of yearly fires is based on a simple count measurement of fire
incidence detected by several satellites on a daily basis. It therefore captures
the frequency and intensity of forest burning activities within a predefined
area.
4.6.2 Covariates
Covariates used for the matching procedure and the time series analysis are
summarized in Tables C.3 and C.4, respectively. Data are either constructed
through spatial calculations or obtained from official secondary data sources
(district, reserve). Outcome variables (deforestation, degradation, and fires),
data on forest coverage, cloud coverage, non-forest coverage and hydrography
coverage (rivers, lakes) are provided by INPE’s yearly deforestation database.
Coverage is measured as a ratio of land use over the total area of a cell.
Land use classes are obtained from the 2008 revision of INPE’s TerraClass
project.15 Areas deforested before 2008 are classified into new land use types of
agricultural land, mixed land occupation, secondary vegetation, pasture land,
and urban areas. We use these classes to construct coverages for each cell.
INPE classified these lands in the same year in which the BFP rolled out. It
is reasonable to assume that the BFP has not shaped in the first months’ land
use decisions and we can treat these variables as unaffected by the program.
13 INPE-PRODES Instituto Nacional de Pesquisa Espaciais / Projeto PRODES - Monitoramento
da floresta amazônica brasileira por satélite, http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.php.
14 For a detailed description of the methodology used to construct yearly deforestation data see
section B.1 in the Appendix of chapter 3
15 http://www.inpe.br/cra/projetos_pesquisas/terraclass2010.php
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We include coverage data of federal agrarian settlement projects, using the
shape file provided by the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian
Reform (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária, INCRA).16 A
land speculation map is provided by Bowman et al. (2012), indicating whether
or not a particular plot of forest land can be considered as being potentially
profitable if converted for cattle ranching. We intersect Bowman’s layer with
the cells to construct an index of land profitability that can capture the pre-
existing deforestation pressures on the reserves.
Distance variables are constructed with PostGIS by connecting the center of
each cell with the nearest object in question (see an example in C.4). Distances
in meters are logged to reduce skewed distributions stemming from outliers.
The data on road networks from the Protection System of Amazonia (Sistema
de Proteção da Amazônia, SIPAM)17 serve to construct connecting beelines.
The connectivity to water bodies is measured using the hydrography map
of the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis,
IBAMA).18 The distances to the boundaries of indigenous areas, strictly pro-
tected areas and multiple-use reserves are obtained with spatial layers from
IBAMA (2013).
Non-spatial attributes to our cells database are cross-linked via the spatial
location of the cell centroids within administrative entities. Figure C.1 depicts
on a map excerpt the cell, reserve, and district data levels. Reserve character-
istics on size and the foundation year are obtained from the spatial database
on reserves. The district boundaries from 2007 are used for our analysis and
are publicly available from Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
(INPE, 2012).District characteristics include population densities in 2007 from
the IBGE Demographic Census (IBGE, 2000),GDP per capita and agricultural
GDP per capita in 2006 from IBGE Agricultural Census (IBGE, 2006).Informa-
tion on the farm coverage, the share of small farms and tractors per farm also
come from the Agricultural census. Timber prices between 2003 and 2006 are
constructed as the ratio between quantity and total value of timber produced
and obtainable from the IBGE-PEVS report (IBGE, 2014).
Neighboring variables are used as covariates to control for dependencies
of deforestation on close contexts. Neighboring covariates are constructed by
“queen style”, defining neighbors as such when two cells share a point on the
boundary line. A weighted average of all neighboring values by the number
of total neighbors serves in consequence as the neighboring covariate.
16 http://acervofundiario.incra.gov.br/i3geo/datadownload.htm
17 http://www.sipam.gov.br/
18 Original download is no longer available. Updated data are downloadable via the geoserver
of the Center of Remote Sensing (CSR): http://maps.csr.ufmg.br/
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4.6.3 Sample
The sample used in this research differs from the full database. We drop ob-
servations owing to data characteristics or to analytical reasoning before the
analysis. The cell structure is constructed with 71,354 rectangular grid cells of
5 to 5 km covering the full Brazilian Legal Amazon. The resulting 86,483 cells
are the data shell in which we fill the data described above.
As we are focusing only on multiple-use reserves our sample reduces to
38,886 observations. Owing to data irregularities of the satellite monitoring
system at the edges of images we further exclude 89 observations. No cells
have to be excluded because of missing neighbors (e.g., singular cells on is-
lands). Our analytical focus resides within Amazonas, with 61 multiple-use
reserves, resulting in 9,143 control cells without the BFP and 5,254 treated
cells of the BFP.
For analytical reasons, we drop 928 units that cover less than 5% of the orig-
inal grid cell, i.e., dropping each cell that is roughly smaller than 1.25 sq. km
We suspect that these small spatial units are prone to measurement errors and
create problems of spatial interdependencies in the unobservables. More im-
portantly, we exclude all observations that have no forest cover (152). These
can result from extensive logging in previous years, but more probably are
fully covered by swamps and water bodies. To avoid an analytical bias from
spatial leakage we exclude all untreated cells within a distance of 20 km to
treated cells (899). This results in 12,418 observations. Clouds introduce a bias
from systematic measurement errors of yearly deforestation for small spatial
units. We therefore exclude all cells that had experienced more than 90% cloud
coverage in any year of our timeframe, dropping 2,632 observations. Finally,
we identify 11 outliers in our control group that have experienced exaggerated
deforestation levels with more than 200 ha cleared in some year during our
timeframe. For this analysis we assume that these occurrences are driven by
local unobservable peculiarities which could be related to treatment status and
bias our results. Our final sample consists of 6301 control and 3474 treatment
cells covering over 56 reserves including the 15 reserves of the BFP. Figure 4.5
maps the analytical sample used in the matching process.
4.7 results
The results of the counterfactual analysis on BFP impacts are presented in 5
parts: First, we evaluate the quality of our matching procedure. Second, we
assess the ability to measure impacts in the context of low deforestation oc-
currences. Third, the average impacts on deforestation are discussed in detail
following Hypothesis (H1) (see section 4.4). Fourth, context dependent hetero-
geneous impacts are analyzed following hypotheses H2.1 - H2.4. Fifth, we test
the impacts on alternative measures of forest conservation (forest degradation
and forest fires).
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Figure 4.5: Matched sample of spatial cells
Note: The Figure shows the sliced sample of the multiple-used reserves in the state of Ama-
zonas. The BFP cells in red 3474 are matched to the unique non-BFP cells (722) in green with
a 1:1 nearest neighbor matching based on the Mahalanobis distance measurement.
4.7.1 The quality of matching
Matching is conducted on the Mahalanobis distance on pre-program charac-
teristics covering environmental, social, and economic conditions. Our pres-
elected sample included 6,301 control cells and 3,474 treated cells across 15
treated and 56 control reserves (see also Figure 4.5). The matched 1 to 1 sam-
ple resulted in 3474 paired controls created out of 722 unique controls spread
over 30 reserves (see Figure 4.5). The aim of the matching procedure is to
reduce imbalances among the covariates that indicate the probability of pro-
gram selection (e.g., FAS having preselected those reserves that had exhibited
lowest prior deforestation rates). Figure 4.6 depicts the imbalances between
control and treated group before and after matching. The dots indicate the
(standardized) mean distance between control cells and treatment cells. The
differences before matching - including all cells of non-participating reserves
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- are on average higher than after matching.19 The main focus lies on the per-
centage deforestation of each cell before the BFP start. The standardized mean
difference between 2003 to 2006 declines on average from 0.18 to 0.02 standard
deviations, a decline of 90% to almost zero difference.
4.7.2 Ability to measure impacts
Deforestation rates are traditionally very low within multiple-use reserves in
Amazonas. At the beginning of 2002, 850 sq. km had already been deforested
within the BFP reserves. Deforestation activities during the years from 2003 to
2007 amounted to only 40.8 sq. km, and after the start of the program until
2012 they totaled 32.8 sq. km (cf. Figure 4.7). The detection of forest harming
activities in a context of low deforestation rates is limited by the nature of the
satellite monitoring system. INPE reports only newly deforested areas. Once
an area is deforested, it is no longer monitored for return deforestation, which
is a common process among shifting cultivators. Deforested and abandoned
areas regenerate after a few years and our deforestation measurement does
not account for re-deforestation activities. Given that a large part of the area
was already deforested before 2003 and given that newly deforested areas are
small within all reserves, we test our ability to measure any impact on forest
cover of the BFP.
The maximum forest conservation impact of the BFP would consist of a
complete cessation of deforestation beginning with the start of the program.
The overall deforestation level is very low within all reserves in Amazonas,
averaging between 0.54 ha to 0.06 ha of yearly deforestation in the matched
sample (see Table C.4). These low variations cast doubt on our ability to detect
any impacts with remotely sensed data. Before continuing, we test the ability
to empirically measure impacts by setting the few treated observations with
positive deforestation values to zero in the years the BFP starts in each of the
reserves (see Table C.5). Estimates of the BFP using our FE model indicate to
the hypothetically maximum impacts the intervention could have achieved.
Results of the FE regressions using the hypothetical deforestation levels are
presented in Table 4.1 below. Column (1) shows results using the full un-
matched sample. The coefficient is negative (-0.286) and significant at a 1 per-
cent level. The second column presents the FE impact estimate after matching
- our preferred estimation method. The coefficient is also negative (-0.254) and
significant on a 10% level. This result suggests that the BFP treatment could
only be measured up to an average reduction of deforestation of 22%.20 21
19 The median difference across all variables before matching is 0.057. After matching mean stan-
dard deviations fall sharply by 59% to 0.023, indicating a significant improvement of sample
balances.
20 In the unmatched case the coefficient has a higher value than in the matched case and is
significant indicating that all unmatched regressions tend to upward bias our results.
21 0.22 = exp(−0.254) − 1; See Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) for the calculation of impact of
explanatory dummy coefficients in regressions.
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Figure 4.6: Covariate balances before and after matching
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Note: The Figure depicts the mean standardized differences between control observations and
treated observations, before (black) and after (yellow) matching. The distances decrease after
matching significantly towards zero. At zero difference between matched controls and treated
units, the selection bias converges to zero.
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Figure 4.7: Deforestation in the state of Amazonas and its multiple-use reserves
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Note: Left panel shows yearly deforestation levels within the state of Amazonas. Right
panel shows trends for multiple-use reserve of the state of Amazonas receiving the Bolsa
Floresta program (BFP; purple, lower line) and not receiving the BFP (upper, green line).
The distribution of our dependent variable is highly skewed because of the
low deforestation rate in forest reserves in Amazonas. In the matched sam-
ple, 95% of all observations, across cells and years, report zero deforestation.
Only 12.7% of all cells experience some deforestation during our timeframe.
This circumstance could downward bias our treatment estimates as variations
in the explanatory variables lack a response in large parts of the dependent
variable. We deal with this in 3 ways. First, we estimate a weighted FE esti-
mation in column (3). Weights are constructed by the inverse probability of
the cell experiencing some deforestation before treatment (2003-2007). Weight-
ing the sample by probabilities gives less influence to observations that would
not have deforested in any case. Second, we weight by the size of our cell
units in column (4), giving lower importance to very small observational areas.
This method controls for the probability of observations experiencing zero
deforestation simply because small areas are less probable to be affected by
deforestation. Third, we test our results in column (4) with the estimation of
a Random Effects Panel Tobit model, which incorporates the skewed distribu-
tion. Coefficients in columns (2) to (4) are still negative but insignificant. These
results demonstrate that despite the low variation of our outcome, it would
technically be possible to measure significant impacts of the BFP.
4.7.3 The average effects on deforestation
The average effects of the BFP on deforestation are reported in Table 4.2. All
coefficients of the BFP dummy are insignificant, regardless of the estimation
method. Comparing the unmatched with the matched sample, the matched
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Table 4.1: The hypothetical maximum Bolsa Floresta effect
Dependent ln hypothetical deforestation
Unmatched Matched
weighted weighted
FE by FE by RE
FE FE P.def. cell size Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bolsa Floresta -0.286*** -0.254* -0.089* -0.191 -0.417
(0.104) (0.143) (0.047) (0.141) (0.053)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97750 69480 69480 69480 69480
Groups 56 45 45 45 45
R-sq. / Chi-sq 0.032 0.045 0.012 0.046 1773.0
Note: The Table reports fixed effects estimates in columns (1)-(4). Column
(3) uses weights by estimates of a pre-treatment probability of deforesta-
tion. Column (4) uses weights by the cell size. Column (5) reports Random
Effects Tobit estimates. The dependent variable is the change in the log of
yearly newly deforested area. Further controls include cloud coverage over
remaining forest area, the log of yearly district GDP per capita, the log of
yearly agricultural GDP per capita and the log of yearly average timber
prices. Clustered standard errors on a reserve level are reported in paren-
theses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level.
coefficient is approximately 50% higher, indicating a downward bias of the
treatment effect in the unmatched regression. The last estimate in column 5, the
Random Effects Tobit estimate, shows a higher coefficient, though insignificant
and therefore unreliable for a causal interpretation. These results indicate no
causal change of deforestation rates due to the BFP intervention.
The previous section verified that a impact on deforestation would be mea-
surable if deforestation had ceased with the start of the BFP. However, at the
aggregate level we cannot find any impact of the BFP. Following the impact
hypothesis H2.1 - H2.4 of section 4.4, we investigate for heterogeneous effects
in the next section.
4.7.4 Context dependent heterogeneous impacts
The analysis of the average effect of the BFP failed to detect any positive or
negative impacts on deforestation. A first explanation is the incipient phase
of the program. Starting to introduce conservation incentives in 2008, the pro-
gram might not have had the chance to significantly protect forests by 2012
against a counterfactual scenario.
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Table 4.2: The Bolsa Floresta effect on deforestation
Dependent ln Deforestation
Unmatched Matched
weighted weighted
FE by FE by RE
FE FE P.def. cell size Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bolsa Floresta 0.032 0.049 -0.000 0.067 0.375
(0.057) (0.114) (0.037) (0.123) (0.065)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97750 69480 69480 69480 69480
Groups 56 45 45 45 45
R-sq. / Chi-sq 0.022 0.028 0.006 0.030 1116.6
Note: The table reports fixed effects estimates in columns (1)-(4). Column
(3) uses weights by estimates of a pre-treatment probability of deforesta-
tion. Column (4) uses weights by the cell size. Column (5) reports Random
Effects Tobit estimates. The dependent variable is the change in the log of
yearly newly deforested area. Further controls include cloud coverage over
remaining forest area, the log of yearly district GDP per capita, the log of
yearly agricultural GDP per capita and the log of yearly average timber
prices. Clustered standard errors on a reserve level are reported in paren-
theses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level.
The second explanation for the zero average impacts refers to the hypotheses
H2.1 to H2.4 described in section 4.4. Diverging positive and negative effects
of the BFP can sum up to zero. We expect no change in deforestation due to
the program where deforestation pressures are low internally and externally
(H2.1). Differently, we expect a strong influence of the environmental alliances
mechanism to reduce deforestation in a context of low pressures internally and
high pressures externally (H2.2). In a context of high internal pressures but low
external pressures we expect declining deforestation rates, arguing that the
newly introduced monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are able to offset
the benefits from forest harming activities (H2.3). Finally, we expect increasing
deforestation rates to be observable where internal and external pressures on
reserve forests are high, arguing that the development aid facilitates already
existing forest harming activities (H2.4).
External and internal pressures on forest resources are measured with re-
spect to the pre-treatment deforestation within each reserve and in a 20 km
buffer around each reserve. We measure the risk of the BFP reserves with the
ratio of total deforestation between 2003 and 2006 over the remaining forested
area in 2002. A reserve is defined to experience a high internal risk if it is
among the group with the seven highest deforestation ratios (see Table 4.3,
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Table 4.3: Classification or relative internal & external deforestation pressures of the
BFP reserves
high high HiR HiR LiR LiR
internal external internal external & & & &
Reserves Def. ratio Def. ratio risk (HiR) risk (HeR) HeR LeR HeR LeR
RDS Canumã 0.458 0.454 1 1 1
RDS do Rio Negro 0.367 0.367 1 1 1
RESEX Catuá-Ipixuna 0.131 0.041 1 1
RESEX do Rio Gregório 0.130 0.016 1 1
RDS do Juma 0.124 0.365 1 1 1
FE de Maués 0.105 0.284 1 1 1
RDS Rio Madeira 0.080 0.128 1 1 1
RDS do Uatumã 0.064 0.176 1 1
APA do Rio Negro 0.048 0.095 1
RDS Piagaçu-Purus 0.019 0.032 1
RDS Amanã 0.018 0.014 1
RDS Uacari 0.014 0.010 1
RDS Cujubim 0.002 0.017 1
RDS Mamirauá 0.001 0.213 1 1
RDS Rio Amapá 0.000 0.033 1
Note: Column 2 reports the internal (within reserves) deforestation ratio measured as the percentage
share of deforested area between 2003 and 2006 of the remaining forested area in 2002. Column 3
reports the external (in a 20 km buffer of reserves) deforestation ratio measured as the percentage share
of deforested area between 2003 and 2006 of the remaining forested area in 2002. Column (4) indicates
if a reserve is among the group with the 7 highest values of internal deforestation ratio. Column (5)
indicates if a reserve is among the group with the 7 highest values of external deforestation ratio.
Columns 5-8 indicate the grouping of reserves into high internal risk (HiR) or low internal risk (LiR)
combined with high external risk (HeR) or low external risk (LeR). APA (Environmental Protection
Area), RESEX (Extractive Reserve), RDS (Sustainable Development Reserve), and FE (State Forest) are
subtypes of the multiple-use reserve category.
column 4 below). The remaining eight reserves experience relatively low inter-
nal pressures. A reserve is classified to experience a high external risk if it is
among the group with the seven highest deforestation ratios within its buffer
zone. Low external risks are attributed to the remaining eight reserves. This
results in reserves with high internal & high external risk (HiR & HeR), high
internal and low external risk (HiR & HeR), low internal risk and high external
risk (LiR & HeR), low internal risk and low external risk (LiR & LeR). See the
classification of reserves on a map in Figure 4.8 below.
Table 4.4 shows the context-dependent heterogeneous impacts of the BFP.
Estimations follow our preferred FE model (Table 15, Column 2). Each risk
group is estimated individually. We conduct this sub-estimation by using only
cells of treated reserves within a given risk group and their corresponding
paired control cells. Column (1) shows the BFP effect for the group of reserves
that experienced a high internal risk and high external risk of deforestation.
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Figure 4.8: Classification of internal and external risk of the BFP reserves
Note: Note: The Figure shows the 15 BFP reserves and their buffer zones, classified in high
(dark red) and low (light red) relative risks of deforestation. Risks are defined by the share of
deforested area between 2003 and 2007 over the remaining forested area. The highest 7 values
classify a BFP reserve as experiencing high deforestation pressures within. High external risks
are classified for the reserves with the highest 7 values within their buffer zones.
For this group the treatment effect is positive with a coefficient of 0.271 and
significant at 5% level. In accordance to our hypothesis, the result indicates
that in these particular reserves deforestation increased by 31% owing to the
BFP.22 The estimate for the reserves with high internal but low internal risk (in
column 2) is negative and insignificant. Nonetheless the direction of the sign is
in line with our expectations. Put differently, reserves that experience relatively
high pressures from outside but have traditionally low deforestation inside
(column 3) the coefficient of the BFP is -0.097 and significant on a 5% level.
Again our hypothesis is confirmed, indicating a reduction of deforestation by
9% in these reserves due to the program. Lastly, the group of reserves with
low external and internal risk (column 4) shows a low and insignificant BFP
impact coefficient of 0.010, close to zero.
Impacts of the BFP on deforestation rates are low in absolute terms. The
deforested area within the BFP reserves during the years of the intervention
total 3038 ha (see also Table C.5). The group of reserves with a high internal
and external risk contributes with 1402 ha. Following the estimate of column
3 in Table 4.4, deforestation would have been 333 ha lower (31%) without
the intervention. This increase is partly offset in reserves with low internal
and high external risk (column 3 of Table 4.4) with a decrease of 59 ha of
22 0.31 = exp(0.271) − 1
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Table 4.4: The Bolsa Floresta effect and its risk context
Dependent ln Deforestation
high internal & high internal & low internal & low internal &
high external low external high external low external
risk risk risk risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bolsa Floresta 0.271** -0.200 -0.097** 0.010
treatment (0.113) (0.163) (0.044) (0.069)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12400 4360 12300 40420
Groups 22 14 13 28
R-sq. / Chi-sq 0.071 0.105 0.014 0.014
Note: The table reports fixed effects estimates after matching, the dependent variable
being the change in the log of yearly deforested area. Further controls include cloud
coverage over remaining forest area, the log of yearly district GDP per capita, the
log of yearly agricultural GDP per capita and the log of yearly average timber prices.
Clustered standard errors on a reserve level are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** de-
note significance at the 10/5/1% level.
deforestation from 643 to 584 ha. As discussed above the diverging trends in
deforestation after the beginning of the program are in sum too low to attribute
a positive or negative effect of the BFP across all reserves.
4.7.5 Alternative measures of conservation outcomes
The BFP has different conservation outcomes in line with the reserve rules, in
addition to forest conservation. We examine two other conservation outcomes:
reducing forest degradation and fires.
Yearly information of degraded forest areas is available since 2007 (INPE,
2008b). This reduces the timeframe on our estimates to 2007 - 2012, with ob-
servations for only one year before treatment started. Our estimations thus
rely more strongly on the matching assumptions and less on the panel data
assumptions. As a measurement of fire incidence we use the aggregate count
of heat foci within a year from different satellite sources provided by INPE.
Results are schematically summarized in Table 4.5 for all reserves and our
risk groups using the 4 post-matching estimation techniques presented in sec-
tion 4.7.2.23 Blank cells indicate non-significant results, positively and nega-
tively significant results are indicated with plus and minus signs. The Table
23 We repeat the exercise for each reserve separately. Results are presented in the Appendix in
Table C.6.
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Table 4.5: The Bolsa Floresta effects by risk context
Dependent ln Deforestation ln Forest degradation ln No. of fires
w.FE w.FE RE w.FE w.FE RE w.FE w.FE RE
FE P.def. c.s. Tobit FE P.def. c.s. Tobit FE P.def. c.s. Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All matched +
reserves
High internal & + + + + +
high external risk
High internal & - - - -
low external risk
Low internal & - - + + + + +
high external risk
Low internal & + + +
low external risk
Note: The table reports the significant results of fixed effects estimates using different dependent variables. The
first row reports estimates on the full matched sample of cells across all Bolsa Floresta reserves. Rows 2 to 5
report estimates on sub-groups. Internal and external risks refer to the ratio of deforestation between 2003 and
2006 over forest cover in 2002 within reserves and in 20 km buffer zones around reserves (excluding water
areas and other reserve areas). High and low groups are defined as the upper and lower part of an ordered
sample. The 7 reserves with the highest internal ratio of deforestation classify as ’high internal risk’. The 7
reserves with the highest external ration of deforestation classify as ’high external risk’. Positive (negative) signs
indicate significant positive (negative) coefficients at a minimum 10% level. Missing signs indicate to insignificant
estimates.
repeats estimates on logarithm yearly deforestation in columns (1) to (4).24
Columns (5-8) use the logarithm of yearly degraded forest areas as the out-
come and columns (9) to (12) use the yearly no. of fire incidences. It is appar-
ent from a first look on the table that significance levels of coefficients vary
across estimation techniques and therefore switch between statistical signifi-
cance and insignificance. These fluctuations are presumably explained by the
large share of observations with zero values in the dependent outcome. We
therefore tend to interpret significant results as a causal direction of impacts
and do not interpret the size of the effects.
First we revisit the analysis on yearly deforestation by risk group in columns
(1) to (4). Presenting results from different estimation techniques gives addi-
tional insights. For reserves with high internal and high external risks, esti-
mates are positive and significant in 3 out of 4 estimations. Reserves with high
internal but low internal risks (column 2) show a significant negative coeffi-
cient in 2 out of 4 specifications. Similarly, we find 2 significant negative coef-
ficients for reserves with low internal and high external risks. Independent of
the estimation technique, no significant impact on deforestation is detected in
24 Full estimation results by risk groups and on different outcomes for each individual reserve
are provided in Table 10.
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reserves with low internal and external risks. Although not all specifications
are significant, the results confirm our hypotheses on heterogeneous impacts
in relation to the context of deforestation pressures.
Regressions on forest degradation are shown in columns (5) to (8) of Table
4.5. Average impacts using the full sample of reserves (first row) are not sig-
nificant, as on deforestation. For reserves with high internal and external risks,
we find little support for BFP impacts on forest degradation, with only 1 out
of 4 significant specifications (hypothesis H2.4). Forest conservation measured
by degraded areas is increased in reserves with high internal pressures but
low external pressures (hypothesis H2.3). Reserves with low internal and high
external risk reveal a different impact direction, contrary to our expectations
(hypothesis H2.2). In all specifications, the BFP appears to cause an increase
in degraded areas. A possible explanation to this unexpected effect is that the
remotely sensed satellite data are interpreting areas under BFP-supported sus-
tainable timber production as degraded. There are no significant effects on
forest degradation for reserves with low internal and external pressures.
Regressions on yearly fire incidences are shown in columns (9) to (12) of
Table 4.5. Average impacts remain insignificant, except for a positive impact in
the FE specification, which we judge to be insufficient to confirm hypothesis
H2.4 using fires as a forest conservation outcome. Similarly, we cannot confirm
hypotheses H2.3 for reserves with high internal and low external pressures
with no significant impact estimates. Also for reserves with low internal and
high external pressures we find only one significant specification (hypothesis
H2.2). Hypothesis H2.1 stated our expectation that the BFP is unable to fur-
ther increase already high compliance rates. The last row indicates otherwise
with 3 out of 4 specifications with significantly positive impact coefficients. We
speculate that because of the low economic opportunities inhabitants of these
reserves remain dependent on slash and burn agriculture. An increase in fire
activity without an increase in deforestation rates can be explained if the BFP
invested in extensification of existing agricultural production systems within
secondary forests not surveyed by INPEs monitoring system.
Summarizing, we find no overall, measurable effect of the BFP on forest
conservation, measured in terms of deforestation, forest degradation or fires.
Detrimental effects can be found in contexts of high internal and high exter-
nal pressures on forest resources in terms of deforestation. Nevertheless, in a
context of low internal pressure and low external pressure, fire incidence in-
creased in BFP supported reserves. In a context of low internal pressures and
high external pressures program impacts are mixed with decreasing deforesta-
tion but increasing forest degradation. Only in a context of high internal pres-
sures but low external pressures the BFP shows consistently favorable impacts
on both deforestation and forest degradation.
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4.8 robustness
The overall effect of the BFP on deforestation rates is low and insignificant
using our preferred estimations in section 4.7.3. Although matching achieved
a significant improvement of the covariate balance (cf. Figure 4.6), remaining
unbalances could bias our results. We conduct a variety of alternative match-
ing procedures to test for misspecifications (not reported). First, we increase
the stringency of ’similarity’ between the matched pairs. We restrict paired
matches to 2.0, 1.5, 1.0 or 0.5 caliper of standard deviation difference in their co-
variate values. Impact coefficients remain low and insignificant. Furthermore,
we test if the BFP effects cumulate within transport corridors and restrict the
sample to distances of 30, 20, and 10 km from cities, rivers, or roads. After re-
matching, the FE estimations coefficients turn negative - ranging from -0.067
to -0.026 - but remain insignificant.
Multiple-use reserves in Brazil are managed under federal, state, or munici-
pal administration. The FAS specifically implemented the BFP program within
state-administered reserves. In our preferred matching procedure we use all
administration types, to maximize the pool of potentially matched control cells.
The matching procedure allows including federal administered reserves to the
control sample because after the procedure observations aimed to be ’equal’
along the dimensions of covariates. To exclude federal reserves beforehand
would necessarily lead to a decreased similarity of the matched pairs. In addi-
tion, this analysis relies on post-matching panel data estimations where fixed
factors over time, (e.g., reserve administration and management) are canceled
out. A bias will only occur if federal reserves have sharply changed their man-
agement quality after the BFP start in 2007. For example if federal reserves im-
proved their protection capabilities simultaneously as the state reserves they
would not serve as good controls and lead to an under-estimation of the BFP’s
effects.
To rule out the possible bias from inadequate control selection, we test our
estimation strategy using only state administered reserves. Cells of the 15 BFP
reserves are matched to cells of remaining 20 state reserves. Post-matching FE
estimates of the average BFP’s impact stay insignificant. The random effects
(RE) Tobit estimate increases to 0.513 and becomes significant at a 1% level.
This result indicates that deforestation levels in federal reserves tend to be
higher than in untreated state reserves. This exercise suggests that using only
state reserves positively biases our impact estimates.
Our database includes smaller and larger cells due to the slicing process
of reserves by a 5 to 5 km grid (see section 4.5.1 and 4.6.3). We choose to
keep all irregular cells that are not fully covered by the original grid cells to
avoid biases from the loss of information or misattribution (see next section).
Convinced that controls should be similar in size we restrict the matching
process to find only pairs where the cell size is equal (to a margin of 5%).
However, the concern remains that this data structure could drive our results.
We test therefore, if estimates change when successively excluding cells smaller
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Figure 4.9: Bolsa Floresta impacts by cell size exclusions
Note: Lines represent the impact the FE estimates of the BFP intervention
after matching. The Abscissa indicates the threshold of cells excluded from
the sample. E.g., the value 0.2 indicates a sample containing only cells larger
or equal to 20% of the original 5 to 5 km grid cell used for slicing the
reserves. Sample sizes using all reserves (without differentiation on risk
type) vary between 6,948 (0.05) to 4,500 (1.0) units. A detailed depiction of
estimates with confidence intervals is shown in Figure C.2.
than 10, 20, . . . 100% of the slicing grid cell. The results are presented in Figure
4.9 (Figure C.2 in detail) and show that the size of impact coefficients increase
with the exclusion of smaller cells. For example, excluding successively cells
below 10 to 100% increases the average BFP impact coefficient increases from
0.049 to 0.113. Nonetheless, reducing the sample size does not change the order
of risk groups, and significance levels generally stay the same.
4.9 caveats
4.9.1 Potential biases from artificially small spatial units
Ideally, statistical analysis is based on actual decision units. By construction,
PAs lack clearly defined property rights or information on defined responsi-
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bilities (Avelino, Baylis, and Honey-Rosés, 2015). In our case, decisions are
undertaken at the reserve, community, and household levels. In order to bal-
ance all aspects, we choose a grid size of 0.045 degrees in height and width to
slice the reserves into smaller cells. We believe this 5 to 5 km grid balances five
prevalent data-driven problems that result from slicing spatially demarcated
administrational entities for regression analyses, namely: The problem of com-
puting power, and the biases of spatial autocorrelation, information loss, and
misattribution.
Analysts are often constrained to the computing power and the format of in-
formation in which the spatial information is provided. Remotely sensed data
are mostly provided in high resolution raster formats. Analysts often choose
the given resolution as unit of analysis and refrain from spatial aggregation to
a lower resolutions.25 In consequence, the high resolution data increase rapidly
the requirement on computational power. To limit the number of observations,
researches sometimes repeatedly select random subsamples, estimate and av-
erage the results. This method also aims to resolve the issue of spatial auto-
correlation but deliberately leaves a bulk of available information aside.26 Our
choice of 5 to 5 km grid cells allows us to feasibly process all spatial informa-
tion and use regression analysis keeping the full spatial area available.
The bias from spatial autocorrelation from omitted variables can emerge
from raster data structures as used in this study. Factors that determine the
risk of deforestation tend to be increasingly equal with decreasing distances
between neighboring observations. Omitted explanatory variables that do not
vary across neighboring cells create a correlation among the individual resid-
uals of regression models (Anselin, 2002). For example, in this study an area
with high valued trees prone to attract logging and be deforested could cover
several cells. The resulting correlation would bias the estimates. Reducing the
size of the artificial spatial units increases the underlying ’similarity’ of omit-
ted factors among neighbors and increases the risk of spatial autocorrelation.
We believe to have limited the possibility of spatial autocorrelation with a fairly
large grid of 5 to 5 km, which allows potential omitted variables to be spatially
uncorrelated.
A more severe bias could emerge from the spatial autocorrelation through a
redundancy of data. Decreasing the size of grid cells results in an increasing
’similarity’ of neighboring grid cells in the observed characteristics. This effect
can be described as an artificial multiplication of data. This would not inval-
idate the estimates but decrease their standard errors drastically. A statistical
inference of the estimates is not possible with such uncorrected standard er-
rors. Although we did not test for spatial autocorrelation per se, we avoid a
too small grid cell size and cluster our standard errors on the reserve level.
Dividing spatial administration units into cells creates smaller units that are
either covered completely by the larger entity or are only partially covered (see
25 See (Andam et al., 2008; Joppa and Pfaff, 2010; Kirby et al., 2006; Pfaff et al., 2014, 2015;
Robalino and Pfaff, 2012; Robalino, Sandoval, Barton, Chacon, and Pfaff, 2015)
26 Ibid.
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Figure 4.4). Analysts commonly deal with partially covered units in two ways:
(a) Excluding all cells from the database which are not covered by 100% (or
close to 100%); or (b) considering a partially covered cell as fully covered upon
a subjective threshold (e.g., over 50% covered, or centroid allocation). Option
(a) produces a bias from loss of information. In the case of PAs, which often
have physical borders (rivers, roads, etc.), excluding bordering cells leads to a
bias where we specifically expect at these edges the majority of deforestation
activities. We do not face this bias as we keep all grid cells in our sample.
Option (b) leads to a bias from misattribution. Grouping all deforestation
patches at a border into one cell that de facto crosses a reserve border makes
it impossible to distinguish if deforestation happened at the inner border or
at the outer border region (see Figure 4.4). If spatial leakage effects exist the
estimated treatment effect will be biased. With positive leakage effects lead-
ing to overestimations and negative leakage effects to underestimations of the
treatment effect due to the false attributions of deforestation patches. The bias
from loss of information and the bias from misattribution, both biases decline
with decreasing grid cell sizes. With declining unit sizes the precision of rep-
resenting the factual borders increases and the biases from information loss
and misattribution fall towards zero. We averted the bias of misattribution by
using our irregular cell structure, which allows us to unambiguously attribute
any spatial information to the right administrational unit.
4.9.2 Caveats from remotely sensed deforestation of small spatial units
For our context, where the incidence of deforestation is low and the spatial
units are small, several limitations of our outcome measurements should be
considered: The role of regrowth in areas of low deforestation, the role of
detection time lags, and the role of clouds for small spatial units.
The role of forest regrowth is a general limitation to INPE’s deforestation
data, which omit deforestation of secondary forests that have regrown on al-
ready deforested patches. This could introduce an analytical error in our con-
text as we have large areas that have already been classified as deforested
within the protected reserves in 2003. 4.1% of the area within reserves was on
average already deforested in 2003. This analytical bias tends to be higher in
our research context where deforestation rates are traditionally low and the
need to extend logging into virgin forests is low as long as reusable areas of
secondary forest is available.
The role of detection time lags for small spatial units emerges from the
technicalities of INPE’s remote sensing strategy. The date of satellite pictures
can vary between May and October, and thus a given deforestation event may
be attributed to one year or the next, depending on the timing of the picture
(see Figure 4.10). Small spatial units are particularly prone to this problem,
as the smaller the spatial unit, the higher the probability that deforestation
occurs only during one or few days. We tackle this limitation by testing for the
robustness of our results shifting the start of the policy to a one and two years
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Figure 4.10: Satellite timing and deforestation measurement errors
before and after program start. Average impacts remain insignificant, for both
directional shifts.
The role of clouds also deserves higher attention when using smaller spa-
tial units. Small spatial units are highly sensitive to measurement errors from
cloud coverage, as they can easily be fully obscured by clouds in a given satel-
lite image. If a small spatial unit is fully covered by clouds till the end of our
timeframe, it will receive a zero deforestation rate in all years, irrespective of
whether deforestation has occurred (see Figure 4.11a). Alternatively, deforesta-
tion in a given year may remain undetected because of clouds that year but
be detected the following year, and hence attributed to the wrong year (see
Figure 4.11b). Conversely, if deforestation is detected at the end of a year but
the area was clouded during the previous year, deforestation would be falsely
attributed to both years, appearing go have occurred earlier (see Figure 4.11c).
When observational units are relatively large in comparison with clouds, false
attributions to future and previous years tend to cancel out, but this is less
probable when units are small. Neighboring small units tend to be covered by
the same cloud, therefore the measurement errors have the same direction and
spatial-autocorrelation biases are created. We control for yearly cloud cover-
age in our estimation procedures and exclude all observations with more than
90% cloud coverage during our timeframe. Although, this does not solve the
problem of misattribution entirely we are confident that the fairly large cell
size avoids spatial-autocorrelation due to clouds.
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Figure 4.11: Cloudy satellite images and deforestation measurement errors
4.10 conclusions
In this section, we present results from the first regional counterfactual evalua-
tion of the BFP’s initial effects on outcome variables related to forest cover and
forest quality (degradation and fire incidence). We emphasize that it was not
the objective of this study to evaluate the intended development outcomes of
the program.
Given the extremely low pre-program levels of deforestation in the interven-
tion area and the relatively short time since the program began (2008-2012), a
priori we can not expect to measure large conservation effects. Using a high
spatial resolution and a large number of covariates reflecting potential con-
founding variables, we were indeed not able to demonstrate a robust overall
conservation effect of the program. We show, nonetheless, that it would have
been possible to measure an average positive conservation effect had defor-
estation entirely ceased in participating reserves. We further explore theoret-
ically motivated hypotheses about heterogeneous treatment effects and find
relatively robust conservation effects in local contexts characterized by high
external and low internal anthropogenic pressure on natural resources. How-
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ever, we also find largely consistent evidence for small increases in forest and
forest quality loss in reserves subject to high internal and external pressure.
The usual caveats of quasi-experimental evaluation techniques, including
the potential influence of unobserved confounding variables (Rosenbaum, 2002),
apply also to this study. From PA research it is well known, however, that the
usual source of (remote location) bias typically leads to an overestimation of
conservation impacts. This in combination with our systematic and extensive
robustness analyses makes us relatively confident that our analysis reflects
the actual impacts of the program on the measured outcome variables up to
the end of the observations in 2012. Continuing observation may or may not
confirm the conditions described here.
Against this backdrop, we can only speculate why the BFP has not produced
more robust measurable impacts on the observed outcome variables. Potential
reasons include the overall slowdown in deforestation throughout the Brazil-
ian Amazon that could have delayed the advance of the deforestation frontier
towards the BFP reserves vis-à-vis the expectations of implementers in the pro-
gram planning stage. In this case, only time will show to what extent program
induced conservation alliances with reserve inhabitants are strong enough to
achieve conservation levels beyond those that would have been achieved by
protection alone.
If future analyses confirm the conjectures that emerge from our analysis
of effects in the heterogeneous local resource pressure contexts of the BFP,
the following lessons can be drawn: (1) PES-cum-ICDP programs aimed at
forming alliances between reserve management and local forest users can be
effective in conserving forests if external pressure on resources threatens lo-
cal forest dependent livelihoods that are characterized by low conservation
opportunity costs. (2) In situations of comparatively high internal and exter-
nal anthropogenic pressures, and thus opportunity costs, conditional transfers
require stronger elements of conditionality than currently imposed by the pro-
gram to generate conservation effects.
Finally, what are the strategic policy implications from our findings? If no
(or only negligible) deforestation and forest degradation happened both before
and after the BFP was implemented in a reserve, and the same holds true for
the logically designated low-threat control areas, then this can in a project eval-
uation still be seen as a success for the PA and the BFP in question, although it
will mean that the incremental conservation impact of BFP in that case was nil.
Such a zero-additionality scenario does thus not imply that the program was
ill-designed or -implemented; however, it can raise legitimate questions about
the pre-selection of predominantly low-threat areas: why invest considerable
resources in additional ‘treatment’, when in environmental terms there was no
sign of a ‘disease’ in the first place?
Certainly, a rationale for such a strategy could still for a number of reasons
make sense. First, the construction of longer-term conservation alliances (i.e.,
acting in advance of future land-use and resource-extractive pressures) could
be one reason for ‘preventive treatment’ or ‘vaccination’. Second, the prize
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function of rewarding good stewardship with a grant could demonstrate to
other communities the potential for conservation incentive strategies, even if
the program had zero effects of improving that stewardship further – and it
simultaneously brings welfare gains to the recipients. Finally, BFP was a pilot
in Brazil both as REDD and PES initiative, and BFP as an early mover allows us
to learn some lessons. Yet, the strategic question for prospective replications of
the BFP approach is if these longer-term concerns are sufficiently good reason
for the allocation of scarce conservation funding to remote low-threat areas.

Part III
C O N C L U S I O N

5
C O N C L U S I O N
5.1 summary
This thesis addressed the role of the political context and the effectiveness of
mixed incentive strategies for tropical forest conservation in Brazil.
Conserving the remaining global reserves of natural forests and their ecosys-
tem services hinges on the design of effective policy instruments. Most coun-
tries have environmental legislation and protection schemes in place (Kanowski,
McDermott, and Cashore, 2011). Nonetheless, developing countries often lack
an adequate forest cover monitoring system and/or an effective law enforce-
ment infrastructure (Börner et al., 2015a). In Brazil, both these necessary con-
ditions for effective forest conservation are in place and annual forest loss has
fallen significantly since the early 2000s (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). This thesis
shows the contribution of complementary interventions targeting the political
context of conservation policy interventions.
To assess the relationships between political players, agricultural and eco-
nomic elites, chapter 2 investigated a federal anti-corruption policy. Target-
ing Brazilian districts via a lottery, auditors controlled and reported the go-
vernance quality in health care, education, and public infrastructure related
sectors, but excluded environmental policy mandates of local governments.
Audit reports revealed a robust and positive correlation between the level of
corruption and deforestation. In addition, the natural experiment of the policy
allowed for a causal investigation of corruption disclosure. Results showed no
effect of the public auditing on deforestation dynamics. However, other studies
did find an auditing impact on the targeted outcomes. Hence, the agricultural
and forestry sectors that drive Amazon deforestation were less prone to rent
seeking spillover effects than anecdotal evidence on collusion between these
sectors and local political elites might have suggested.
To understand the interaction of local governments and land users, chapter
3 analysed the blacklisting policy, a regularly published list of districts with
the highest deforestation rates. Blacklisting demonstrated to be an effective
measure to curb forest clearing. To disentangle the underlying mechanisms
of the effect, an innovative combination of three empirical methods was used,
namely: Matching and mechanism analysis using panel data estimation tech-
niques. Net conservation effects after controlling for external incentive mech-
anisms, suggested in line with anecdotal evidence that reputational risk might
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have been an important driver of collective conservation action at the local
level. Local administrations, farmers and NGOs had often organized to reduce
deforestation and to exit the blacklist.
Successful environmental governance can be enabled through public poli-
cies. One incentive-based option to improve natural resource management
in protected areas was investigated in Chapter 4. The study analyzed a Pay-
ments for Environmental Services (PES) program for households in combina-
tion with investments in forest-friendly production and infrastructure at com-
munity level. Located predominantly in a remote parts of the Amazonas state
of Brazil, the program targeted reserves in areas with traditionally low defor-
estation pressures. On the aggregate, forest losses and forest degradation out-
comes did not differ in comparison to non-participating reserves. Nonetheless,
diverging effects between reserves are consistently significant. Forest losses are
related to targeted reserves with high deforestation pressures, whereas addi-
tional forest conservation is detected in targeted reserves with low pressures
inside boundaries, but high pressures in close distance.
5.2 policy design and policy recommendations
The evaluation results are summarized in Table 5.1. The forest conservation im-
pacts of the anti-corruption, Blacklisting, and BFP interventions are on average:
None, positive, and none, respectively. And yet, scrutinizing average effects for
effect heterogeneity and underlying mechanisms, however, reveals that the un-
derlying stories are more complex. For the development of better forest conser-
vation policies, it is thus not sufficient to find out “what worked” and “what
did not work”. Decision makers need to know “why” interventions work (or
not) and under which conditions. In theory, well designed policies should be
effective. In practice, however, conservation policy design often deviates from
scientific recommendations. Trade-offs between efficiency and equity as well as
political motivations influence the design of conservation policies (Börner et al.,
2010; Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder, 2008; Rosa da Conceição, Börner, and Wun-
der, 2015). In the context of tropical forest conservation, common design short-
comings include: sub-optimal spatial targeting (siting) and socio-economic tar-
geting, insufficient monitoring and enforcement, and limited adaptation to
peculiarities of local context (contextualization), including local governance
structures. The potential gains in policy cost-effectiveness from addressing
such shortcomings have been widely discussed (Engel et al., 2008; Minang and
van Noordwijk, 2013; Lambin et al., 2014; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). None-
theless, further empirical work is needed to identify promising entry points
for interventions towards enhancing the existing conservation policy mixes
in the world’s tropical forest regions. Quantitative comparative analyses and
meta-studies could produce new insights and hypotheses about the relative
importance of specific design elements (Bohm and Russell, 1985; Börner et al.,
2016; Ezzine-de Blas, Wunder, Ruiz-Pérez, and Moreno-Sanchez, 2016). The fol-
lowing draws upon the framework as introduced in section 1.2 and sets into
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Table 5.1: Design elements and impacts
Anti-Corruption
Program
Blacklist Bolsa Floresta
Program
Ch. 2 Ch. 3 Ch. 4
Research question Do anti-corruption
measures affect forest
conservation
outcomes?
Does naming and
shaming reduce
deforestation? And, if
yes, which
mechanisms are at
work?
Do conservation
incentives in
protected areas
reduce deforestation?
Siting From low to high
opportunity costs
High opportunity
costs
Low opportunity
costs
Targeting Indirectly political
stakeholders
Directly political
stakeholders and
land-owners
Directly land-users
Monitoring None Satellite and CAR informal and
community-based
Enforcement None Inclusion to and
holding within the
blacklist
Community-based
Contextualization
(policy type)
high (P3) very high (P3, P4) high (P4)
Approximate cost
efficiency
Low (costly selection,
auditing, prosecution)
High (inexpensive
selection, costs
burden out-shifted)
Very low (inexpensive
selection, tough high
costs from payments,
administration, and
targeting)
Conservation impact None Positive None (Though,
positive [negative] in
reserves with low
[high] internal
pressures and high
external pressures)
relation the three policy designs, their context, design elements and respective
conservation impacts.
The siting of an environmental policy is defined by its spatial targeting crite-
ria. Given scarce resources, conservation policies are best applied where high
effects can be expected. The opportunity costs of forest conservation are of-
ten proposed as an important targeting criterion. Low opportunity costs tend
to be associated with low deforestation levels and then any intervention will
bring about little additional conservation. The potential of impacts increases
as forest conversion becomes more profitable, but in the presence of exuber-
ant conservation opportunity costs few intervention options will be effective
either. The three analyzed policy interventions are sited across the Brazilian
Legal Amazon (BLA) at different levels of opportunity costs of forest conser-
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vation (see Figure 5.1).The anti-corruption policy randomly selected districts
and is spread across regions of the BLA with low to high levels of opportunity
costs. For comparability, 49.3% of all forest clearings occurred within the 307
audited districts during the years 2002-2007.1 By its randomized design, siting
and the level of opportunity costs can not serve to explain the zero effect. The
blacklisting policy targeted 50 high deforesting districts with high opportunity
costs of forest conservation (50.3% of all forest clearings in the years 2002-2007).
In consequence, blacklisting avoided approximately 4,022 sq. km of deforesta-
tion. In comparison, the BFP initiated its support in reserves of the Amazonas
state, a region with low deforestation pressures. Its share on total deforestation
amounts to 0.26% (2002-2007). The absence of significant deforestation pres-
sures can be regarded as the main reason for the lack of measurable effects.
Without playing down the multiple (including social) objectives and the long
term strategy of the BFP, the comparison with the Blacklist example leads to a
straightforward policy recommendation:
R1 For immediate conservation impacts, policies should target areas where
deforestation pressures are high not only tomorrow, but also today.2
Development economics for a long time recognized the trade-offs between
targeting and poverty alleviation effects (cf. Ravallion and Chao, 1989; Raval-
lion, 2003). Forest conservation research addressed the role of targeting firstly
in relation with the protection of biodiversity rich regions (Margoluis, Stem,
Salafsky, and Brown, 2009; Myers et al., 2000) before turning towards socio-
economic indicators (Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006; Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais,
2005; Wünscher, Engel, and Wunder, 2008) and deforestation risk indicators
(Alix-Garcia, De Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2005; Wunder, 2009; Wünscher and En-
gel, 2012) . Targeting can also be understood as the ability of a policy to reach
key stakeholders in the land and forest use system. The anti-corruption pol-
icy targeted districts’ governance quality and thereby addressed a major stake-
holder to forest conservation. Nonetheless, the program did not target environ-
mental action of local governments and their outcomes. Although good gover-
nance and good public infrastructures are related to forest conservation, this
indirect approach did not induce measurable additional conservation action. In
contrast, the Blacklist directly targeted district administrations and land-based
economic sectors. Thereby, the policy managed to target local politicians and
land-owners, many of which then reportedly self-organized to engage in forest
conservation. The BFP directly targeted land-users of the reserves, though par-
ticipation and payments were provided irrespective of their opportunity cost.
Newton et al. (2012) argue that variable BFP payments could induce higher
conservation effects. Further, the analysis showed only positive conservation
1 The time-frame 2002-2007 refers to the pre-treatment periods of the Blacklist and the BFP. In
chapter 2 only 227 forested districts are used for the analysis.
2 More precisely, a combination of high forest stock and high immediate pressure is needed
for conservation policies to exhibit measurable effects in the time frames commonly used for
impact evaluation. Policymakers may have different time frames, but should then adequately
adjust their reference scenarios, which often serve as a basis for program funding.
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Figure 5.1: Policy siting
Note: Data on predicted deforested area is obtained from Soares-Filho,
Nepstad, Curran, Cerqueira, Garcia, Ramos, Voll, McDonald, Lefebvre, and
Schlesinger (2006)
effects in contexts where residents have moderate opportunity costs but face
higher pressures from outside of the reserve boundaries. Hence, whereas the
BFP directly targeted residents it may have missed out on key stakeholders
involved in forest harming activities.It can thus be concluded that:
R2 Programs involving conservation incentives should target all relevant
stakeholders.
Most policies need monitoring and enforcement to induce behavioral change
(Lambin et al., 2014; Ribot et al., 2006). Ideally, a monitoring system is capa-
ble of observing the intended and unintended outcomes of policies, whereas
enforcement involves effectively following up on illegal behavior through li-
ability establishment and coercion (e.g., by suspending PES or issuing fines).
Although active enforcement requires some sort of monitoring, some policies
can be effective without active enforcement. For example, in the case of the
anti-corruption policy, federal prosecutors did the monitoring and public dis-
closure was enough to induce behavioral change in the monitored sectors as
evidenced by previous research. Contrary to anecdotal evidence on the close
links between local political elites and the land and forest-based economic sec-
tors in the Amazon region, this thesis showed that such behavioral change
seems to have left (non-targeted and unenforced) environmental outcomes un-
affected. This finding, however, cannot be attributed to either of the missing
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design elements: targeting, monitoring, or enforcement. It remains to be shown
whether corruption auditing in the local environmental policy administration,
i.e., a hypothetical policy approach specifically targeted to the outcome of inter-
est in our analysis, would produce measurable change. The blacklisting policy
has clearly defined its monitoring element. Deforestation rates and land regis-
trations in the rural cadaster (CAR) are traced. Enforcement is conducted by
keeping districts in the Blacklist, which are non-compliant with the environ-
mental goals (reduced deforestation and increased land registrations). These
well formalized design elements are probabe to have contributed to the large
impact of the policy. The BFP had not defined a monitoring system for its
PES contracts. Undefined land rights within the targeted reserves made an
individual monitoring unfeasible. Informal monitoring did exist at the com-
munity level by the staff members of the BFP. In addition, community-based
monitoring and enforcement was probalby the case because compliant partic-
ipants would suffer from non-compliant behavior of fellow residents or out-
siders. The weak or non-existent formal monitoring and enforcement design
of the BFP are indispensable to understand the observed small but negative
conservation effects in areas with higher deforestation pressures. Residents of
reserves with comparatively high historical deforestation rates within as well
as outside reserve boundaries tend to be exposed to economic opportunities in
agriculture and forestry. In these cases an incentive program with stricter mon-
itoring and enforcement measures could have helped to avoid a capitalization
of forest-harming practices.
R3 In cash-constrained local economies, monetary conservation incentives
can increase the opportunity costs of conservation and need to be accom-
panied by stricter monitoring and enforcement action.
Contextualized environmental policies are interventions adapted to conditions
of the targeted area. Context characteristics have a major influence on the ef-
fectiveness of policies (cf. Lambin et al., 2014). Hence policies adapted to the
context can achieve higher impacts (Engel, 2015) Contextualization as a de-
sign element was introduced in chapter 1 by presenting how policies handle
different characteristics (bio-physical, socio-economic and political) and actors
of a given context. Policies of type P1 were defined as interventions without
apprehension of the diversity in characteristics and actors determining envi-
ronmental outcomes. Policies of type P2 are designed to target specific context
characteristics. Policies of type P3 aim at actors within given contexts and
provide incentives and disincentive to steer allegiance with existing policies.
Lastly, policies of type P4 are designed to incentivize, disincentivize or en-
able actors to create own interventions within their context. The degree of
contextualization, therefore, depends on the policy goal and its other design
elements (siting, targeting, monitoring, enforcement). The anti-corruption pol-
icy can be described as a type P3 policy. Although, it did not target a specific
region , it discouraged specific (corrupt) actors in specific local administra-
tive sectors. Hence, the policy exhibits a high degree of contextualization. As
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discussed above, this thesis looked at an hypothesized spillover effect of the
policy’s targeting strategy that could not be confirmed. The Blacklisting policy
targeted districts with high deforestation rates. It recognized political actors as
inhibitors to environmental policy application (type P3). In parallel, the disclo-
sure of the blacklist motivated conservation partnerships between politicians,
farmers and NGOs (type P4). The combination of both approaches resulted in
large deforestation reductions. The bundle of PES and infrastructural invest-
ments of the BFP can be interpreted as a type P4 policy. Highly contextualized,
the program increased the management quality of state reserves and incen-
tivized residents to develop forest friendly production systems. Nonetheless,
the program created ambiguous impacts that can best be explained by the
insufficient monitoring mechanism. In synthesis, it can be recommended:
R4 To increase the potential success of conservation efforts, contextualized
policies can remove potential inhibitors to conservation and motivate ac-
tors to create new conservation incentives.
A complete policy evaluation must finally include a cost estimation. This thesis
did not focus on cost-efficiency, but a brief inquiry on the ratio between im-
pacts and investments can provide helpful insights. Furthermore, we consider
only implementation costs of each policy and leave out transaction costs. The
’cost efficiency winner” is clearly the Blacklist, which is the only policy with a
significant impact (25.6% or 4,022 sq. km of avoided forest loss).3 Nonetheless,
this thesis and the discussion above argues that some effects could have been
generated by the other two policies, had they been designed differently. An
alternative design of the anti-corruption program could have included envi-
ronmental outcomes and scrutinized the performance of local environmental
governance. For the sake of the argument, lets assume the estimation results
in chapter 2 were significant. This would result in deforestation reductions
by 10.1% or 3,932 sq. km.4 The BFP showed a reduced forest loss of 9.2% in
a subset of reserves.5 With stricter enforcement mechanisms within the other
reserves, the same effect could be assumed in the remaining reserves with an
avoided forest loss of 2.8 sq. km.Given these back of the envelope calculations,
the implementation costs of avoided deforestation were: 22,920 reais per sq. km
for the anti-corruption program, 60 reais per sq. km for the Blacklisting policy,
and 5.1m reais per sq. km for the BFP.6 As previously discussed, the oppor-
3 See Table 3.2, model 3.
4 See Table 2.5, model 4.
5 See Table 4.4, model 3.
6 The anti-corruption policy sent a maximum of 15 auditors to each of the 225 selected districts
(Ferraz et al., 2012). In addition, it can be assumed that auditors spend a full month for each
selected district. The maximum wage of public officials in Brazil is the salary of supreme-court
judges, with 26,700 reais (although fraud exceptions do exist) (The Economist, 2012). Summing
up, the salary costs probably did not exceed 90.1m reais. The three published Blacklists base
on public data and are assumed to have occupied a maximum of 3 public officials for one
month each. This gives salary costs of 240,300 reais. The BFP gave 50 reais to each of the 8,000
families (standing in 2008) for at least 3 years, summing to 14.4m reais of implementation
costs (without cost for the other parts of the program or staff salaries). Cost values refer to the
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tunity costs of forest conservation were at the average for the regions of the
anti-corruption program, high for the Blacklist and low for the BFP.7.
In sum, the Blacklist stands out as a low-cost and high-impact strategy -
implemented in an area of high opportunity costs it spent little funds and
managed to significantly reduce deforestation. The anti-corruption policy, in
our hypothetical scenario, exhibits a median level of cost efficiency. Nonethe-
less, real transaction costs and opportunity costs are difficult to assess with
certainty. Lastly, the BFP, situated in areas with historically low deforestation,
invested large amounts of resources to offset the low opportunity costs of
protected area residents. Even in a conservative scenario, the program thus
exhibits a relatively low level of environmental cost-effectiveness - its potential
development benefits notwithstanding. However, achieving forest conserva-
tion by disclosing information to the public, blaming key stakeholders, scruti-
nizing environmental compliance and motivating forest-friendly partnerships
between politicians and farmers is only cost-effective from an implementation
cost perspective. An important share of the total economic costs of the policy
is borne by the land users.
R5 Public disclosure as a cross-compliance mechanism can be a cost-effective
instrument to increase compliance with environmental regulations.
The policy recommendations outlined above largely assume a reasonably well
functioning institutional framework and enforcement system. Adequate siting,
careful targeting, thorough monitoring and enforcement or wise contextual-
ization are only sufficient conditions for the success of policies. Good design
without siting interventions in relevant areas, cannot create additional forest
conservation. Satisfactory siting without targeting key stakeholders that would
not comply in absence of the intervention will fail to produce additional conser-
vation. Without monitoring and enforcement, perfect siting and targeting has
little chance to induce behavioral changes. Lastly, contextualization can only
be a complementary strategy to improve actors’ environmental governance.
This thesis has demonstrated that context specific environmental policies,
especially those targeting political actors, can be both ineffective or effective.
Success depends on the design features of the policy and the broader policy
context, in particular environmental law and enforcement action. Conservation
policy instruments aimed at political actors can then exercise tangible pressure
towards encouraging local (including collective) conservation action.
year 2012 with an exchange rate of 1.95 reais per dollars (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
Releases/H10/20120130/).
7 For comparison, Börner et al. (2010) analyze the potential of REDD payments in the BLA and
calculate opportunity costs between 14.33 reais per sq. km and 17.80 reais per sq. km across the
Brazilian Amazon
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a.1 tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics on total deforestation and initial conditions
Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Total deforestation 275.47 564.54 0.50 8146.25
Corruption (standardized) -0.01 0.91 -0.73 5.42
Corruption (standardized yearly) 0.00 0.94 -1.26 4.33
Irregularities (standardized) -0.02 0.99 -1.86 3.49
Irregularities (standardized yearly) 0.01 0.99 -2.25 3.18
Irregularities p. program (standardized) -0.02 0.98 -1.49 3.85
Irregularities p. program (standardized yearly) 0.03 0.98 -1.90 3.45
Initial forest 5955.53 14597.76 12.81 150502.20
Cloud error 0.16 0.25 0.00 1.00
Distance to Brasilia [km] 1477.85 499.54 369.94 2872.22
Savanna area 987.32 2363.35 0.00 19759.08
Initial population (2000) 27325.61 36976.44 1365.00 471980.00
Ini. real GDP p.c. 6881.20 6877.06 1466.24 73753.38
Ini. real GDP p.c. in agriculture 1596.96 5912.70 1.37 73168.49
Ini. Multiple-use protected area 554.99 2118.80 0.00 39093.36
Ini. Strictly protected area 351.27 1851.57 0.00 30239.70
Ini. Indigenous territory 1168.00 5666.61 0.00 88371.95
Ini. Settlement project size 407.3584 844.3924 0 10684.7
Note: Statistics refer to N = 550 originally forested districts. Governance variables are stan-
dardized over the sample of N = 237 audited districts in the Legal Amazon. Ini. real GDP p.c.
and Ini. real GDP p.c. in agriculture respectively to 548 and 516 districts. Area values are in
units of sq. kilometer. Monetary units are deflated values of Brazilian Reais.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics of the panel data (2002-2012)
Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Deforestation [sq. km] 25.04 63.82 0.00 1307.89
Audit 0.27 0.50 0.00 3.00
Standardized corruption 0.00 0.64 -0.73 8.85
Yearly stand. Corruption 0.00 0.64 -1.26 4.85
Standardized irregularities -0.01 0.67 -1.86 3.49
Yearly stand. Irregularities 0.00 0.66 -2.25 3.18
Standardized relative irregularities -0.01 0.66 -1.49 3.85
Yearly stand. relative irregularities 0.01 0.66 -1.90 3.45
Neighb. deforestation rates 29.99 52.55 0.00 684.00
Neighb. Audits 0.27 0.30 0.00 1.67
Neighb. corruption (yearly st.) 0.01 0.32 -0.74 2.57
Neighb. relative irregularities (yearly st.) 0.02 0.36 -1.09 1.60
Clouds error [%] 0.10 0.20 0.00 1.00
First term mayor 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
Note: For First term mayor statistics refer to N=5489 observations (on 499 districts). Values of
neighboring covariates refer to N= 6039 (on 549 districts) one observation less than for all
other variables with N=6050 (on 550 districts). This results because of one district having no
neighbor in the subsample.
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a.2 list of semantic expressions
Listing A.1 provides a coding example for the construction of a corruption measurement. The
process searches for 40 expressions indicating to a corrupt event, grouped into seven categories.
We use R’s grep function (originally developed for Ubuntu) to scan each text line for a match
with the mass of regular expressions (R Core Team, 2015). Thereby, the constructed corruption
measurement represent the number of lines having at least one corrupt expression.
Listing A.1: Counting corrupt expressions (R code)
1 ###read text file
textfile <- readLines("_usr_include_php_projetos_scas_arquivos_26−AM−
Tapaua. txt ")
### Corrupt expressions
## 1 Diversion of public funds
6 expr_d1 <- " ( valor* .*indevido*|indevido* .*valor*) "
expr_d2 <- " (pag[a*|o*]* .*indevido*|indevido* .*pag[a*|o*]*) "
expr_d3 <- " ( utilizado* .*indevido*|indevido* .*utilizado*) "
expr_d4 <- " (não.*util iza ç* .*objeto ) "
expr_d5 <- " (não.*comprovad* .*util iza ção.*recursos*) "
11 expr_d6 <- " (não.*atesto* .*recebimento*|falta .*atesto* .*recebimento*|
nenhuma* .*atesto* .*recebimento*|sem.*atesto* .*recebimento*|ausência .*
atesto* .*recebimento*) "
expr_d7 <- " ( (não|nenhuma|falta|ausência ) .*comprov* .*recebimento*) "
expr_d8 <- " ( (não|ausência ) .*comprov* .*depósito*) "
expr_d9 <- " (despesa* .*não.*previsa*|despesa* .*prevista* .*não|prevista* .*n
ão.*despesa*|prevista* .*despesa* .*não|não.*despesa* .*prevista*|não.*
prevista* .*despesa*) "
expr_d10<- " (ausência .*entrega .*medi*|ausência .*entrega .*equi*|ausência .*
entrega .*mate*|ausência .*reci* .*entrega) "
16 expr_d11<- " ( Lei n° 9.424|Lei n° 9.394) "
expr_d12<- " (incompatí* .*FUNDEF) "
## 2 Irregular procurement
expr_i1 <- " (sem.*prévio .*empenho*) "
expr_i2 <- " ( Lei n° 4.320) "
21 expr_i3 <- " (sem.*devido* .* l i c i t a tó*|não.*devido* .* l i c i t a tó) "
expr_i4 <- " ( Lei n° 8.666) "
## 3 Over-invoicing
expr_o1 <- " (sobrepreço*) "
expr_o2 <- " (acima.*mercado*|mercado* .*acima) "
26 expr_o3 <- " (elevado* .*preço*|preço* . elevado*) "
## 4 Fraud
expr_f1 <- " (pago* .*pessoa* .*não) "
expr_f2 <- " ( servidor* .*com recursos ) "
expr_f3 <- " ( secretária .*com recursos ) "
31 expr_f4 <- " (empresas* .*agente* .*público*|agente* .*público* .*empresas*) "
expr_f5 <- " ( firma .*agente* .*público*|firmas .*agente* .*público*) "
expr_f6 <- " ( firma .*prefeito|firmas .*prefeito*) "
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expr_f7 <- " (sem.*empenho* .*notas*|não.*empenho* .*notas*|falta .*empenho* .*
notas*) "
expr_f8 <- " (não.*notas* .* f iscais|falta* .*notas* .* f iscais ) "
36 expr_f9 <- " (ausência .*notas* .* f iscais .*originais*) "
expr_f10<- " ( cláusulas* .*restri t iva*) "
expr_f11<- " ( (não|sem|falta|nenhuma|nem|ausência ) .*comprova* .*compra) "
## 5 Incomplete construction
epxr_c1 <- " (não.*constru ída*) "
41 epxr_c2 <- " (não.*realizad* .*( construçoe s| obras |construção| obra )|(
construçoe s| obras |construção| obra ) .*não.*realizad*) "
epxr_c3 <- " (não.*executad* .*( construçoe s| obras |construção| obra )|(
construçoe s| obras |construção| obra ) .*não.*executad*) "
epxr_c4 <- " (não.*constru íd* .*( construçoe s| obras |construção| obra )|(
construçoe s| obras |construção| obra ) .*não.*constru íd*) "
epxr_c5 <- " (não.*conclu íd* .*( construçoe s| obras |construção| obra )|(
construçoe s| obras |construção| obra ) .*não.*conclu íd*) "
epxr_c6 <- " (execu . ão .*parcialm*) "
46 epxr_c7 <- " ( ( recursos*| obra) .*equivale .*%|equivale .*%.*( obra| obras|
recursos*) ) "
## 6 Inexistence of documentation
epxr_t1 <- " ( ( informaçõ*|documentaçã*) .*não.*disponibi*|não.*disponibi* .*(
informaçõ*|documentaçã*) ) "
epxr_t2 <- " ( ( informaçõ*|documentaçã*) .* omissã*| omissã* .*( informaçõ*|
documentaçã*) ) "
## 7 Advanced payment
51 epxr_a1 <- " (antecipad* .*pagam*|pagam* .*antecipad*) "
### Collection of expressions
expr_all<- paste(
expr_d1,expr_d2,expr_d3,expr_d4,expr_d5,expr_d6,expr_d7,expr_d8,expr_d9,
expr_d10,expr_d11,expr_d12,
56 expr_i1,expr_i2,expr_i3,expr_i4,
expr_o1,expr_o2,expr_o3,
expr_f1,expr_f2,expr_f3,expr_f4,expr_f5,expr_f6,expr_f7,expr_f8,expr_f9,
expr_f10,expr_f11,
epxr_c1,epxr_c2,epxr_c3,epxr_c4,epxr_c5,epxr_c6,epxr_c7,
epxr_t1,epxr_t2,
61 epxr_a1,
sep="|")
### Matching lines
matches<-grep(pattern=expr_all,x=textfile)
66
### Count matching lines
length(matches)
Note: FUNDEF, engl.: Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Fundamental Educa-
tion and Teacher Enhancement, port.: Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino
Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério
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b.1 calculation of yearly deforestation rates per districts
Calculation of annual deforestation. In addition to district-level annual gross
deforestation tables, the Brazilian Space Research Center (INPE) provides the
spatial data files used to estimate gross deforestation rates for public download
on an annual basis. The data are provided in shape file format for each Land-
sat path row. In the 228 downloadable layers that cover the Brazilian Legal
Amazon (BLA) in 2012, polygons are classified into remaining forest, hydrog-
raphy, non-forest (swamps, savanna), clouds, residual, deforested and detected
in 1997, deforested and detected in 1999, deforested and detected in each year
between 2000 and 2012. INPES classification methodology of deforestation de-
tects only clear cut deforestation on areas that have never been deforested.
Forest regrowth on abandoned plots is not accounted for. For each deforested
polygon a detection date is provided which we call the end_date. To construct
annual deforestation levels from the spatial data we need to know when the
deforested polygon had last been classified as forest, we call this the start_-
date. For each deforestation polygon INPE also reports the number of years it
was covered by clouds during previous years. To define the start date for each
polygon we thus rely on the shape files provided for previous years. In Figure
B.3 polygons with different start and end dates are shown schematically. Each
of the three polygons could have been deforested at any time or gradually be-
tween its start and end date. Polygon 3, for example, spreads over 2 years, as it
has been covered by clouds in the image of 2009. We assume that the polygon
could have been deforested with the same probability at each point in the rele-
vant time frame and then aggregate the expected deforestation for each day to
estimate how much deforestation has most likely occurred between the 1st of
August and the 31st of July of each year in each district. This procedure differs
slightly from INPE’s methodology described in Câmara, de Morisson Valeri-
ano, and Vianei Soares (2006). Here it is assumed that deforestation could only
have occurred in a specific dry season for each pathrow.
The main difference between our and INPE’s approach is that we do not
calculate expected deforestation below clouds. INPE uses the cloud coverage
of each year to estimate deforestation below clouds relative to the ratio of de-
forestation to forest within a specific area. The published deforestation rates
therefore refer to detected deforestation plus expected deforestation below
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clouds. For the purpose of estimating the impact of blacklisting at a specific
date on deforestation after this date, we prefer to use raw deforestation calcu-
lated as described above. We then use cloud cover (see below) as an indicator
of measurement error in our regression. By using the official 2007 administra-
tive boundary shape file for Brazil as published by the Brazilian Institute for
Geography and Statistics (IBGE) we ensure that our deforestation estimate is
consistent across all data sources.
Figure B.4 depicts the total aggregated yearly deforestation rates per dis-
trict published by INPE and our estimation of deforestation rates. The data
processing and area calculations are conducted with PostgreSQL 9.2.3 and the
PostGIS 2.0.1 add-on. The difference between our calculated total deforesta-
tion in the BLA and the official values are the result of large cloud cover in the
early years of the observation period.
Calculation of yearly forest area. Our forest area calculations for each year
are anchored to the year 2012 based on the shape files published in the same
year. We calculate the remaining forest area in 2012. INPE only classifies cloud
coverage above the remaining forest areas. We therefore add to the calculated
forest area in 2012 area of clouds. Thereafter we subtract from our calculated
yearly deforestation rates (see above) to arrive at forest area for each year prior
to 2012. As a result forest, non-forested and deforested areas always sum up
to 100% of the district area.
Calculation of measurement (cloud) errors. Since clouds are not randomly
distributed over space and time we have to control for the fact that some defor-
estation polygons were detected only after the respective area had been under
clouds for several years. Especially in the most recent year of our time period
the cloud cover will veil some deforestation. But also between 2000 and 2005
PRODES estimates suffered from large cloud cover. We use the percentage
share of yearly cloud areas over the remaining forest area as a yearly indicator
to the measurement error of deforestation within districts.
Area calculation of protected areas. Spatial information on the protected
areas of Brazil from IBAMA as reported in Table B.1 below. We calculate pro-
tected area coverage within the districts of the BLA separately for multiple-use
reserves, strictly protected areas and indigenous territories. The information
on each protected unit comes with its respective decree number and date of
establishments. This allows us to calculate the yearly cover of protected areas
within each district for each year. We use the same time frame that applies
to our deforestation data from August to July. For example a protected area
that was established before the 31st of July 2010 will be used to calculate total
protected area per district in 2010.
Area calculation of landholdings registered within the Cadastro Ambien-
tal Rural (CAR). The spatial information on each registered landholding is
divided into definite and provisional CAR. The former comprises CAR prop-
erties that have already gone through the verification process of the States’
Special Secretariat of Environment (SEMA). Because the relative share of def-
inite CARs is rather small we rely on the total registered area. Every CAR
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registration comes with a date and/or a date of submission. We rely on this
information to calculate the total annual CAR area within districts using July
31st as cut-off date. The spatial database on CAR registrations has a large
amount of overlaying polygons. We deal with this fact by merging all CAR
registrations within each year to one single layer without overlays. The result-
ing 6 layers for the years 2007 to 2012 are then intersected with the district
layer to calculate annual CAR coverage.
b.2 parallel time trends of deforestation before treatment
Testing for pre-treatment parallel trends in deforestation. A key assump-
tion in our analysis of blacklisting effects on deforestation is that forest loss
would have followed the same trend in the blacklisted districts and the non-
blacklisted districts in the absence of blacklisting. Since our database covered
the years between 2002 and 2007, we can test whether this has been the case
before the blacklisting policy started in 2008. As per equation 3.2 we rely on
a first difference (FD) specification with log of deforestation as a dependent
variable. Specifically, we thus assume equal growth trends in deforestation
conditional on all covariates (see right panel of Figure 3.3):
E[∆ lnDit|∆Xit, ∆Bi = 1] = E[∆ lnDit|∆Xit, ∆Bi = 0] for t = {2002, . . . , 2007}
(B.1)
We use two approaches to testing for pre-treatment equality of trends. The
first test uses the full matched sample and the second (Chow’s test) compares
trends of the blacklisted with non-blacklisted subsamples (Chow, 1960).
The full sample test relies on the following model using the notation from
equations 3.1 and 3.2:
∆ lnDit = + βBi + λ1 · t+ λ2 · t ·Bi + ∆X ′it γ+ Z ′i δ+ κs + ∆εit(B.2)
for t = {2002, . . . , 2007}
The deforestation growth trend for non-blacklisted districts is given by λ1.
The trend of the blacklisted districts is the linear combination of λ1 + λ2. We
use the Wald test for linear combinations to test the null-hypotheses that or
λ1 = λ1+ λ2 or 0 = λ2. The alternative hypothesis is , which we expect to reject
if pre-treatment trends were equal.
For Chow’s test we first estimate the two models:
∆ lnDit|B=1 = + βBi + λ
1 · t+ ∆X ′it γ+ Z ′i δ+ κs + ∆εit (B.3)
∆ lnDit|B=0 = + βBi + λ
0 · t+ ∆X ′it γ+ Z ′i δ+ κs + ∆εit (B.4)
i.e., we run the same regression for blacklisted and matched non-blacklisted
subsamples. To test if the time trends of both groups are equal we implement
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a Chow test to compare the two coefficients λ1 and λ0 (Chow, 1960). In the case
of equal pre-treatment deforestation growth trends we would fail to reject the
Null-hypothesis that λ1 = λ1.
Results on the test of parallel time trends. The estimation results of equa-
tions B.2, B.3, B.4 are presented in columns 1-3 of Table B.9, respectively. Our
first test produces an F-statistic of 2.63 and we thus cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis of equal time trends with a p-value of 0.109. This means that the two
coefficients a not significantly different from each other. Our second test shows
the same result with a Chi-squared statistic of 1.30 and a p-value of 0.257. We
also restricted the samples to years between 2003 to 2007, 2004 to 2007 and
2005 to 2007, to see if our assumption also holds for a fewer years before the
blacklisting policy starts. Results are not reported as all tests produce equiva-
lent results.
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b.3 figures
Figure B.1: Blacklisted districts and the blacklist criteria
Criterion I: 
Total area deforested 
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Total area deforested 
in last 3 years 
Criterion III: 
Deforestation increase 
in 3 out of 5 past years 
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Note: The Venn diagram depicts the number of districts blacklisted and
non-blacklisted from the first published list in 2008. Counts are based on
PRODES official deforestation data. The blacklist was composed during the
year 2008, therefore we consider for the first criterion the total deforested
area until 2007. The first 36 districts with the highest deforested area fulfill
criterion I. The first 36 districts with the highest deforested area between
2005 and 2007 fulfill the second criteria. All districts that at least show
3 years with increasing deforestation rates between 2003 and 2007 fulfill
criterion III.
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Figure B.2: Forested districts of the Brazilian Legal Amazon
Note: The map shows all districts of the Brazilian Legal Amazon, defined by
INPE (771). In light grey are all districts with more than 10% forest cover in
2002 and complete information on all covariates used for the analysis (492).
In dark grey are forested districts with incomplete data on the covariates
(6).
Figure B.3: Deforestation polygons to aggregate deforestation rates
01/08/2010 01/08/2009 01/08/2011 
Polygon 1 
Polygon 2 
Polygon 3 
start_date end_date 
time 
Deforestation (2010) 
Note: Three detected deforestation polygons by satellite imagery are represented
by the closed lines. The detection date of each polygon (end_date) represents the
last date it could have been deforested. The first date an area could be deforested
(start_date) is determined by the last satellite image that determined the polygon
as forested. Annual deforestation rates are constructed by the sum of all polygons
weighted by the share of the polygons’ time frame within a given year.
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Figure B.4: Yearly total deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon
Note: The solid line shows yearly deforestation rates calculated by the IN-
PE/PRODES project for the districts of the Brazilian Legal Amazon (771).
The dashed line shows deforestation rates calculated from INPE’s shape-
files.
Figure B.5: Parallel time trend assumption and potential biases conceptually
Deforestation Deforestation 
time time 
             Blacklisted (observed) 
             Used counterfactual  
             ‘Real’ counterfactual 
             Non-blacklisted controls (observed)         
Measured 
effect 
Real 
effect Measured 
effect Real 
effect 
a. underestimation b. overestimation 
Note: Panel a. shows the case of underestimating the impact due to selection bias where the
real counterfactual of the blacklisted (had they not been treated) exhibits slower deforestation
decreases than the used counterfactual, constructed from the control districts. Panel b. depicts
the case of overestimating the impact where the real counterfactual of the treated districts
would have had faster deforestation decreases than the used counterfactual (e.g., Ashenfelter’s
dip).
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b.4 tables
Table B.1: Data sources
Variable Year(s) Source
Blacklist additions and re-
movals
2008-2012 Decree 6.321/2007 and Provision 28/2008, Pro-
vision 102, 203/2009, Provision 66,67,68/2010
, Provision 138, 139, 175/2011, Provision
187,322,323,324/2012 (Imprensa Nacional do
Brazil, 2007)
Deforestation and clouds 2002-2012 INPE (2012) - PRODES
District list and borders 2007 IBGE (2013a)
Protected areas 2002-2012 IBAMA (2013)
Indigenous areas 2002-2012 IBAMA (2013)
Settlement areas 2002-2012 INCRA (2010)
Mayors’ party affiliation 2002-2012 TSE (2015)
IPCA price deflator 2002-2012 IBGE (2013b)
Soy prices 2002-2012 IBGE (2010) - PAM
Timber prices 2002-2012 IBGE (2014) - PEVS
GDP 2002-2011 IBGE (2013)
Number of farms 2006 IBGE (2006) - Agricultural Census
Share of land owners 2006 IBGE (2006) - Agricultural Census
Land value per ha 2006 IBGE (2006) - Agricultural Census
Number of tractors 2006 IBGE (2006) - Agricultural Census
Cattle stocking rate 2006 IBGE (2006) - Agricultural Census
Population 2007 IBGE (2000)
Average distance to district
center
Nelson (2008)
Field-based law enforce-
ment inspections
2001-2012 IBAMA (2015)
Landholdings registered
within the Cadastro Ambi-
ental Rural (CAR)
2002-2012 Database provided by the Amazon Environmental
Research Institute (IPAM) in October 2013
Rural credit 2002-2012 BCB (2015)
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Table B.2: Summary statistics on regression variables
N Mean SD Min. Max.
Time variant variables
Blacklisted 5412 0.04 0.18 0 1
Cloud error [share] 5412 0.1 0.19 0 1
Deforestation [sq. km] 5412 28.3 68.82 0 1307.89
GDP per capita [R] 5412 9317.82 10439.9 1313.55 158973
Soy price [R/kg] 5412 0.13 0.28 0 1.99
Timber price [R/cu. m] 5412 91.14 90.07 0 959.98
Indigenous territory area cover [share] 5412 0.08 0.17 0 1
Multiple use protected area cover [share] 5412 0.11 0.23 0 1
Strictly protected area cover [share] 5412 0.03 0.1 0 0.72
Settlement area cover [share] 5412 0.14 0.2 0 1
Federal party affiliation 5412 0.11 0.3 0 1
Time invariant variables
Initial total deforested area [km2] 492 1087.84 1206.9 0 10253.2
District area [sq. km] 492 8667.78 15648.1 103.25 159523
Farm area [sq. km] 492 1641.25 2038.26 7.56 14576
Population density [No./sq. km] 492 21.3 97.32 0.09 1321.93
Farms density [No./sq. km] 492 0.59 0.93 0 12.3
Share of small farms 492 0.71 0.19 0.02 0.99
No. of tractors per farm 492 0.15 0.49 0 7.85
Cattle rate [No./ha] 492 1.5 2.13 0 31.94
Share of land owners [%] 492 73.34 23.17 4.49 100
Land value [R/ha] 492 1220.66 1007.49 80 7502.08
Note: Monetary figures are Million Brazilian Reais (R) deflated to 2012 prices, 1 real
corresponded to $0.56 on average in 2012 (www.oanda.com).
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Table B.3: Covariate balance before and after treatment
Mean Mean Difference Normalized
Covariate Status blacklist non-blacklist in means difference
Total deforested area in 2007 Unmatched 3937.86 966.21 2971.65 1.21
Matched 3937.86 2351.69 1586.17 0.65
Deforestation in 2005 Unmatched 141.02 14.68 126.35 1
Matched 141.02 57.41 83.62 0.66
Deforestation in 2006 Unmatched 139.28 12.69 126.59 0.91
Matched 139.28 60.36 78.92 0.56
Deforestation in 2007 Unmatched 125.55 12.28 113.27 0.75
Matched 125.55 62.11 63.44 0.42
Deforestation increases Unmatched 2.38 1.7 0.68 1.07
Matched 2.38 2.44 -0.06 -0.09
District area Unmatched 18106.38 7600.14 10506.2 0.42
Matched 18106.38 12569.2 5537.14 0.22
Forest cover in 2007 Unmatched 0.58 0.46 0.12 0.63
Matched 0.58 0.54 0.04 0.2
Population density in 2007 Unmatched 3.13 23.36 -20.23 -6.35
Matched 3.13 3.03 0.1 0.03
Farms per km2 in 2006 Unmatched 0.16 0.64 -0.49 -3.7
Matched 0.16 0.2 -0.04 -0.32
Share of small farms in 2006 Unmatched 0.64 0.72 -0.08 -0.48
Matched 0.64 0.66 -0.02 -0.13
Farm area cover in 2006 Unmatched 0.39 0.41 -0.02 -0.12
Matched 0.39 0.4 -0.02 -0.09
No. of tractors per farm in 2006 Unmatched 0.31 0.14 0.17 0.37
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Table B.4: Deforestation and blacklisted districts, full sample FD regressions
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Blacklistedit -0.803*** -0..992 -0.998***
(0.192) (0.205) (0.204)
∆ Cloud errorit -0.978*** -0.971*** -0.984***
(-0.171 -0.171 -0.171
ln Initial total deforested areai 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
ln District areai 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln Farm areai 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ln Population densityi 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ln Farms per km2i 0.022 0.022
(0.017) (0.017)
ln Share of small farmsi -0.180* -0.180*
(0.092) (0.094)
ln No. of tractors per farmi -0.085 -0.086
(0.055) (0.056)
ln Cattle ratei -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.009) (0.009)
ln Share of land ownersi 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
ln Land valuei 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
∆ ln GDP per capitait-1 -0.024
(0.133)
∆ ln Soy priceit-1 0.041
(0.116)
∆ ln Timber priceit-1 -0.059**
(0.026)
∆ Indigenous territory area coverit 0.344
(0.397)
∆ Multiple use protected area coverit -0.045
(0.392)
∆ Strictly protected area coverit -0.061
(0.28)
∆ Settlement coverit 0.731**
(0.342)
∆ Federal party affiliationit 0.007
(0.075)
Constant -0.056* 0.093 0.092
(0.034) (0.099) (0.104)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes
Observations 4920 4920 4920
Cluster 492 492 492
Adj. R-squared 0.064 0.065 0.064
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with the dependent variable being the change
in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Standard errors, clustered at district level, are
reported in parentheses. Observations are selected by a 1:1 closest neighbor matching using
inverse-variance weights, with replacement. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level
154 appendix to chapter 3
Table B.5: The effect of blacklisting after matching
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Blacklistedit -0.249 -0.276* -0.297*
(0.150) (0.153) (0.155)
∆ Cloud errorit -0.524*** -0.526*** -0.586***
(0.187) (0.192) (0.173)
ln Initial total deforested areai 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ln District areai 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
ln Farm areai -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
ln Population density i 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
ln Farms per km2i -0.098 -0.141*
(0.071) (0.073)
ln Share of small farmsi 0.019 0.001
(0.058) (0.066)
ln No. of tractors per farmi 0.012 0.006
(0.026) (0.028)
ln Cattle ratei -0.011 -0.023
(0.023) (0.021)
ln Share of land ownersi 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
ln Land valuei -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
∆ ln GDP per capitait-1 -0.011
(0.129)
∆ ln Soy priceit-1 -0.078
(0.188)
∆ ln Timber priceit-1 -0.081**
(0.039)
∆ Indigenous territory area coverit 2.207***
(0.437)
∆ Multiple use protected area coverit 0.130
(0.586)
∆ Strictly protected area coverit -0.721
(0.732)
∆ Settlement coverit 1.112
(0.884)
∆ Federal party affiliationit 0.149
(0.164)
Constant 0.129** 0.228** 0.324***
(0.061) (0.101) (0.103)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000
Cluster 76 76 76
Adj. R-squared 0.251 0.245 0.258
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with the dependent variable being the change
in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Standard errors, clustered at district level, are
reported in parentheses. Observations are selected by a 1:1 closest neighbor matching using
inverse-variance weights, with replacement. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Table B.6: The effect of blacklisting after different matching techniques
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
1:1 MD 1:1 PS 1:2 IV 1:1 IV
restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Blacklistedit -0.346** -0.444*** -0.323** -0.437***
(0.148) (0.147) (0.142) (0.161)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1000 1200 2000 1000
Cluster 88 70 95 71
Adj. R-squared 0.251 0.251 0.245 0.258
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with the dependent variable
being the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Standard errors,
clustered at district level, are reported in parentheses. Observations of column
(1) are selected by a 1:1 matching on the Mahalonobis distance. Observations of
column (2) are selected by a 1:1 matching on the propensity scores. Observations
of column (3) are selected by a 1:2 matching using inverse-variance weights.
Observations of column (4) are selected by a 1:1 matching using inverse-variance
weights based on a reduced sample of covariates (official criteria, see section
3.1). Time invariant and variant controls include first differences of the variables
reported in Table B.2. **,*** denote significance at the 5/1% level.
Table B.7: Placebo regressions on the timing of blacklisting
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
t-3 t-2 t-1 t-0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Blacklistedit-k 0.178 -0.035 -0.083 -0.297*
(0.116) (0.145) (0.153) (0.155)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000
Cluster 76 76 76 76
Adj. R-squared 0.258 0.255 0.256 0.258
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with the dependent variable
being the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Standard errors,
clustered at district level, are reported in parentheses. Observations are selected
by a 1:1 closest neighbor matching using inverse-variance weights, with replace-
ment. * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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Table B.8: The influence of covariates on mechanisms
Dependent ∆ ln No ∆ Car ∆ ln Rural
of env. area credit
Dependent fines coverage
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Cloud errorit -0.730 0.006 0.425**
(0.623) (0.011) (0.162)
∆ ln Initial total deforested areai -0.000 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln District areai -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln Farm areai 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln Population densityi 0.019 -0.000 0.026
(0.020) (0.002) (0.021)
ln Farms per km2i -0.503* -0.044* -0.324
(0.285) (0.023) (0.269)
ln Share of small farmsi -0.335 0.110*** -0.321
(0.359) (0.016) (0.220)
ln No. of tractors per farmi -0.387 0.033** -0.408**
(0.351) (0.014) (0.189)
ln Cattle ratei -0.030 0.005 0.037
(0.082) (0.004) (0.035)
ln Share of land ownersi 0.001 0.000*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
ln Land valuei -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ ln GDP per capitait-1 -0.271 -0.036*** -0.250*
(0.340) (0.011) (0.140)
∆ ln Soy priceit-1 -0.012 -0.006 0.260*
(0.594) (0.010) (0.145)
∆ ln Timber priceit-1 -0.079 -0.006* 0.008
(0.131) (0.003) (0.018)
∆ Indigenous territory area coverit 1.822* -0.084*** -2.316***
(0.908) (0.025) (0.405)
∆ Multiple use protected area coverit -0.158 0.033 0.285
(1.708) (0.044) (0.395)
∆ Strictly protected area coverit -2.824 0.136 3.527***
(3.284) (0.117) (0.862)
∆ Settlement coverit 0.630 -0.020 -0.778***
(0.563) (0.029) (0.197)
∆ Federal party affiliationit 0.316 0.033* -0.140
(0.329) (0.017) (0.224)
Constant 1.282*** -0.122*** 1.067***
(0.449) (0.023) (0.292)
Year and state effects Yes Yes Yes
Time invariant controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 500 500 500
Clusters 76 76 76
Adj. R-squared 0.102 0.523 0.145
Note: The table reports first difference. Car area coverage is measured between 0 and 1. Stan-
dard errors, clustered at district level, are reported in parentheses. Observations are selected
by a 1:1 closest neighbor matching using inverse-variance weights, with replacement. *,**,***
denote significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Table B.9: Test for pre-treatment parallel time trends
Dependent ∆ ln Deforestation
(1) (2) (3)
Blacklistedi 127.197
(78.503)
Year -0.012 -0.065*** -0.016
(0.033) (0.025) (0.026)
Blacklistedi × Year -0.063
(0.039)
State effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant controls Yes Yes
Time-variant controls Yes
Observations 500 250 250
Cluster 76 50 26
Adj. R-squared 0.156 0.154 0.149
Note: The table reports first difference estimates with the dependent vari-
able being the change in the log of yearly newly deforested area. Stan-
dard errors, clustered at district level, are reported in parentheses. Time
invariant and variant controls include first differences of the variables
reported in Table B.2. Observations are selected by a 1:1 closest neighbor
matching using inverse-variance weights, with replacement. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.

C
A P P E N D I X T O C H A P T E R 4
c.1 figures
Figure C.1: Data levels
Note: The Figure depicts different data levels. The unit of analysis - the
irregular cells - comprise data specific to its own environment. Forest con-
servation at a cell level depends on its own context and on the surrounding
context in which it belongs to, namely the reserve and district. Cell, reserve
and district characteristics serve to describe the internal and external pres-
sures each cell experiences.
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Figure C.2: Bolsa Floresta impacts by cell size exclusions and risk type
Note: Lines represent the impact the FE estimates of the BFP intervention after matching. The
Abscissa indicates the threshold of cells excluded from the sample. E.g., the value 0.2 indicates
a sample containing only cells larger or equal to 20% of the original 5 to 5 km2 grid cell used
for slicing the reserves. Sample sizes using all reserves (without differentiation on risk type)
vary between 6948 (0.05) to 4500 (1.0) units. Shaded areas correspond to a confidence interval
at 10% significance level.
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c.2 tables
Table C.1: Matching covariates of pre-treatment deforestation pressures (1)
Covariates Class Data level Driving source of
deforestation
pressure
ln Size of reserve Conservation policy Reserve Internal
Years since foundation of reserve Conservation policy Reserve Internal
Founded in 2009 Conservation policy Reserve Internal
Founded in 2008 Conservation policy Reserve Internal
Founded in 2006 or 2007 Conservation policy Reserve Internal
Founded in 2005 and before Conservation policy Reserve Internal
Percentage area from original grid Cell Natural,
conservation policy
Cell Internal, external
Perc. deforestation in 2003 Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
Perc. deforestation in 2004 Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
Perc. deforestation in 2005 Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
Perc. deforestation in 2006 Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
Perc. deforested area in 2006 Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
Inital forest coverage in 2006 Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
Non-forest coverage Natural Cell Internal, external
Hydrography coverage Natural Cell Internal, external
ln Distance to next roads Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
ln Distance to next city Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
ln Distance to next river Natural, economic Cell Internal, external
Agricultural land use coverage in 2008 Economic Cell Internal
Mixed land use coverage in 2008 Economic Cell Internal
Secondary vegetation coverage in 2008 Economic Cell Internal
Pasture coverage in 2008 Economic Cell Internal
Urban area coverage in 2008 Economic Cell Internal
Note: Together with table C.2 below, this table reports the covariates used for the matching procedure described
in section 4.5.2. The covariates are used to find similar control units for the treated grid cells of the Bolsa Floresta
Program.
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Table C.2: Matching covariates of pre-treatment deforestation pressures (2)
Covariates Class Data level Driving source of
deforestation
pressure
ln Total no. of fires (2003-06) Economic Cell Internal, external
Land speculation coverage Economic Cell External
ln Distance to multiple-use reserve
boundary
Conservation policy Cell External
ln Distance to next indigenous reserve Conservation policy Cell External
ln Distance to next strictly protected
reserve
Conservation policy Cell External
Settlement project coverage Conservation policy Cell Internal
District population density in 2007 Economic District External
ln District GDP per capita in 2006 Economic District External
ln District Agric. GDP per capita in 2006 Economic District External
District farm coverage Economic District External
District share of small farms Economic District External
ln District tractors per farm Economic District External
District av. timber price (2003-06) Economic District External
Neigh. perc. deforestation in 2003 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. perc. deforestation in 2004 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. perc. deforestation in 2005 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. perc. deforestation in 2006 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. forest coverage in 2006 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. hydrography coverage Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. settlement project coverage in 2006 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. mixed land use coverage in 2008 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. agric. land use coverage in 2008 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. secondary vegetation coverage in
2008
Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. pasture coverage in 2008 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Neigh. urban area coverage in 2008 Spatial setting Cell Internal
Note: Together with table C.1 above, this table reports the covariates used for the matching procedure described
in section 4.5.2. The covariates are used to find similar control units for the treated grid Cells of the Bolsa Floresta
Program.
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Table C.3: Summary statistics of matching covariates
Mean St.dev Median Min Max
ln Size of reserve 22.73 1.10 22.77 15.08 24.60
Years since foundation of reserve 4.81 7.11 1.00 -3.00 44.00
Founded in 2006 or 2007 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
Founded in 2005 and before 0.60 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00
Founded in 2008 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00
Founded in 2009 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00
Percentage area from original grid cell [%] 83.61 28.33 100.00 5.00 100.00
Perc. deforestation in 2003 [%] 0.17 0.90 0.00 0.00 39.33
Perc. deforestation in 2004 [%] 0.17 0.91 0.00 0.00 27.73
Perc. deforestation in 2005 [%] 0.09 0.54 0.00 0.00 14.98
Perc. deforestation in 2006 [%] 0.10 0.65 0.00 0.00 19.22
Perc. deforested area in 2006 [%] 3.55 11.79 0.00 0.00 101.01
Initial forest coverage in 2006 [%] 89.76 22.60 100.00 0.00 100.00
Non-forest coverage [%] 4.03 15.66 0.00 0.00 100.00
Hydrography coverage [%] 2.54 10.00 0.00 0.00 99.92
ln Distance to next roads 10.41 1.25 10.71 1.65 12.47
ln Distance to next city 11.18 0.71 11.31 5.13 12.62
ln Distance to next river 9.54 1.51 9.95 -0.62 12.21
Agricultural land use coverage in 2008 [%] 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 5.73
Mixed land use coverage in 2008 [%] 0.26 2.02 0.00 0.00 67.34
Secondary vegetation coverage in 2008 [%] 1.45 4.89 0.00 0.00 72.64
Pasture coverage in 2008 [%] 1.58 7.16 0.00 0.00 99.96
Urban area coverage in 2008 [%] 0.05 1.28 0.00 0.00 70.63
ln Total no. of fires (2003-06) 0.43 0.91 0.00 0.00 5.02
Land speculation coverage [%] 18.91 35.27 0.00 0.00 100.00
ln Distance to multiple-use reserve boundary 8.94 1.76 9.04 0.09 12.48
ln Distance to next indigenous reserve 10.94 1.16 11.24 0.42 12.61
ln Distance to next strictly protected reserve 10.78 1.35 11.08 0.01 12.77
Settlement project coverage [%] 22.00 41.45 0.00 0.00 200.00
District population density in 2007 [per ha] 4.93 30.35 0.95 0.09 1156.36
ln District GDP per capita in 2006 [Reais] 8.76 0.59 8.61 7.49 10.73
ln District Agric. GDP per capita in 2006 [Reais] -1.36 1.43 -0.98 -6.97 3.28
District farm coverage [%] 9.77 16.07 5.07 0.06 170.06
District share of small farms 0.63 0.21 0.64 0.10 0.99
ln District tractors per farm 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.00 1.09
District av. timber price (2003-06) [Reais] 291.11 247.69 219.62 0.00 1554.57
Neigh. perc. deforestation in 2003 [%] 0.23 0.72 0.00 0.00 12.15
Neigh. perc. deforestation in 2004 [%] 0.23 0.75 0.00 0.00 12.29
Neigh. perc. deforestation in 2005 [%] 0.12 0.41 0.00 0.00 8.20
Neigh. perc. deforestation in 2006 [%] 0.14 0.53 0.00 0.00 9.30
Neigh. forest coverage in 2006 [%] 88.26 21.54 98.41 0.00 100.00
Neigh. hydrography coverage [%] 2.91 8.55 0.00 0.00 92.39
Neigh. settlement project coverage in 2006 [%] 17.57 34.61 0.00 0.00 200.00
Neigh. Mixed land use coverage in 2008 [%] 0.28 1.71 0.00 0.00 55.29
Neigh. agric land use coverage in 2008 [%] 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.00 8.74
Neigh. secondary vegetation coverage in 2008 [%] 1.50 3.65 0.12 0.00 45.61
Neigh. pasture coverage in 2008 [%] 2.17 7.25 0.00 0.00 72.24
Neigh. urban area coverage in 2008 [%] 0.07 1.34 0.00 0.00 68.79
Note: Statistics refer to 3,474 treated BFP cells and 3,474 matched control cells.
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Table C.4: Panel summary statistics of matched covariates
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Deforestation Mean 0.54 0.25 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.36 0.10 0.07
[ha] St.dev 3.62 2.11 0.76 0.83 1.60 1.38 1.75 2.51 0.98 0.81
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 167.25 121.72 26.82 36.80 31.23 40.44 64.84 55.14 27.89 23.48
Cloud error Mean 6.03 7.34 3.89 2.75 7.64 2.69 2.49 7.74 1.33 9.60
[%] St.dev 15.13 16.87 11.57 9.26 18.63 10.31 10.84 16.42 7.60 18.12
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 89.95 89.83 89.89 89.00 89.56 88.47 89.76 89.95 89.84 89.97
GDP p. capita Mean 4475.98 6204.31 5942.53 5904.91 5913.75 6628.93 6490.78 6851.22 6704.91 8048.02
[Reais] St.dev 3101.65 3469.25 3750.45 4238.84 4714.58 5234.29 5088.91 5624.79 4945.00 5853.84
Min 2170.94 2656.09 2460.57 2434.31 2222.81 3247.32 3436.96 3888.64 3722.18 4718.39
Max 18654.93 20268.91 20868.54 23606.85 23706.24 25921.85 27173.99 29384.24 28923.68 33176.04
GDP p. capita Mean 0.51 0.87 0.75 0.62 0.42 0.46 0.43 0.35 0.35 0.52
in agric. St.dev 0.52 0.76 0.69 0.62 0.80 0.79 0.75 0.47 0.54 0.72
[Reais] Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Max 3.05 3.70 3.34 3.03 4.98 4.71 4.56 2.75 3.34 3.55
Timber price Mean 48.27 15.19 19.92 18.22 20.71 20.53 22.23 22.19 19.87 28.06
[Reais] St.dev 47.80 16.29 17.90 16.37 18.34 18.19 19.42 19.02 18.24 11.97
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 98.13 64.67 58.51 53.53 56.69 56.29 71.62 69.18 64.68 50.75
Note: Statistics refer to 3474 treated BFP cells and 3474 matched control cells.
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Table C.5: Bolsa Florsta program start by reserves
Reserve Year of BFP start Yearly average Total deforestation
(Aug-Jul) deforestation after after BFP start [ha]
BFP start [ha]
APA Rio Negro 2010 81.75 245.26
RDS do Rio Negro 2009 132.04 528.17
FE de Maués 2008 65.63 328.15
RDS Canumã 2009 7.86 31.44
RDS Uacari 2008 8.70 43.50
RDS Rio Amapá 2009 0.00 0.00
RDS do Uatumã 2008 100.16 500.80
RDS Amanã 2009 77.56 310.23
RDS Rio Madeira 2008 54.08 270.38
RDS do Juma 2008 48.92 244.60
RDS Mamirauá 2008 16.64 83.22
RDS Cujubim 2008 22.87 114.35
RDS Piagaçu-Purus 2008 30.21 151.05
RESEX do Rio Gregório 2009 30.10 120.41
RESEX Catuá-Ipixuna 2008 13.29 66.45
Total 3038.02
Note: Years are based on the August to July time-frame according to INPEs deforesta-
tion monitoring system. Information is based on FAS data. APA (Environmental Pro-
tection Area), RESEX (Extractive Reserve), RDS (Sustainable Development Reserve),
and FE (State Forest) are subtypes of the multiple-use reserve category.
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Table C.6: Bolsa Floresta effects by reserve
Dependent ln Deforestation ln Forest degradation ln No. of fires
w.FE w.FE RE w.FE w.FE RE w.FE w.FE RE
Risk FE P.def. c.s. Tobit FE P.def. c.s. Tobit FE P.def. c.s. Tobit
group Reserve (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
H
iR
&
H
eR
RDS Canumã
RDS do Rio Negro + + + +
RDS do Juma - - + - - + - + + +
FE de Maués + + +
RDS Rio Madeira + + + + +
H
iR
&
Le
R RESEX Catuá-Ipixuna - - - - - -
RESEX do Rio Gregório +
Li
R
&
H
eR RDS do Uatumã
RDS Mamirauá + +
Li
R
&
Le
R
APA do Rio Negro + + + + - - -
RDS Piagaçu-Purus - - + + + +
RDS Amanã - - - - - - + + + +
RDS Uacari - - - -
RDS Cujubim + + + + + +
RDS Rio Amapá + + + + +
Note: The Table reports the significant results of fixed effects estimates using different dependent variables. The first row
reports estimates on the full matched sample of cells across all BFP reserves. Rows 2 to 5 report estimates on sub-groups.
Internal and external risks refer to the ratio of deforestation between 2003 and 2006 over forest cover in 2002 within reserves
and in 20 km buffer zones around reserves (excluding water areas and other reserve areas). High and low groups are
defined as the upper and lower part of an ordered sample. The 7 reserves with the highest internal ratio of deforestation
classify as ’high internal risk’. The 7 reserves with the highest external ration of deforestation classify as ’high external risk’.
Positive (negative) signs indicate significant positive (negative) coefficients at a minimum 10% level. Missing signs indicate
to insignificant estimates. APA (Environmental Protection Area), RESEX (Extractive Reserve), RDS (Sustainable Development
Reserve), and FE (State Forest) are subtypes of the multiple-use reserve category.
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c.3 fixed effects transformation
The fixed effects estimator:
l˜nDefirdt = C˜ ′it β+ γ P˜ESrt + D˜
′
dt δ+ η˜t + ε˜irdt
is constructed as the subtraction of the full data model:
lnDefirdt = C ′it β+ γPESrt + D
′
dt δ+ µi + κr + σd + ηt + εirdt
from its time demeaned data:
lnDefird = C
′
i β+ γPESr + D
′
d δ+ µi + κr + σd + η+ εird
where:
lnDefird = T−1
T∑
t=1
lnDefirdt
C ′i = T
−1
T∑
t=1
C ′it
PES
′
i = T
−1
T∑
t=1
PES ′it
D ′i = T
−1
T∑
t=1
D ′it
µi = T
−1
T∑
t=1
µi = µi
κr = T
−1
T∑
t=1
κr = κr
σd = T
−1
T∑
t=1
σd = σd
for all groups i.
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c.4 spatial data processing with postgis
All spatial data measurements are constructed with PostgreSQL 9.2.3 and the
PostGIS 2.0. Examples include layers of polygons, lines and points. Distances
between individual cells and line objects such as rivers, roads, reserve bound-
aries, etc. are constructed as direct lines from the center point of a cell to the
nearest line-fragment of the respective object (see Listing C.1). Distances be-
tween individual cells and point objects (e.g., district capitals) are constructed
as direct lines from the center point of a cell to the nearest point (see List-
ing C.2). To calculate distances to polygons, the object has to be converted into
lines first (see Listing C.3). Area calculations, like deforestation within cells are
based on the intersection of the two layers. An efficient computation of areas
with an intersection is exemplified in Listing C.4.
Listing C.1: Distance calculation from small polygon to line object
drop table if exists new_object ;
2 with
dist_to as
(
select
gid, --identifier of line_object
7 (
st_dump( --dump line_object into its single elements
st_simplify(geom,0.04) --simplify lines to reduce computation
)
).geom as geom from line_object
12 )
select
l.aid,
min(
st_length(
17 geography(
ST_ShortestLine(p.centroid,l.geom) --constructs shortest line (
centroid point already exist)
)
)
) as distance
22 into
new_object
from
polygon_object p,
dist_to l
27 group by
p.aid --line identifier
;
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Listing C.2: Distance calculation from small polygon to point object
1 drop table if exists new_object ;
create table new_object as
select
p.aid, --polygon identifier
min(
6 st_length(
geography( --converstion to meter with WGS84 projection
ST_ShortestLine(p.centroid,c.geom) --beeline
)
)
11 ) as distance
from
polygon_object p,
(select st_snapToGrid(geom,0.0005) as geom from cit001) c --simplify
coordinates of point layer
where
16 st_dwithin(c.geom,p.centroid,4.1) --with 4.1 degrees being the highest
distance
group by
p.aid ;
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Listing C.3: Distance calculation from small polygon to polygon set
drop table if exists new_object ;
2 with
dist_to as
(
select
gid,
7 st_exteriorRing( --converting polygons to boundary lines ignoring holes/
interior rings
(st_dump(
st_simplify(geom,0.04)
)
).geom
12 ) as geom from target_polygon
)
select
g.aid,
min(st_length(geography(ST_ShortestLine(g.centroid,r.geom)))) as distance
17 into
new_object
from
polygon g,
dist_to r
22 group by g.aid ;
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Listing C.4: Instersection of deforestation layer with cells
drop table if exists new_intersect ;
create table new_intersect as
3 select
g.aid, --cell identifier
p.def, --land class dummy on deforestation
p.floresta, --land class dummy for forest
p.hidrografia, --land class dummy for hydrography
8 p.nao_floresta, --land class dummy for not-forest area (savanna, swamps)
p.residuo, --land class dummy for residual areas
p.nuvem, --land class dummy for clouds
p.nid, --PRODES identifier
p.year3112,
13 p.lag_p, --passe years since the polygon was observed (without cloud
cover) as forest
p.tstart_p, --constructed date where polygon was last detected as forest
p.tend_p, --date of satellite image that classified polygon as deforested
case --do not intersect if the PRODES polygon is fully contained within a
cell
when st_coveredby(p.geom,g.geom) then
18 st_area(geography(p.geom)) --calculate area
else
st_area(geography(st_intersection(p.geom,g.geom))) --intersect and
calculate area
end as prodes2012_area
from
23 prodes2012 p --polygon layer constructed from the downloadable PRODES
layer database
inner join
cells g
ON (
p.geom && g.geom and not --intersect bounding boxes first to reduce
computation time
28 st_touches(p.geom,g.geom) --do not intersect polygons that would result
in a line only.
) ;
Note: The PRODES vector data on all land classes (forest, deforested, hydrography, residual,
clouds, not forest) can be downloaded by satellite pathrow (INPE, 2012).
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